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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
This thesis consists of two parts. The first part deals with the 
study of equilibrium points of bimatnx games while in the second part 
arbitration games are investigated. Consequently, cooperative as well 
as non-cooperative two-person games are considered. In a cooperative game 
the players beeing free to communicate and to make binding argreements, 
whereas in a non-cooperative game preplay communication between the 
players is forbidden. 
Traditionally, the study of two-person non-cooperative games in nor­
mal form is based on the equilibrium point concept (Nash [1950J), where 
an equilibrium point of a game is a pair of strategies, one for each 
player, with the property that no player can gain by deviating. Unfor­
tunately, the equilibrium point concept has several disadvantages, 
because, in general, equilibria are not unique, they are not interchange­
able and not Pareto optimal. In the literature, we come across several 
ways to handle this problem. 
1. One tries to find a procedure for selecting a particular equilibrium 
point which can serve as a solution of the game; as an example we think 
of the tracing-procedure of Harsanyi [1975]. 
2. One considers equilibrium points with additional (nice) properties; 
this, for instance, was done by Wu Wen-tsun and Jiang Jia-he [1962] 
(essential equilibrium points), Selten [1975] (perfect equilibria), 
Harsanyi [1973a,b] ((quasi-)strong equilibrium points) and Myerson 
Γ197Θ] (proper equilibria). 
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3. One studies classes of games of a certain type,- this was dono by 
Nash Γ1951] (solvable games), Banberg [1968] (U-Spiele) and Opitz [1968] 
(Konkurrenz-Spiele). 
In spite of the drawbacks mentioned above, we study the (structure 
of the) set of equilibrium points of a (finite) two-person game in nor­
mal form in the first part of this thesis. Our motives for doing so are 
the following. Firstly, we expect that knowing the structure of the 
equilibrium point set can be valuable for those who are working along 
the lines described above. As far as this thesis is concerned this 
appears to be true at the point wnere we use our knowledge about the 
set of equilibria to deduce properties of so-called regular and stable 
equilibrium points. Secondly, we are able to give short proofs of several 
known facts by restricting our general results to more specific situations. 
Finally, it is mathematically interesting to generalize results for zero-
sum ganes to nonzero-sum games. 
In the second part of this thesis, we nodel, à la Nash Γ1953] and 
Raiffa [1953J, a two-person cooperative game as a non-cooperative game, 
called arbitration game. It appears that the equilibrium points of such 
games indeed have the three nice properties mentioned before. So for 
this class of games the equilibrium point concept is not a questionable 
one. 
The organization of this thesis is as follows. In the first chapter 
we survey some basic results from the theory of games, the theory of 
multifunctions and the theory concerning the linear complementarity 
problem. 
In chapter II, maximal Nash subsets are studied in order to show 
that the set of equilibrium points of a bimatrix game is the finite 
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union of all such subsots. It appears tnat a maximal Nash subset is the 
Cartesian product of two convex polytopes. The extreme points of these 
polytopes are characterized in terms of square submatnces of the pay-
off matrices. In addition, dimension relations are derived for these 
polytopes. 
Chapter III deals with regular equilibrium points of bimatnx games. 
Using properties of such equilibrium points, we are able to give short 
proofs of some known facts about completely mixed bimatnx games and 
bimatnx games with a unique equilibrium point. We prove that a bimatrix 
game with a convex equilibrium point set or with a finite number of 
equilibrium points has a regular equilibrium point. It is still an un-
solved problem wnether each bimatnx game has a regular equilibrium 
point. We will show, moreover, that the class of all mxn-bimatnx games 
(m,n ( JN) for which all the equilibrium points are regular, is an open 
and dense subset of the class of all mxn-bimatnx games. Also stable 
equilibrium points are investigated, where an equilibrium point of a 
bimatnx game is stable if, roughly speaking, all bimatnx games in a 
neighbourhood of the game in question nave an equilibrium point close 
to it. It is shown that a stable equilibrium point of a bimatnx game 
is always a (relative) boundary point of some maximal Nash subset and 
that a regular and isolated equilibrium point is stable. Finally, it 
turns out that each stable bimatnx game has an odd number of equili-
brium points. 
In chapter IV, we consider bounded semi-infinite bimatnx games 
with a non-empty equilibrium point set and investigate the structure 
of this latter set. As m the finite case, this set is the union of the 
maximal Nash subsets. An example is given that, in the semi-infmite 
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case, the number of maximal Nash subsets may be (countably) infinite. 
Furthermore, with an extreme strategy of the second player we associate 
a square submatnx of the payoff matrix of the first player and we 
relate the set of equilibrium points of a bounded semi-infmite bimatnx 
game and the equilibria of the finite subgames. 
In chapter V, a paper of Vilkas is critically discussed. Next, the 
value set of certain subfamilies of the family of bounded measurable two-
person games in normal form, is characterized by three properties. Also, 
two systems of properties characterizing the equilibrium point set of a 
bimatnx game are given. 
Chapter VI deals with bargaining pairs and bargaining solutions. We 
show that most of the bargaining solutions, proposed in the literature, 
are upper semicontinuous. We give four conditions on bargaining pairs, 
each of them guaranteeing that every upper semicontinuous solution is 
in fact continuous in the corresponding bargaining pair. Also lower 
semicontinuous weak solutions are investigated. 
In chapter VII, two-person games in normal form are considered, 
where the players may correlate their strategies and where the problem 
arises, which Pareto optimal point in the payoff region to choose. We 
suppose, following Nash [1953] and Raiffa Γ1953], that the players solve 
this problem with the aid of an arbitrator by delivering a threat 
strategy, one for each player. Then, with the help of an arbitration 
function, the arbitrator assigns a Pareto point to the payoff point 
corresponding to these threat strategies. This situation corresponds, 
essentially, to a non-cooperative game, called arbitration game. In 
order to show the existence of value and (ε-)optimal threat strategies 
of arbitration games, we introduce a family of so-called dummy zero-sum 
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games. This new approach utilizes the zero-sum-like character of arbi­
tration games in a suitable way. Also, for two classes of arbitration 
games, the existence of the arbitration value is proved by approximating 
those games by sequences of subgames for which it is known that the 
arbitration value exists. 
In chapter VIII it is shown that, for an arbitration game where the 
underlying game is a bimatnx game, the optimal threat strategy spaces 
of the players are polytopes. Furthermore, a multifunction is introduced 
which is useful in finding good approximations of the value and optimal 
threat strategies for such arbitration games. 
In the final chapter we study - for arbitration games - the effect 
on value and (ε-)optimal threat strategies of perturbations of the game 
parameters such as payoff functions and arbitration functions. One main 
result is that the arbitration value depends on the payoff functions in 
an upper semicontinuous manner if the underlying bargaining solution 
is upper semicontinuous. It also turns out that an optimal threat stra­
tegy for a disturbed game is an almost optimal one for the original 
game, if the perturbation is small. 
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NOTATION 
1. For a finite set S, |s| is the number of elements of S. 
2. If m t W, then U .= {1,2,...fm}. W ·=υ. 
m «> 
3. К := Ж υ {-«",00) . For each cc Ж, c + I» = <"> + c = » , c + (-<») = (-<») + с = -<=. 
4. The elenents of the standard basis of Ж (m TN) are denoted by 
e.,e„,...,e and 1 .=(1,1,...,1)сЖ . If no confusion is possible, 
ι ζ ш ш 
then we also write 1 instead of 1 . 
m 
The i-th coordinate of a vector χ Í Ж is denoted by χ or (x) . 
•' 1 1 
For x,y с Ш we write χ > у if χ > у, for all ι -. К and χ > у iff χ > у , 
•' * ι •" m
 1
 i - Ί 
for all. ι t И . 
m 
If x<= Ш т, then, for p t | 1 , » ) , | | x | | := І ^ 1 | х і | р and 
| |x! |œ :=max {|х | } . 
le И 
m 
m , m For x , y É m , <x,y>:=L . х у . 1=1 ι-1! 
The elements of S ·= {χ с Ж ; χ а О, Σ ,χ = 1} (m с TJ) are called 
1=1 ι 
probability vectors (of length m). 
2 2 
5. If x,y с Ж , then {χ,у] :={λχ+ (l-X)yc Ж ; λ f [0,1]} denotes the line 
segment between χ and y. 
6. Let m с U, η f M L ί30} . An mxn-matrix with the real number a in the 
ID 
(i,l)-th cell is denoted by [a 1 ,. The element in the (i,])-th 
i] i=l,D=1 
cell of a matrix A is denoted by a 
ID 
The transpose of a matrix A is denoted by A . The rank (determinant) 
of a matrix A is denoted by rank A (det A). 
If A is an mxn-matrix, then ||A|I :=max {la I ; ι e U , D <- И Ϊ -
и ию ID m η 
W is the set of all real mxn-matrices. J :=[ll . .. 
mxn mxn i=l,D=1 
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If А,В ' ZM , then Л > В means that a > b , for each ι f U and each 
mxn i] 13 m 
і с И . 
η 
Elements of И are called ветг-гпГгпгсе matrices of size mx=°. 
mx"» 
We say that a matrix A ' M is bounded if there is а с f 3R, such 
mx» 
that la I < c, for all ι f К and τ t И. 
1
 ij ' m 
7. If X is a non-empty set, then e (χ f X) is the (degenerate) proba­
bility measure on X with all mass in x. 
8. £ is the set of infinite sequences x= (χ.,χ.,...) for which 
Ы1 = d K l
< c o
· 
9. If S is a subset of some real vector space, then we write conv(S) 
and aff(S) for the convex hull of S and the affine hull of S, respec­
tively. 
10. If S is a subset of some topological space, then cl(S) denotes the 
closure of S. 
11. If С is a convex subset of some real vector space, then the set of 
extreme points of С is denoted by ext(C). The dimension of (the affine 
hull of) С is denoted by dim(C). By relint(C) we mean the relative 
interior of C. 
12. We write δ = 1 . i f , (I,T)(XJ) for the Kronecker delta. 
1] I. 0 1 ji ] 
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PART I 
EQUILIBRIA OF TWO-PERSON GAMES IN NORMAL FORM 
17 
CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARIES 
§1. DEFINITIONS AND WELL-KNOWN FACTS 
In this section, we introduce a number of well-known concepts in 
game theory. 
DEFINITION 1.1.4 two-person game (in normal form) is an ordered qua­
druplet Γ= <X,Y,K.,K7>, in which X and Y are non-empty sets and 
К : χχ Y->-]Ris, for if {1,2}, a function on the Cartesian product of 
X and Y. The sets X and Y are called the strategy spaces of player 1 
and player 2, respectively. The elements of X and Y are called strate­
gies. К is the payoff function of player ic {1,2}. 
Such a (non-cooperative) game Г is played as follows. The players 
1 and 2 choose, independently of each other, an χ e X and а у с Y, res­
pectively; subsequently, player ic {1,2} recieves a reward К (χ,у). 
In the study of non-cooperative games the notion of equilibrium 
point plays a central role, where an equilibrium point of a game is a 
pair of strategies, one for each player, from which no player can gain 
by deviating. 
DEFINITION 1.2. Let Γ=<Χ,Υ,Κ ,K2> be a two-person game. A pair 
(x ,y ) с χ χ γ is called an equvlzbrvum рогпЬ of the game Г (cf. Nash 
[1950a]) if 
* * -k it -к -k 
K. (x ,y ) = max Κ (χ,у ) and Κ. (χ ,у ) = max Κ-, (χ ,у) . 
1
 хеХ
 1
 ¿
 yCY ¿ 
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The set of equilibrium points of the game Γ is denoted by Ε(Γ). 
More generally, for a two-oerson game Γ=<x,Y,K.,K->, a pair 
(x,y) с χχ Y is called an (F. ,£„) -equilib^iun point ((г.,ε.) > 0) of tae 
game Γ if 
K, (x,y) > sup K. (x,y) - f. and K_(x,y) >sup К (x,y) - ε.. 
1
 X( X 1 1 ¿ yf γ ¿ ¿ 
An (ε,ε)-equilibrium point is also called an e-equilibriwn point. The 
(ε1,ε2) 
set of (ε.,ε_)-equilibrium ooints of the game Γ is denoted by Ε (Γ) 
and Ε ε Γ ) :=E ( e' C ) (Γ) . 
If one allows the players of a game Γ=<x,Y,K.,K_> to randomize 
between their strategies, then these players are, in fact, playing a 
new game Γ=<P,Q,E1,E2>, where Ρ (Q) is a non-empty family of probability 
measures on the measure space <X,\> (<Y,V>) (where X (У) is some σ-
algebra of'subsets of X (Y)) and where, for ie {1,2}, 
Ε (μ,ν)=/.'Κ (χ,y) dp(x) dv(y), for all (p,v)rPxQ. (1.1) 
We call Г a mixed extension of Г if 
(1) {x}£X, for all xeX, and {у} с V, for all у e Y, 
(2) e с Ρ, for all χ e X, and e e Q, for all γ e Y, 
χ Y 
(3) Ρ and Q are convex sets, 
(4) for ie {1,2}, К is Xx^-measurable and μχν-integrable, for all 
(μ,ν) r Ρ x Q. 
EXAMPLE 1.3. Let Γ = <X,Υ,Κ.,Κ^ be a two-person game. Let 
P.. := convie ; χ e Χ} and P,
r
:=conv{e ; y e γ} . 
X x Y y J 
The game <P ,Ρ ,Ε ,Ε >, where the payoff functions E. and E, are defined 
as in (1.1), is called the finite mixed extension of the game Γ. 
EXAMPLE 1.4. Let Γ=<X,Υ,Κ.,K2> be a continuous game on the square,i.e. 
(i) X and Y are compact metric spaces and 
(n) K. and K_ are continuous functions on χ χ γ. 
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The class of continuous games on the square Χ χ Y will be denoted by 
C(X,Y). Let ρ (Ρ ) be the family of probability measures on the Borei 
subsets of X (Y). For а Γ C(X,Y), the game <P ,P ,E.,E2> is a mixed 
extension of Γ, where E and E are defined as in (1.1) . 
Now we restrict our attention to the important subclass of those 
two-person games for which the players' interests are strictly opposed. 
DEFINITION 1.5. A two-person game Γ=<X,Y,K.,K2> is called a zero-sum 
gave if К.+К =0. In that case, Г is also denoted by the triplet 
<X,Y,K>, where К := Kj =-K . 
DEFINITION 1.6. For a two-person zero-sum game Γ=<Χ,Υ,Κ>, 
va 1 (") := sup m f K(x,y) 
X X y-Y 
is called the Lower value of Γ and 
аІ(Г) := inf sup K(x,y) 
y Υ Χ'Χ 
the upper value of Γ. Evidently, аІ(Г) < а1(Г). 
If val (Γ) = аІ(Г) , then we say that Γ is strictly deterrrrined and we call 
аІ(Г) .= val (Γ) or, shortly, v P ) the Valve of the game Γ. 
For a strictly determined game Γ, the elements of 
0. (Γ) := {x* с X; K(x ,y) > ν(Γ) , for each у f Y} and 
0 2 С) := {у* < Y; K(x,y*) < v(~), for each χ e χ} 
are called optinal strategies of player 1 and player 2, respectively. 
DEFINITION 1.7. Let "=<X,Y,K> be a strictly determined game with 
ν(Γ) ( IR and let ε > 0 . The elements of 
Oj (Γ) := {xF < X; K(xe,y) •> ν(Γ) - t , for each y ε Y} and 
OjtD := {y£ t Y; K(x,y':) < (Г) + ε , for each χ f χ} 
are called с—optimal strategies of player 1 and player 2, respectively. 
In the next theorem, for zero-sum games, the relation between 
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(L-)equilibrium points and (ε-)optimal strategies is described. 
THEOREM 1.8. Let Γ = <χ,γ,κ> be a zero-s^m two-person game. Then 
(1) Γ ¿s strictly doler^-Lned and ν(Γ) ,_ Ж, iff ΕΓ(Γ) φ φ, for all г > 0. 
(2) Г is strictly deternincd and Ο (Γ) ¿φ, for ie {1,2}, iff Ε(Γ) ¿φ. 
(3) If " is strictly аеъегтіъпеа avd (Г) r IR, then, for all t > 0, 
О^(Г) ХО^Г) сЕ2Е-(Г) С О ^ ( Г ) Х02 Е(Г). 
PROOF. The proof of (1) can be found in Ti^s Г1977]. The proof of (2) 
has been given by Vorobev [1964]. The proof of (3) is left to the 
reader. [, 
§2. MULTIFUNCTIONS 
Before we consider some special classes of games in more detail, we 
collect here some properties of multifunctions used in this thesis. For 
a more detailed account, we refer to Hildenbrand [1974]. 
DEFINITION 2.1. A multifunction F from a set S into a set Τ is a map 
which associates with each point of S a non-empty subset of T. Equi-
valently, F can be viewed as a map from the set S into the power set of T. 
Before we introduce several continuity concepts for multifunctions, 
Τ 
we introduce a metric d„ (the Hausdorf f-metric) on the collection 2 of 
Η 
non-empty closed subsets of a compact metric space (T,d). For any 
X,Y r 2 T, let 
d (Χ,Υ) := inf {e > 0; XcU (Y) , YrU (X)}, 
Η с ε 
where U (X) := it ε Τ; there exists an χ с X such that d(x,t) <ε} denotes 
Τ the ε-neighbourhood of X. Note that (2 ,d ) is a compact metric space. 
Let S and Τ be metric spaces. 
Τ 
DEFINITION 2.2. A map F. S ->• 2 is called upper sermcontbnuous at s f S 
21 
if, corresponding to each e > 0, there exists a neighbourhood V of s 
such that F(s) с U (F(s )), for all s tV. 
с о 
Τ , . . 
A mapping F: S -»• 2 is called LOWev semioontbnuous at s L S if, corres­
ponding to each г > 0, there exists a neighbourhood V of s such that 
F(s ) с и (F(s) ) , for all s ' V. 
ο ε 
Τ 
REMARK 2.3. It can be proved that F: S -* 2 is continuous (with respect 
to the metric d ) if and only if, for each s с S, F is both upper and 
lower semicontinuous at s. 
DEFINITION 2.4. A multifunction F from S into Τ is called closed if the 
graph {(s,t)cSxT; tcF(s)} of F is closed in Χ χ Y. 
The following equivalence will be used frequently. 
THEOREM 2.5. Let s be a metvie space and let Τ be a oompaat теі гс spa^e. 
Τ 
A map F: S •* 2 is upper semieontinuous at s t S if and only if for 
every sequence (s.jt.),(s ,t 2 ) , . . . in S χ Τ such that lim (s ,t ) = (s,t) 
n-H» 
and t ι F (s ) , f ο·» each η с U , it follows that t с F(s) . 
COROLLARY 2.6. Jƒ s is a metric space and τ is a compact metric space, 
Τ 
them a map F: S -»- 2 is upper semicontinuous at s с S> for all s ' Sj if 
and only if F is closed. 
For a multifunction F from S into S, we call an element se S a 
fixed point of F if s с F(s). In 1941, S. Kakutani proved the following 
fixed point theorem for multifunctions. 
THEOREM 2.7. Let s be a non-empty compact convex subset of Ж . Then a 
s 
multi f unction F: s *• 2 possesses a fixed point if 
(1) F is upper semicontinuous, and 
(2) F(s) is convex, for all s e s . 
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§3. BIMATRIX GAMES 
In this section, we restrict our attention to the class of bimatrix 
games. 
DEFINITION 3.1. Let A = [a ] m. ", and В = [b ] ", " be real mxn-
i] i=l,]=l 13 1=1,3=1 
matrices. The two-person game in normal form <S ,S ,E ,E->, with for 
'l'"2 
(p,q) f S m x S n , 
n
 - t . 
~ " - and 
Ejtpjq) : = Σ 1 = 1 Σ ^ Ρ^^Ч^ = Р^Я. · 
E2(p,q) :=pBq , 
is called the rtixn-bimatrix game corresponding to the ordered pair of 
matrices A and В and this game is denoted by (A,B). 
The matrices A and В are called the payoff matrices of player 1 and 
player 2, respectively. 
2 2 
The class of all mxn-bimatnx games is denoted by W . If M is 
mxn mxn 
considered as a metric space, then we shall always mean the metric 
2 2 
space <W ,d> , where, for (Α,Β) , (Α',Β') e m , c
 mxn mxn 
άΚΑ,ΒΜΑ',Β')) :=max {ЦА-А' Ц^ ,||B-B' Ц^}. 
REMARK 3.2. In fact, an mxn-bimatnx game (Α,Β) is the finite mixed 
extension of the two-oerson game in normal form <H , U ,K.,K_>, where for 
m η 1 ¿ 
ι e TJ and 3 e U , 
m η 
Κ. (ι,]) :=a and К„(і,з) :=b 1 13 2 in 
Therefore, for a strategy ρ (q) of player 1 (2), ρ (q ) can be seen as 
the probability of choosing 1 (3) and E (p,q) can be interpreted as the 
expected reward for player ke {1,2}. 
—
 — ш η 
By 1.1 2, э pair (p,q) с S χ S is an equilibrium point of the 
2 
bimatrix game (Α,Β) с W if 
mxn 
- -t -t , - -t - t 
pAq = max pAq and pBq = max pBq . 
peS qcS 
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The set of eqjilibnum points of the game (Λ,Β) is denoted by Ε(Λ,Β) . 
For q < S (ρ L S ) , we call the elements of the set 
~ /-* r~ г^п ^ -t .-t-, B. (q) :=fp' S ; pAq = пах pAq i 
ρ s" 
(B2(p) :=
 (q S n; р В ^ = іпах pBcf}) 
qísn _
 n sm 
the bost replies of player 1 (2) to the strategy q (p) . В : Ξ' •+ 2 
s
n 
(В.: S -+ 2 ) is called the best-reply multi function of player 1 (2) 
corresponding to the game (A,B). Note that (p,q) с Ε(A,В) if and only if 
(p,q) ' В (q) x B2(p) . 
Nash [1950al considered, for a bimatnx game (Α,Β), the multifunc­
tion that assigns to every (p,q) < S χ S the compact and convex subset 
B. (q) χ В (p) of S xs and he proved, using Kakutani's fixed point 
theorem, that the set of fixed points of this nap is non-empty and 
coincides with Ε(Α,Β). 
The following equivalence will be used frequently in this thesis. 
LEMMA 3.3. Let (Α,Β) с JA and let (p,q) с З ш х З п . Then (p,q) cE(A,B) 
mxn 
if and only if C(p) cM(A;q) and c(q) см(р;В), where С (ρ) := {ι с U ; ρ > 0} 
is the carrier of o, C(q) vs the carrier of q, 
M(A;q) := {i с U ; e Aq = max e, Aq } and M(p;B) :={l с К ; рВе = max рВе } 
m i , к n i , К 
к'IL, k'W 
m η 
PROOF, (a) Suppose that (p,q) t E(A,B). Then 
pAq = Σ p e A q < λ ρ max e Aq = max e Aq . 
i'C(p) X 1 icC(p) 1 к k к 
However, pAq >max e Aq . So e Aq =max e Aq if ιί С(ρ). Consequently, 
к
 k 1
 к * 
C(p) cM(A;q). Similarly, one shows that C(q) см(р;В) . 
(b) Now suppose that C(p) cM(A;q) and C(q) см(р,-В). Then, for each 
m 
pAq = Σ p e Aq = Σ ρ max e Aq = max e, Aq > e Aq . 
le Cip)" 1 1 i'C(p) 1 к к ^ 1 
Similarly, pBq >рВе , for each ] ' И . Hence, (p,q) с Ε(Α,Β) . [ 
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From lemma 3.3 we infer the next result. 
2 
COROLLARY 3.4. Let (A,B) t И . Iƒ 
mxn ' 
A ' = cA + 1 χ and В ' = dB + у 1 , 
m η 
where c,d ( (Ο,») , χ с IR and у ε Ш , then E (A,В) = E (A' ,Β' ) . 
In view of this result, it is no restriction to suppose, while 
studying the equilibrium point set of a bimatrix game (Α,Β), that A > 0 
and В < 0. 
Let (Α,Β) f И and let (p,q) ' S χ S . The possibly empty sets 
m^n 
L(p) := {q с S ; (p,q) ' Е(А,В)}
Г
 and 
Κ(ξ) := {p t S
1
"; (p,5)
 l E(A,B)} 
shall play an important role in the next chapter. 
LEMMA 3.5. For each p^ S and each qt S , L(p) and K(q) ave (convex) 
polytopes, i.e. the convex hull· of a finite number of points. 
PROOF. We prove that, for each q t S , K(q) is a polytope by showing that 
K(q) is a bounded polyhedral set. Now 
m
 n 
K(q)=S m- Π {p L Ж
Ш
; pAq t>e Aq1"} Τ Π {ρ с IR*; pBqt > рВе } , 
1=1 1 э=1 ^ 
which implies that K(q) is the intersection of the bounded polyhedral 
set S and a finite number of half-spaces. The fact that L(p) is a con­
vex polytope, for each ρ e S , can be proved in a similar way. Π 
§4. MATRIX GAMES 
In this section, we give some properties of a special kind of bi­
matrix games. 
DEFINITION 4.1. A bimatrix game of the form (A,-A) is also called a 
matrix game and it is mostly denoted by A. 
In 1928, von Neumann proved his famous minimax theorem,which states 
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that a matrix game has a value - denoted by val(A) - and that the 
optimal strategy spaces of player 1 and player 2 - denoted by 01(A) and 
0„(A), respectively - are non-empty. 
It is well known that E(A,-A) = 0. (A) xO.tA) and that О (A) is a 
convex polytope, for i£ {1,2}. 
We call the elements of the set ext(0 (A)) the extreme optimal stra-
tegies of player ic {1,2}. These extreme optimal strategies were charac-
terized by Shapley and Snow [1950]: 
THEOREM 4.2. Let A t И , ρ e О,(A) and q б О»(А). If val(А) ^  0, then the 
mxn 1 ^ 2 J 
following two assertions are equivalent: 
(1) p e e x t f O j i A ) ) and q e ext (0 2 (A) ) , 
(2) there exists a nonsingular submatrix к of A such that 
val(A) = ( Ι , , Κ " 1 ! ^ ) " 1 , p
v
 = val(A) I K - 1 and q^ = val(A) K - 1 ! ^ . 
JS. K. 14 J4 К К 
{Here ρ and 1 (q and 1 ) are the vectors obtained from ρ and 1 (q 
К К К К m 
and 1 ) , respectively, by removing the coordinates corresponding to the 
rows (columns) of A which play no role in K.J 
Bohnenblust, Karlin and Shapley [1950} and Gale and Sherman [1950] 
established an important relationship between the dimensions of the 
sets of optimal strategies: 
THEOREM 4.3. Let A e W . Then 
mxn 
dim O.(A) - dim С (A) = dim O»(A) - dim С (A), 
where C, (A) := conv{e e S ,- ι с U C(p)} and where С, (A) is 1
 ! ptO^A) 2 
analogously defined. 
The same authors proved that a strategy ι (j) of player 1 (2) is 
essential, i.e. ι e U C(p) (jt U C(q)) if and only if ι (3) 
ptOjtA) qeOjiA) 
is an equalizer strategy, i.e. 
e Aq t=val(A), for all qe0 2(A) (pAe
11
 = val (A) , for all peO.ÍA)). 
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§5. THE LINEAR COMPLEMENTARITY PROBLEM 
It is well known that optimal strategies of a matrix game can be 
found by solving a certain linear programming problem. In the more 
general case of a bimatrix game, the problem of finding an equilibrium 
point of that game can be formulated as a linear complementarity problem. 
DEFINITION 5.1. The problem of finding a ζ ε Ж (к e И) satisfying 
ζ > 0, w := г + (LZ 1) 1 > 0, and <z,w> = 0, (5.1) 
к 
where г с ДК and L с W are given, is called the linear oomplenentavity 
problem corresponding to r and L and is denoted by the pair (r,L) . 
к 
He call ζ e Ж a solution of the linear complementarity problem (r,L) 
2k if ζ satisfies (5.1). If (z,w) с It satisfies (5.1), then we call ζ a 
non-degenerate solution of the problem (r,L) if at most к of the 2k 
variables z,,...,z, ,w, , . . . »w, are equal to zero. 1 к 1 к 1 
For a survey of this field, see, for instance, Cottle and Dantzig 
[1968 ] or Luthi [1976]. 
2 
DEFINITION 5.2. Let (A,B) с И .We call the linear complementarity 
problem (r,L), where 
ГО -A 
(1 ,-1 ) с Ж , and L 
m η L-ßt О (m+n)x(m+n)' 
the linear eomplenentarity problem corresponding to the bimatrix game 
(A,B). 
The proof of the following result is repeated for the convenience 
of the reader (cf. Eaves [1971], p.625). 
LEMMA 5.3. Let (A,B) be an mxn-bimatvix game with A> 0 and В < 0. 
(1) If (p,q) CE(A,B), then (-p/pBq ,q/pAq ) is a solution of the linear 
complementarity problem corresponding to the game (А,в). 
(2) If (x,y) 6 Ж χ IR is a solution of the linear complementarity problem 
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aorresOond'ing to the gane (А,в)^ then x¿0, y ¿O and 
( χ / Σ
ι=1 Χι' Y / I D = l
y
]
)
 '-
Ь ( А
'
В )
· 
PROOF. (1) Let (p,q) f L(A,B) and let z= (x,y) , where χ := -p/pBq and 
Y :=q/pAq . Then it follows that 
e Ay < 1, for all ι - 1Ί , and xBe < -1, for all τ г И . 
ι m ] ' J η 
Consequently, r + (Lz1") SO. Furthermore, 
<z,r+(Lzt)t> = Σ " χ -J n,y -xAy t-xBy t 
ι=1 ι ] = l-'3 
= -(pBq ) - (pAq ) + (pAq χ pBq ) (pAq + pBq ) =0. 
Hence, ζ is a solution of the problem (r,L). 
(2) If ζ= (χ,y) f Ж x Ж is a solution of the problem (r,L), then 
e Ay t < 1, for all ι f M , xBe11 < -1, for all π < W , and 
m : η'
 ( 5 # 2 ) 
„ m t _ η „ t „ 
Σ , χ - хАу - Σ . У - хВу = 0. 1=1 ι ' з=1^з 
Consequently, Σ _.x - хАу =-Σ _ γ - хВу =0. This implies that x^O, 
у^ 0 and that ρ := (Σ ™ χ ) _ χ S™ and q := (Σ " y ) _ y : s". Now it fol­
lows from (5.2) that (p,q) с Ε(Α,Β). Π 
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CHAPTER II 
ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF EQUILIBRIUM POINTS OF A BIMATRIX GAME 
§1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we give a new proof of the fact that the set of 
equilibrium points of a bimatnx game is a finite union of Cartesian 
products of (two) convex polytopes. 
To this end we consider, in section 2, Nash subsets, i.e. sets of 
equilibrium points that are interchangeable. We show that a maximal 
Nash subset is a Cartesian product of two convex polytopes. Then we 
show that the set of equilibrium points of a bimatnx game is tne union 
of maximal Nash subsets. 
In section 3, the extreme points of maximal Nash subsets, the so-
called extreme equilibrium points, are investigated. It is proved that 
the number of these extreme equilibrium points and, consequently, also 
the number of maximal Nash subsets, is finite. Furthermore, a charac­
terization of the extreme equilibrium points, in terms of square sub-
matrices of the payoff matrices, is given. 
In section 4, dimension relations are derived for the 
factor sets of a maximal Nash subset. These relations generalize those 
of Millham [ 1974 ] and include those for the zero-sum case. 
The results of this chapter are based upon Jansen Γ 1981a]. 
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52. THE STRUCTURE OF MAXIMAL NASH SUBSETS 
DEFINITION 2.1. Let (A,B) be a bimatnx game and let ScE(A,B). Two 
equilibrium points (p,q) ,(p1»q') ι S are called S-intevahangeable if 
(pjq1) e S and (p',q) <-S. Two equilibrium points are intprchangeabte if 
they are E(A,B)-interchangeable. We call S a Nash subset for the game 
(A,B) if every pair of equilibrium points in S is S-interchangeable. 
A Nash subset S is called a maztmal flash subset for the game (A,B) if 
there exists no Nash subset TcE(A,B) such that S is properly contained 
in T. 
REMARK 2.2. If S is a Nash subset of some mxn-bimatnx game, then 
3 = 71.(3) XTT 2(S), where 
т. (S) := {p t S ; there exists a q с S with (p,q) e S} and 
π (S) := {q с S , there exists a ρ r S with (p,q) ( S}, 
are the factor sets of S. 
The term maximal Nash subset was first introduced by Heuer and 
Millham [1976]. Nash, who already considered such sets in 1951, called 
them sub-solutions. These authors showed that a maximal Nash subset for 
an mxn-bimatnx game is a closed and convex subset of S χ S . The fol­
lowing theorem implies that a maximal Nash subset is in fact the 
Cartesian product of two convex polytopes (see lemma 1.3.5). 
2 
THEOREM 2.3. Let (Α,Β) r w and let S be a maximal Nash subset for the 
mxn ·' 
о о
 т
 о о 
дате (А,в). Suppose that (p,q) f relint (S), "nen s = K(q) xL(p). 
PROOF. In view of remark 2.2, the theorem is proved if we can show that 
Ti1(S)=K(q) and тг2(3) =L(p) . 
(a) Suppose ρ t -τ (S) . Then there exists a qr S such that (D,q) с S. 
О О О 
Since (p,q) с S and S іч a Nash subset, we may conclude that (p,q) t Ε(Α,Β) . 
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So ρ e K(q) . Consequently, тт. (S) <- K(q) . Similarly, one proves that 
TT 2(S) cL(p) . 
о 
(b) Now we want to show that π.(S) χL(p) is a Nash subset. So we have 
to prove that 
TTjtS) x L(p) C E ( A , B ) . (2.1) 
о о 
Suppose that (p,q) с тт. (S) x L(p) . Since ρ f relint π. (S) , there exists an 
ε > 1 such that 
p ( c ) := ( 1 - ε ) ρ + epe ÏTJ (S) . ( 2 .2 ) 
From (2 .2 ) i t f o l l o w s t h a t 
C(p) c c ( p ) . ( 2 .3 ) 
о о о 
S i n c e ( ρ ( ε ) , q ) , ( ρ , σ ) e S, we h a v e , f o r j e M ( p ; B ) , 
o o t 0 t —1 t -1 t 
pBq = pBe = ε ρ (ε) Be + (1-ε ) рВе 
— 1 0 t —1 o t o o - ь 
£·ε p(fc)Bq + (l-ε )pBq = pBq . 
t »t 0 
So pBe =pBq and consequently ] e M(p;B) , because (p,q) € E(A,B) . 
Thus we have proved that 
M(p;B) с М(р;В) . (2.4) 
Combining the fact that (p,q) cE(A,B) with (2.3) and (2.4), we obtain 
that 
C(p) с c(p) с M(A;q) and С (q) с M (p;B) с M (р;В) . 
Consequently, (p,q) fE(A,B) and (2.1) is proved. 
о 
(c) Now suppose that L(p) ;Éir_{S). Then, in view of (a) and (b) , 
о 
π (Ξ) xL(p) is a Nash subset for (A,B) properly containing S. This con­
ci 
tradicts the fact that S is a maximal Nash subset. So L(p) =ir_(S). 
о 
In a similar manner, one can prove that K(q) = π (S). Π 
2 
COROLLARY 2.4. Let (А,в) f ΊΛ and let s be a maximal Nash subset for 
mxn 
the game (A,B). Suppose that (p,q) erelint(S) and that (p,q) с S χ S . 
Then (p,q) e S if and only if (p,q),(p,q) с S. 
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PROOF. If (p,q) S, then it is obvious that (p,q) , (p,q) <" S. Suppose 
с о о о 
that (p,q) , (p,q) ' S. Then p' K(q) and qi L(p). Consequently, 
(p,q) f K(q) x L(p) =Ξ. Г 
Before we can characterize the maximal Nash subsets, we first need 
a lemma. 
2 
LEMMA 2.5. Let (A,B) г и . Ir С га a convex subset of E(A,B). then 
m
x
n 
eOery pair of equilibrium points from С is interchangeable. 
PROOF. Suppose that С contains more than one element. For 
(p(0)
 /4(0) ) , (pd) ,q(l)) t C, let, for each λ с (0,1) , 
ρ(λ) := (1-λ)ρ(0) + λρ(1) and q(X) := (l-X)q(O) +Xq(l) . 
Then (pU),q(X)) - C, for each Xc [0,1]. So, for all X< [0,lj, 
p(X)Aq(X) 2pAq(X) , for each ρ- Ξ , and 
p(X)Bq(X) >p(X)Bq , for each qt S . 
Particularly, for each λ с [0,1], 
р(Х)Аа(Х)Ь >p(0)Aq(X)t and (2.5) 
p(X)Aq(X)t>p(l)Aq(X)t. (2.6) 
Now suppose that we have a strict inequality in (2.5) or (2.6) for 
some λ t (0,1). Then 
p(X)Aq(X)t=Xp(X)Aq(X)t+ (Ι-λ)ρ(λ) Aq(X) t 
> Xp(l)Aq(X)t+ (l-X)p(0)Aq(X)t = p(X)Aq(X)t. 
This is impossible. So 
píXÍAqtX)11 = p(0)Aq(X)t, for each λ f 10,1), and (2.7) 
p(X)Aq(X)t = p(l)Aq(X)t, for each λ e (0,1 ] . (2.8) 
Consequently, the equalities in (2.7) and (2.8) hold for all λ с L0,1]. 
Hence, 
ptOjAqd) 1 1 = p(l)Aq(l)t >pAq(l) t, for all pt S m, and 
p(l)Aq(0)t: = p(0)Aq(0)t>pAq(0)t, for all pt S™. 
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In the same way it can be proved that 
p(0)Bq(l)t SptOJBqS for all qc s", and 
р(1)В
Ч
(0) Ь >p(l)Bqt, for all q с s". 
Now we can conclude that (p(0),q(1)),(p(1),q(0)) e E(A,B). So 
(p(0),q(0)) and (p(l),q(l)) are interchangeable. С 
A maximal Nash subset is a convex set not properly contained in any 
other convex subset of the set of equilibrium points. This property is 
characteristic for maximal Nash subsets as we will prove now. 
THEOREM 2.6. Let (A,B) Ъе a bimatrix game and let С be a convex subset 
of E(A,B). Then с is a maximal Nash subset for the game (A,B), iff с 
is not properly contained in any other convex subset of ΕίΑ,Β). 
PROOF. (1) Let С be a convex subset of E(A,B) not properly contained in 
any other convex subset of E(A,B). 
(a) First we prove that 
С := {(p,q) e E(A,B) ; there exists an (x,y) f E(A,B) with (x,q),(p,y) f С} 
is a convex set. If (p,q) , (p,q) с С, then there exist (x,y),(x,y) tE(A,B) 
such that (x.q) , (p,y) с С and (x,q) , (p,y) cC. But then 
(λχ+ (1-λ)χ,λ4+ (1-λ)5) , (λρ+ (Ι-λ)ρ,λγ + (l-A)y) e С, for all λ с (0,1) . 
In view of the foregoing lemma, we may conclude that 
(λχ+ (1-λ)χ,λγ+ (l-A)y) £E(A,B) and (λρ+ (l-X)p,Xq+ (l-A)q) cE(A,B), 
for all λ с (0,1). Consequently, λ(p,q) + (l-λ) (p,q) б С, for all λ e (0,1). 
(b) Also, С is a Nash subset. If (p,q),(p,q) f С, then there exist 
(x,y),(x,y) с E(A,B) as in (a). Note that (χ,γ),(x,у) e С. So lemma 2.5 
implies (with С in the role of С) that (χ,у) с E(А,В). Similarly 
(p,q) с Е(А,В) . Since (p,q) , Ы,у) t Е(А,В) and (ρ,у) , (x,q) e С, it follows 
that (p,q) £ C. Similarly, (p,q) f С. So (p,q) and (p,q) are C-interchange-
able. 
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(с) Because С is convex and С с с, it follows that C = C. So, in view 
of (b), С is a Nash subset. It is obvious that, in addition, С is a 
maximal Nash subset. 
(2) Now suppose that С is a maximal Nash subset for the game (A,B) and that 
С is contained in an other convex subset of E(A,B). With the help of 
the lemma of Zorn, wo can find a maximal (w.r.t inclusion) convex sub-
sot С of E(A,B) containing C. In view of part (1) of this proof, С is 
a maximal Nash subset for tne game (A,B). This is impossible since 
C^C ,C^C and С is a maximal Nash subset. So the proof is complete. Π 
The next result of Chin, Parthasarathy and Raghavan [ 1974] is now 
immediate. 
COROLLARY 2.7. If (A,B) is a binatpix game, then E(A,B) is convex if 
and only if Е(л,В) гв a flash subset. 
REMARK 2.8. Let (A,B) be a bimatnx game and let (p,q) cE(A,B). Since 
{(p,q)} is a convex subset of E(A,B), we can, applying Zorn's lemma, 
find a maximal (w.r.t. inclusion) convex subset of E(A,B) containing 
(p,q). Consequently, in view of theorem 2.6, every equilibrium point of 
the game (A,B) is contained in a maximal Nash subset and E(A,B) is the 
union of such subsets. 
§3. EXTREME POINTS OF MAXIMAL NASH SUBSETS 
For a matrix game Snapley and Snow [1950] characterized all pairs 
of extreme optimal strategies of the players. We want to describe, for 
the case of bimatnx games, the extreme points of the maximal Nash sub­
sets Our approach incorporates the work of Kuhn [1961] and Mangasanan 
[1964]. See also the work of Winkels [1979]. 
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DEFINITION 3.1. An equilibrium point of a bimatrix game (A,B) is called 
an extreme equilibriim poirt if it is an extremo point of some maximal 
Nash subset for the gane (А,В). 
REMARK 3.2. For a matrix game A the only maximal Nash subset is 
O. (A) xOpiA) and the extreme equilibrium points, as defined in 3.1, are 
just the pairs of extreme optimal strategies of the game Л (see section 
1.4) . 
Let (A,B) e W . Mills [1960] proved that (p,q) t S xS is an equi-
mxn ^ 
librium point of tne game (A,B) if and only if there exist scalars α 
and β such that 
e Aq < α, for each ι t IN , 
ι m 
pBe <β, for each η t U , and 
Γ
 j J n 
pAq +pBq = α+β. 
This leads to the definition of the following (convex polyhedral) sets 
ρ := { (ρ,β) e G x TR; pBe < β for each 3 e И } 
В D 
О := { (q,a) eS х IR; e Aq < α for each 1 e U } . 
*Α ι m 
Before we can formulate the main theorem of this section, we need tTe 
following result. 
LEMMA 3.3. Lei (A,B) e W and let (p,q) < s m x s n . 
mxn 
(1) If ρ e ext(K(q) ) , then (p^Bq 1) с ext (Ρ ) . 
(2) If q£ ext(L(p)) , then (q,pAq ) € ext(Q ) . 
PROOF. We only prove (2) . Let qe ext(L(p)) and suppose that 
(q^Aq11) =!5(q,,a*) +!5(q",a") , 
where (q' ,a ' ) , (q" ,a") £ Q and (q' ,α') ^  (q",ci") . Notice then that q' ^  q". 
Since e Aq = he Afq') + ^ e A(q") < ha Ч-Ьа" = pAq , for all 1 t W , we 1 ^ 1 ^ 1 ^ r ~L ·
 m
r 
have, for ieM(A;q), e A(q') = a' and e A(q") = a". This implies that 
C(p) с M(A;q) <-MÍA^') and С (ρ) с M (A;q" ) . Since q = ^ q'+'^ q' ν can 
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conclude that 
C(q·) rcíq) см(р;В) and C(q") с с (q) <-ч(р;В). 
So, in view of lemma 1.3.3, (p,q') , (p,q") rE(A,B). Then, however, 
q ' ^ ' c M p ) while q=!5(q,+q"). This contradicts the fact tnat 
qtext(L(p)). So (q,pAq ) t ext (Q ) . L 
THEOREM 3.4. The set of equilibrium points of a bimatrix game is a (not 
necessarily disjunct) union of a fini Le number of maximal Nash subsets. 
PROOF. Let S be a maximal Nash subset for the game (A,B) and suppose 
о о 
that (p,q) ' ext(S) and that (p,q) с relint(S). Then, by theorem 2.3, we 
have (D,q) < ext(K(q) χL(p)) =ext(K(q)) x ext(L(p)). S o p ext(K(q)) and 
о о t о t qr ext(L(p)) and, by lemma 3.3, (p,pBq ) ext(P ) and (q,pAq ) ( ext(Q ) . 
В A 
Hence, if (p,q) is an extreme equilibrium point of the game (Α,Β), then 
(p,pBq ,q,pAq ) <. ext (P ) xext(Q ). Since ext(P ) and ext(2A) are 
finite sets and different extreme points of Ρ χ Q correspond to dif­
ferent extreme equilibrium points, the number of extreme equilibrium 
points of the game (Α,Β) is also finite. Hence, the number of maximal 
Nash subsets is finite. Η 
In the following example it is shown that, for any number nt H\{1}, 
there exists an nxn-bimatnx game with η different maximal Nash sub­
sets having a point in common. 
EXAMPLE 3.5. Let A be the nxn-matnx with 1 (0) in the (1,3)-th cell 
if 1 > ] (1 < ]) and let В the nxn-matnx with all coefficients equal to 
η 
one. Then Ε(Α,Β) = U S , where S := convie, ,...,e } χ convie.,...,e } 
]^ ζ=ι к Je κ η 1 к 
is a maximal Nash subset for the game (Α,Β) for each k t U . Now 
( е
п '
е
і
) с
к
2 Л · 
As we have seen in the example above, for two different maximal Nash 
subsets S and Τ of a bimatnx game, the Nash subset S r T may oe non-
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empty. Heuer and Millham [1976] proved that in that case 
(1) S^Τ is a (proper) face of the convex polytopes S and Τ, and 
(2) ext (S η Τ) = ext (Ξ) Ρ ext (Τ) . 
REMARK 3 . 6 . M a n g a s a r i a n [ 1 9 6 4 ] c a l l e d an e l e m e n t ( ρ , β , ς , α ) C S ^ X J R X ^ X K 
2 
an extreme equilibrtum point of a b i m a t r i x game (Л,В) с W , i f 
mxn 
(p,0) с ext(P ), (q,a) r ext(0 ) and p(A+B)q =α+β. We wish to show that 
о A 
a point (ρ,β,α,α.) с S x i R x s ' x K i s a n extreme equilibrium point of the 
game (A,B) if and only if (p,q) is an extreme equilibrium point (m the 
sense of 3.1) and if α = pAq and β = pBq . Suppose that 
(ρ,Β,ς,α) < ext(P xQ ) and (p,q) eE(A,B). Then it is easy to show that 
α=pAq and β=pBq . In view of 3.4, (p,q) is an element of some maxi­
mal Nash subset S for the game (A,B) . If (p,q) /ext(S), then there 
exist (p,q),(p,q) ' S with ρ ¿ρ or q^ q and (p,q) = b(p,q) + Ч(p.q) . Let 
p^p . Then (p,q),(p,q) ' S, so (p,pBq ) and (p,pBq ) are elements of Ρ,,. 
в 
These contentions, together with the observation that 
(p,pBq ) =!j(p,pBq ) +1j(p,pBq ), contradict the fact that 
(p,pBq ) < ext(P ). Consequently, (p,q) is an extreme point of some maxi-
mal Nash subset for the gane (А,В). The remainder of the above claim 
has been proved in the proof of theorem 3.4. In view of theorem 3.4, 
this result implies Mangasarian's lemma on page 779. 
REMARK 3.7. The extension of theorem 3.4 to the case of more than two 
players does not necessarily hold. On page 3 of their work. Chin,Partha-
sarathy and Raghavan [1974] give an example of a non-cooperative 3-
2 
person game, where all the players have the set S as strategy space 
and where the set of equilibrium points is equal to the (convex) set 
{((λ,1-λ), (λ,1-λ) , (λ,1-λ)) t S2 x Ξ 2 χ S 2; λ e [0,1]}. Now this set of 
equilibrium points is the union of an uncountable number of maximal Nash 
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subsets I where (maximal) Nash subsets for 3-person ganes are defined in 
tne obvious way]. This example also shows that a convex subset of the 
set E of equilibrium points of an η-person (n> 2) game, which is not 
properly contained in another convex subset of E, is not necessarily a 
maximal Nash subset. 
Now we want to show (à la Kuhn) that there corresponds to an extreme 
2 
equilibrium point (p,q) of a bimatnx game (A,B) с Л a certain square 
submatrix of A that determines the vector q completely. 
First renumber the columns of the matrix A such that C(q) = {Ι,.,.,γ}, 
where γ := |c(q)|. Let u := |M(A;q)|. 
(a) We want to show that the (u+l) χ (γ+l)-matrix 
К 
M -1 
1 OJ 
where M := Га ] .... . „, , has rank γ+1. ij ι M(A;q) ,;|cC(q) 
Suppose that rank Μ<γ+1, then there exists a vector 
у = (у, , . .. ,y , 0, ..., 0) ι Ж and a constant s с IR such that 1 γ 
(ι) (Yj у ,s) ?< (0,...,0), 
(il) Σ , у =0 and 
(ill) l ' a y - s = 0, for each i<-M(A;q). 
3=1 ID : 
Consider for each ε^Ο the η-vectors u U ) := q+εγ and ν(ε) := q-Ey. Then 
there is an L > 0 such that, for all ε с (Ο,ε), υ(ε),ν(ε) с S and 
e Aq < pAq +c(s- max Gi,AY ' ' o r each i¿M(A;q). 
л
 k¿M(A;q) 
For all ε . (Ο,ε) it follows that 
e Αυ(ε) = e Aq + ее Ay = pAq + es, if if M(A;q), and 
e A u ( r ) t = e A q + f e A y S e A q + ε max e Ay 
1
 i l l k(/M(A;q) 
< pAq + r s i f i / M ( A ; q ) . 
This implies that (u(£),pAq + cs) eQ for all с с (Ο,ε). 
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ν t 
Similarly an ε > 0 can be chosen in such a way that (ν(ε),pAq - rs) с Q 
ν .л v. 
for all εr (0,г). So for 0 < ε <тіпгε,ε} 
(q,pAq )= biute) ,pAq + Ls) + (ν (ε) ,pAq -es)), 
which contradicts the fact that (q,pAq ) L ext(Q ). 
(b) Since rank (M) = v+l we can fird γ+l row«; of M (including the last 
row) that are linearly independent. These rows form a nonsingular 
ΓΚ -1" (γ+1) χ (Y+l)-submatrix К of M. 
.1 OJ 
(c) Combining the results of (a) and (b) we may conclude that 
(q. , . . . ,q ,pAq ) is the unique solution of the system KxL" = e .. 
If we use the fact that К is (det K) tines the adjoint matrix we 
have proved the following result. (Cf. Vorobev Г1958], Kuhn [1961]). 
2 
THEOREM 3.Θ. Let (A,B) f M .If (p,q) гз an extreme еаиіЪіЬ гит point 
m^n 
of the game (A,B) and γ := |c(q) |, then there exists a y-y-submatrix К 
of Ά such that Irenumber, if necessary, the rows and columns of A in 
such a way that к is in the upper left corner of A] 
(1) the (γ+1)χ(γ+l)-matrix К := is nonsingvlar, 
(2) q =(det(K))~1 h Ύ,Κ bf DfC(q) and 
•j 1=1 ij 
[к is the со factor of the element k ] 
JO iD 
(3) pAqt = det(K)/det(K) =det(K) (Σ Y. У Ύ, К J - 1. 
1=1 ]=1 i] 
An analogous statement can be formulated w.r.t. the connection of the 
vector ρ and the number pBq with a certazn square subnatrix of B. 
REMARK 3.9. Let (A,B) be a bimatnx game. Without loss of generality 
we may suppose that A> 0 and В < 0. Let S be a maximal Nash subset for 
the game (A,B) . Suppose that (p,q) crelint(S) and that L(p) ={q}. 
Using the fact that A> 0, theorem 3.8(c) implies that the rank of the 
matrix A(S) := La J ..,„ . „, , equals lc(q) 1. Consequently, 1] it M(A;q) , j^Ciq) ι ч ι м J·' 
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dim L(p) = |c(q) | -rank A(S) . We shall see in theorem 4.3 that a similar 
statement holds for sets L(p) with more than one element. If K(q) ={ρ}, 
then dim K(q) = |c(p) I - rank B(S) , where B(S) .= fb ] . 
1 1
 1] icC(p) ,jcM(p;B) 
§4. A DIMENSION RELATION FOR MAXIMAL NASH SUBSETS 
The purpose of this section is to extend the dimension relations as 
given by Millham [1974]. The relations derived below include, in con-
strast to the results in Millham's paper, those for the zero-sum case 
as described in theorem 1.4.3. 
LEMMA 4.1. Let (A,B) be a bimatrix game and let S be a maximal Mash 
subset for (A,B) . Suppose that (p,q) crelint(S). Then, for all (p,q) r S^  
C<p) cc(p) , C(q) cc(q) , M(A;q) э M(A;q) and M(p;B) эм(р;В). 
о о с о 
PROOF. Suppose that pcK(q), p^p. Because p< relint K(q), there exist 
^ о о ^ 
a peK(q) and a ) t (0,1) such that ρ = λρ + (1-λ)ρ. This implies that 
C(p) с C(p) . Now, for ] f M(p;B) , 
о о£ ''t t ~ t 0 t ^ 0 t 0 0t 
pBq =pBe =ApBe + (l-À)pBe <XpBq + (l-X)pBq = pBq . 
t ot 
This is possible only if pBe = pBq . So 3€M(p;B) and we have proved 
that M(p;B) •-M(p;B). The other assertions are proved in a similar way. Π 
DEFINITION 4.2. Let (A,B) be a bimatnx game and let S be a maximal Nash 
subset for the game (Α,Β). In view of lemma 4.1, the matrices 
A(S) :=Га ] „,, , _, . and B(S) := Lb ] , 
ij icM(A;q) ,]iC(q) i] leC(ρ) ,]eM(p;B) 
do not depend on the choice of tne point (p,q) r relint(S). We call A(S) 
and B(S) the S-submatrices of A and B, resp. 
2 
THEOREM 4.3. Let (Α,Β) £ W be a bimatrix game with A> 0 and В < 0. 
m
x
n 
Let S be a тахгтаі Nash subset for the game (А,в). If (p,q) с relint(S), 
then (1) dim L(p) = |c(q) | -rank A(S) 
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and (2) dim K(q) = |c(p) I -rank Β(Ξ) . 
PROOF. We only prove (1). If L(p) has only one element, we are finished 
(remark 3.9). Suppose now that L(p) contains more than one element. 
There is no loss of generality in supposing that C(q) = {Ι,.,.,γ}, where 
γ = |c(q) |. Let d := γ - rank A(S) . Choose a basis χ(1),...,x(d) of 
Ker A(S) := {x f Ж ; A(S)x =0} in such a way that, for each kt U , 
q + x(k) > 0, where q := (q.,...,q), and pAq - e Aq > e Ax(k) for each 
i/M(A,-q), where x(k) := (x (k) ,0, . . . ,0) f Ш . We normalize the vector 
q+x(k) in such a way that the normalized result y(k) is an element 
of S n, for each к f И . 
(a) We snail show now that the vectors q,y(1),...,y(d) are linearly 
independent. Suppose that there exist constants c
n
,c.,...,c e IR such 
that 
с
о ^ к = і
с
к У
( к )
·
 ( 4 Л ) 
Let с := Σ с, / ||q+x (к) || . Then from (4.1) we may conclude that 
c 0q= cq+ F jjcyctkj/llq+xlk) 1^. (4.2) 
Now x(k) r Ker Α(Ξ) , so from (4.2) we obtain that c.AtSjq =cA(S)q . 
Therefore с = с, because A(S)q /0 (A > 0) . Now using (4.2) again and 
the fact that the vectors x(1),...,x(d) are linearly independent, we 
find that c, = ... = с, = 0 and also from (4.1) that c_ = с = 0. I d 0 
(b) Furthermore, for each к с И,, the vector x(k) is chosen in such a 
d 
way that y(k) ί L(p). 
In view of our cnoice of the vectors x(k), we have that 
||q+x(k) ||1pAy(k)t = pA(q+x(k))t = pAq t+ pAx(k) t = 
r = e Aq + e Ax(k) i f ι e M(A,-q) 
t i l l ^ 
l- > e Aq + e Ax(k) i f i / M ( A ; q ) . 
Consequently, pAy(k) >e Ay(k) , for all if К . Since, moreover, 
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pBy(k) t= (pBqt + pBx(k)t)/r,q+x(k) || j = 
= (pBq + Σ pBe x(k) )/||q+x(k)|| 
DrC(q) Э ^ 
= (pBqt + pBq*1 Σ Y,x(k) )/(1 + Σ Y 1x(k) ) 1=1 ι i=l ι 
= pBq > pBe , for all j t 1Ί , 
(p,y(k)) f E(A,B), for all к f Ю . 
(с) In view of what we have proved in (a) and (b), it follows that 
dim L(p) -d. Suppose now that there exists a vector y(d+l) с relint L(p) 
such that the vectors у (1)-cj, . ..,у (d-t 1)-q are linearly independent. Then, 
in view of lemma 4.1, C(y (d+1) ) =C(q) and M (A;y (d+1) ) = M (A;q) . So if 
y(4) := (ydOj,. ..,y(k) ), for each к e Ю , then 
A(S) Гу (к)/pAy (к) - q/pAq ]=0, for each к e Л .This is inpossible 
since dim Ker A(S) =d. So dim L(p) =d. Τ 
REMARK 4.4. Millham [19741 introduced, for a maximal Nash subset S of 
a bimatnx game (A,B), the essential submatrices for S 
Ae(S) :=[a ] „, . ^. . and Be(S) := [b ] , 
13 ieC(p) ,]iC(q) i] i<:C(p) , ]£C (q) 
where (p,q) ' relint(S) . He proved that dim L(p) = (c(q) | - rank A (S) , 
if the rank of the matrix Га ] , , is equal to the rank of 
e 
A (S). It is obvious that this result follows from theorem 4.3. 
RbMARK 4.5. Let А с W -Without loss of generality, we may suppose 
that A> 0. For the matrix game Α, Ο. (Α) χ О» (A) is the only maximal 
Nash subset. One can prove that for a p e relint O. (A) and a qc relint O.tA) , 
C(p) =M(A;q) and C(q) =M(p;-A). Consequently, A(S) =A (S) . Application 
of theorem 4.3 leads to the following result 
dim OjiA) - |c(p) I =dim 0 2 (A) - |c(q) | , 
where (p,q) <" relint (O. (A) χ О (A) ) (see theorem 1.4.3). 
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CHAPTER III 
REGULARITY AND STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIUM POINTS OF BIMATRIX GAMES 
§1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we investigate a special class of equilibrium points, 
namely the regular ones. A regular equilibrium point is a pair of stra-
tegies (one for each player) for which no player has a pure best reply 
to the other player's strategy outside of the carrier of his own stra-
tegy. These points were introduced by Harsanyi r1973a,b], who called 
them quasi-strong equilibrium points. 
In section 2, we shall see tnat a regular equilibrium point of a 
bimatrix game is always an element of the relative interior of some 
maximal Nash subset for that game. Since a bimatrix game has only a 
finite number of maximal Nash subsets, this implies that a regular bi-
matrix game, that is a bimatrix game with only regular equilibrium 
points, has a finite number of equilibrium points. With the help of a 
variant of the dimension relations, as given in theorem II.4.3, some 
known results about completely mixed bimatrix games are derived again. 
In section 3, it is proved that the class of all regular mxn-bi-
matnx games is an open and dense subset of the set of all mxn-bimatrix 
games. 
We consider, in section 4, binatrix games with a convex set of equi-
librium points. It is shown that such bimatrix games have at least one 
regular equilibrium point. 
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The open set, consisting of those bimatnx games with a unique equi­
librium point, will be studied in section 5. There, properties of regular 
and isolated equilibrium points are used to show that it is possible to 
find a bimatnx game witn a given strategy pair as its unique equilibrium 
point if and only if both strategies have the same number of elements in 
their carrier (cf. Kreps [1974]). 
Next, in section 6, stable equilibrium points of bimatnx games are 
studied. Roughly speaking, an equilibrium point of a given bimatnx game 
is called stable if all bimatnx games in a neighbourhood of the game in 
question have an equilibrium point close to it. This concept of stability 
was first studied by Wu Wen-tsun and Jiang Jia-he [1962]. It appears that 
an isolated equilibrium point is stable if and only if it is a regular 
one. Furthermore it turns out that the class of all stable bimatnx games 
(for which all the equilibrium points are stable) coincides with the class 
of all regular bimatnx games introduced above. In view of the results 
of section 3, this implies that we nave a new proof of theorem A of 
Wu Wen-tsun and Jiang Jia-he [1962], that the class of all stable mxn-
bimatnx games is an open and dense subset of the class of all mxn-bima-
tnx games. Moreover, we give a new proof of theorem В of the same authors, 
that a bimatnx game with only a finite number of equilibrium points has 
at least one stable equilibrium point. 
The class of all stable bimatnx games is studied further in section 
7. By approximating a stable bimatnx game by non-degenerate (in the 
sense of Lemke and Howson [1964]) bimatnx games, it is shown that a 
stable bimatnx game has an odd number of equilibrium points. It also 
appears that the class of mxn-bimatnx games with at least one isolated 
stable equilibrium point is open and dense in the class of all mxn-
bimatnx games. 
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Finally, in section 8, the index theory of Shapley [1974] is for-
nulated for stable bimatnx games. 
Note, that although some of the results of this chapter also hold 
for finite non-cooperative games with more than two players, most of 
our proof techniques can only be applied in the two-person case. 
The results of this chapter are based upon Jansen Γ 1981b]. 
§2. REGULAR EOUILIBRIUM POINTS 
Harsanyi [1973a,b] introduced regular equilibrium points. He called 
them quasi-strong equilibrium points. In this section, we shall prove 
some general properties of such equilibrium points. 
DEFINITION 2.1. An equilibrium point (p,q) of a bimatnx game (A,B) is 
called a regular equilibriim point if 
C(p)=M(A;a) and C(q) = M(p;B) . 
The set of regular equilibrium points of the game (A,B) is denoted by 
E*(A,B) . 
2 
LbMMA 2.2. Let (A,B) e w and let (p,q) eE(A,B). Without loss of 
generality, we may suppose that A > 0 and В < 0. Then the following two 
statements are equivalent. 
(1) (p,q) £ E*(A,B), 
(2) (-p/pBq ,q/pAq ) is a non-degenerate solution of the linear com­
plementarity problemi (r,L) corresponding to the garre (A,B) . 
PROOF. Let χ :=-p/pBq and у := q/pAq . Then 
e kL(x /y)
t
+r k = 0 iff kcM(A;q) or k-m<;M(p;B) (2.1) 
Since (x,y) is a solution of the linear complementarity problem (r,L) 
corresponding to the game (Α,Β), at least m+n of the 2(m+n) variables 
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χ , .. .,x
m
,y1< . ..,y ,ε^(χ,γ) +1, . . . ,em+nL(x,y) -1 (2.2) 
are equal to zero. So (x,y) is a non-degenerate solution of the problem 
(r,L) if and only if exactly m+n of the 2(m+n) variables in (2.2) are 
equal to zero. In view of (2.1), this is equivalent witn (1). G 
о о 
Let A be an mxn-matrix game and let (p,q) с relinttO. (A) xO_(A)). Then 
C(p) = U C(p) = Π {ι ( И ; e Aq t = v(A) } = П M(A;q) = M (A;q) , 
pfOjtA) q 02(A) m 1 qtO (A) 
where the second equality follows from the fact that the set of essen­
tial strategies of player 1 is equal to the set of equalizer strategies 
of player 1 (see the end of section 1.4). Similarly, one shows that 
о о 
C(q) =M(p;-A). Consequently, a matrix game possesses at least one regular 
equilibrium point and 
relinttOjíA) x02(A)) < E*(A,-A). (2.3) 
In fact, we have equality in (2.3), as we may conclude from 
2 
THEOREM 2.3. Let (A,B) с и , let ScE(A,B) be a maximal Nash subset 
mxn 
for the game (А,в) and let (n,q) f s. IT (p,q) f E (А,в)
л
 then 
(p,q) с relint(S). 
PROOF. Let (p,q) f Ε (А,В). If S={(p,q)},then the proof is complete. 
Γ τ о о 
Hence, suppose that SjMfprq)} and let (p,q) r relint(S). 
(a) Since Ξ is a Nash subset for the game (Α,Β), it follows that 
(p,q), (pfq) с S с Ε(Α,Β). So 
C(p) cM(A;q) =C(p) and С (q) с M(p;B) = С (q) . 
In view of lemma II.4.1, this implies that 
C(p) =C(p) and C(q) =C(q) . 
о о 
Likewise, one can snow that M(A;q) =M(A;q) and M(p;B) =M(p;B). 
о о 
(b) Now suppose that ρ e K(q) \ relmt K(q) . Then we can choose ε > 0 such 
о m 
that ρ(ε) := (1+ε)ρ-ερ is an element of S .We see this as follows. For 
о о 
ι с IN we have ρ(ε) = ( 1+ε)ρ -ερ = ρ +e (ρ -ρ ) . 
m
 r
 ι
 ri ri Γ ι ri ri 
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So if ρ =0. then ρ = 0, since we oroved in (a) that С(э) =C(p). 
1 1 
So, in that case, p(f ) =0. 
о 
If ρ / 0 , then we can choose с > 0 such that -ε (ρ -ρ ) < ρ . For such an ri - ι ^i ι 
ε it follows that ρ(ε) > 0. So, for properly chosen ε > 0, we have that 
ρ(ε) ϊ0. Since Σ .ρ(ε) =1, we have proved that ρ(ε) e S . Note that 
о 
ρ(ε) is constructed in such a way that ρ(ε) / K(q), for all ε>0. 
(с) In part (b) , we have shown that 0(ρ(ε)) =C(p), for ε>0 properly 
chosen. Гог ] с Μ (ρ; Β) =Μ(ρ;Β), we have that 
pU)Bq = (1+ε)ρΒ^ -ερΒ^ = (1+ε)ρΒθ -ερΒε =pU)Be , 
for all ε > 0. For ] ¿Μ(ρ;В) we can choose ε > 0 such that 
р(г)Вд,:= (Ι+είρΒ^-ερΒ^ > ( 1+г)рВе1:-
Е
рВе
<:
 = р(с)ЪеЬ. 
Now we have proved that for a properly chosen ε > 0 
C(p(E)) =C(p) =C(p) =M(A;q) and C(q) =C(q) =M(p,-B) =Μ(ρ(ε) ;B) . 
Consequently, (ρ(ε),ς) εΕ(Ά,Β) for a properly chosen ε > 0. This contra-
o 
diets the fact that ρ(ε) ^ K(q), for all ε > 0. So we must have that 
о о 
ρ r relint K(q) . Similarly, q e. relint L(p). Since, by theorem II. 2.3, 
S = K.(q) χ L(p) , we have found that (p,q) f relint (K(q) χ L(p) ) = relint (S) . Π 
From theorem II.3.4 and theorem 2.3, we deduce the following 
COROLLARY 2.4. A bimatvix game (A,в) with Ε (А,В) = E ( A , B ) has a finite 
number of equilibrium points. 
DEFINITION 2.5. A bimatnx game is called a regular bimatrix geme if 
all its equilibrium points are regular. The set of all regular mxn-
bimatnx games is, as subclass of the collection F of all mxn-
^ mxn 
bimatnx games with a finite number of equilibrium points, denoted by 
F . A maximal Nash subset for a bimatnx game is called regular if 
mxn 
all the points in its relative interior are regular. 
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REMARK 2.6. A bimatrix game with a finite number of equilibrium points 
is not necessarily regular, as the following example shows. Take 
. Then E(A,B) ={(e.,e.),(e-.e.)}, whereas 
E*(A,B) = {(e^ej) }. 
Let Ξ be a regular maximal Nash subset for a bimatrix game (Α,Β). 
Then the S-submatnces of A and В are exactly the essential submatrices 
e e 
A (S) ana В (S) for S. See II.4.4. Now we formulate, for a regular maxi­
mal Nash subset S, the dimension relations m terms of the essential 
submatrices for S. 
LLMMA 2.7. Let S be a regular тахітпаі Nash subset for a bimatrix game 
(A,B) with A > 0 and в < 0. Then 
dim L(p) = |c(q)I-rank Ae(S) and 
dim K(q) = |c(p)|-rank Β Θ(Ξ), 
where (p,q) e relint(S). 
DEFINITION 2.8. An equilibrium point (p,q) of a bimatrix game (A,B) is 
called isolated if {(p,q)} is a maximal Nash subset for the game (Α,Β). 
The following result which can be proved with the help of lemma 2.7, 
w:11 be useful since all equilibrium points of a regular bimatrix game 
are regular and isolated. 
COROLLARY 2.9. Let (p,q) be a regular and isolated eauilibrium point of 
a bimatrix game (Α,Β) . Then |c(p) | = |c(q) | . If, moreover, A > 0 and В < 0, 
then the essential submatriaes for {(p,q)} are nonsingular. 
To finish this section, we shall now consider a type of bimatrix 
game for wnich regularity appears in a natural way. 
2 
DEFINITION 2.10. A bimatrix game (Α,Β) с W is called eompletetu mixed 
A : = and В .= 
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if C(p) = U and C(q) = ΠΝ , for all (p,q) e E(A,B) . 
It is obvious that for a completely mixed himatrix game (Α,Β), all 
equilibrium points are regular. Hence, it follows from corollary 2.4 
that a completely mixed bimatnx game has only a finite number of equi­
librium points. It is also easy to see that, in the completely mixed 
case, the set of equilibrium points is convex. Using these two facts, 
we have proved the first statement of tne following result (cf. Raghavan 
[1970], Heuer [1975]) . 
2 
THEOREM 2.11. Let (Α,Β) с W be a completely mixed ЪітаЪ^іх acme. Then 
mxn
 t
 " 
(1) (Α,Β) has a unique equilibrium point (p,q), 
(2) the natriaes A and В are square, 
(3) if A > 0 and в < 0, then the matrices A and в are nonsingular, 
(4) ρ =Σ ".Β /Σ ",Σ m,B , for all ir И , 
ι з=1 i] ι=1 ]=1 13 m 
q = Σ ",Α /Σ ",Σ Ш,А , for all з e IN , 3 1=1 із 1=1 з=1 13 m 
pAq11 = det(A)A ",Σ m,A and pBq11 = det(B) /l "V Σ Ш,В . 
1=1 з=1 із ι=1 3=1 із 
PROOF. It remains to prove the last three statements. Now, (2) follows 
from corollary 2.9; (3) and (4) follow from theorem II.3.8. Π 
2 
DEFINITION 2.12. A bimatnx game (Α,Β) с И is called completely mixed 
mxn 
for player I (2) ifC(p)=]N (C(q) = И ) , for all (p,q) с Ь(А,В) . 
2 
THEOREM 2.13. J ƒ (Α,Β) e W is a completely mixed bimatnx name for J
 ' mxn
 ΰ
 •
 J 
player І
л
 then 
(1) m<n, 
(2) rank(B) =m if В < 0, and 
(3) if m = n, then Ε(Α,Β) ={ρ} χ L(p) for some ρ e S . 
PROOF. From theorem II.3.8, we may conclude that tnere exists for an 
extreme equilibrium point (p,q) of (Α,Β) an mxm-submatnx of В with 
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certain properties. This is only possible if min. So (1) is proved. 
Moreover, it follows from that theorem that this square submatnx of В 
has rank η if В < 0. But tnen В also has rank m. 
It remains to prove (3). Suppose that (D,q),(p,q) f Ε(Λ,Β), where ρ ψ p. 
Tnen tnere exist, in view of theorem II.3.8, two different square mxm-
submatnces of B. This is impossible if m = n, so ρ = ρ and (3) is proved, ü 
2 
To conclude, we consider the class CM of all completely mixed 
mxm 
2 
mxm-bimatnx names. First we note that W іч provided with the metric 
mxm 
d, defined in section 1.3. 
THlORbM 2 . 1 4 . Tne class of all oorvpletely mixed rnxm-bimatvlx games is 
2 
open ъг> и 
mxm 
2 
PROOF. Suppose t h a t CM i s n o t o p e n . Tnen t n e r e e x i s t s a gane 
mxm 
2 1 1 2 2 2 2 (A,B) t CM and a s e q u e n c e (A ,B ) , ( Л ,B ) , . . . i n И \ CM c o n v e r -
mxm mxm Tixm 
к к 2 к к к к g i n g t o (А,В) . S i n c e (А ,В ) /СМ , t h e r e i s a (ρ ,q ) с Е(А ,В ) s u c h 
m
x
m 
к к 
that (ρ ,q ) is not completely mixed. Now we can find a subsequence 
n(l) ,n(2) , . . . of the secuence 1,2,... and an index i-f TJ such that 
и m 
, n(l) n(l). , n(2) n(2) 
(p ,q ) , (p ,q ), ... is a convergent sequence with limit 
(p,q) - S mx S m and р П С к ) = 0, for all к с U, or q n ( k ) = 0, for all к < И. 
10 10 
This implies that (p,q) < E(A,B) and that ρ = 0 or q =0. This con-
10 10 
tradicts the fact that (A,B) is a completely nixed bimatrix game. So 
2 
CM must bo open. Γ 
mxm 
§3. REGULAR BIMATRIX GAMES 
In this section, we investigate the topological properties of tne 
r* 
class г . We shall be making frequent use of the following result. 
2 1 1 2 2 
LEMMA 3.1. Let (A,B) t m , let (A ,B ),(A ,B ), . . . be a sequenoe in 
mxn 
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2 · 1 1 2 2 
И аоп егдгпд to (Α,Β) and let (ρ ,q ) , (ρ ,q ) , . . . be a aonveraent 
^m „n . , , к k^  „, к k. „ , , 
seqvenae гп S χ Ξ ъ)ъ п (ρ ,q ) t E(A ,Β ) , jor· еас« к t w. bai/j 
(p,q) := lim (ρ ,q ) . 
к χ» 
(1) Then there exists α κ <· U sue« ¿¿ζαί., /or aZZ к > κ, 
C(p k)^c(p), C(qk) TC(q) and 
M(Ak;qk) cM(A;q), M(pk;Bk) <-M(p;B). 
Consequently, (p,q) ' E(A,B). 
(2) If (p,q) rE (л,В) , ъЬ.еп the inclusions in (1) may be replaced by 
* к к * к к 
equality. This tmplies that (p ,q ) с E (A ,B ), for all к>К. 
(3) If (p,q) is a regular and isolated equilihrivn point, then there 
к к 
exists an M > K , such that, for all k>M, (p ,q ) is a regular and 
isolated equilibrivn point. 
PROOF. (1) (a) Obviously, there exists а К, с ΊΛ such that, for all k > K , 
C(p) cc(pk) . 
(b) Also, there exists а К- с И such that, for all k > K., C(q) cc(q ) . 
(c) Suppose that ι ¿M(A;q) . Then ε :=max e Aq -e Aq > 0. Since 
k 1 1 l 0 
lim max e A (q ) =max e Aq , there is an M. ^  U such that, for all 
k-» j. i ι 1 1 
ι k k t ti k k t t 
k > M, , max e A (q ) -max e Aq <e/3. Because lim e A (q ) = e Aq , 
1
 ι
 1
- i 1 k-x» 10 0 
there is an M 9 « U such that for all k 2: M., |e A (q ) - e. Aq | <ε/3. ¿ ¿ л
-0 1 0 
So for each k£N(i-) :=max {Μ. ,M } we have 
max e A (q ) -e A (q ) > max e Aq -ε/3-(6 Aq + ε/3) 
ι
 1 10 ι 1 10 
= max e A q - e Aq - ^ € = ε / 3 > 0 . 
ι
 1
 "^O k k Consequently, i . / M t A ;q ) for a l l k ï N d . ) . 
k k 
This implies that M (A ;q ) cM(A;q) for all k > K-, := max{N (i) ; ι <_ M \M(A;q)}. 
J m 
(d) Similarly, one can show that there is а К. с ït such that for all k ä К . 
M(pk;Bk) с М(р;В). 
(e) Using (a),(b),(с) and (d), part (1) is proved if we take 
К := maxi К ;i t К.} . 1 4 
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(2) If (p,q) с Ε (А,В) , then 
C(pk) =C(p) =M(A;q) ^ M(Ak;qk) JC(pk) , for all к ì К . (3.1) 
к к к Consequently, all the sets m (3.1) must be equal, so C(p ) =M(A ;q ), 
к к к 
for all к > К. Similarly, one shows that C(q ) =C(q) =M(p;B) =M(p ;B ), 
for all k>K. Hence, (pk,qk) eE*(A k,B k), for all k>K. 
к к 
(3) We may suppose that A,A > 0 and B,B < 0 for all к f U. 
If S = {(p,q)} is a regular maximal Nash subset for the game (Α,Β) , then 
it follows from corollary 2.9 that |c(p)| = |c(q)| and that the essen-
e e tial submatnces A (S) and В (S) have full rank. 
Without loss of generality, we may suppose that C(p) =C(q) = {Ι,.,.,γ}, 
where γ := |c(p) |. From (2) we may conclude that, for all к * К, 
(3.2) 
(ρ ,q ) с E (A ,B ) and 
C(pk) =C(p) =C(q) =C(q k). 
By theorem 2.3, there exists, for each к >К, a (unique) maximal Nash sub-
k к к к 
set S, for the game (A ,B ) with (p ,q ) f relint(S, ) . 
In view of (3.2), for к s К, the essential submatrices for the regular 
maximal Nash subset S. are the Yxy-submatrices in the upper left corner 
к к 
of A and В , respectively. Since the essential submatnces for S con-
e e 
verge to A (S) and В (S) , respectively, there exists an L ' ZN such 
that the essential submatnces for S. have full rank for all k>L. Then 
к 
к к 
it follows from the dimension relations in lemma 2.7 that S, ={(p ,q )}, 
for all к >M := max {К,іЛ. Г 
THEOREM 3.2. The set ¥ is an open and dense subset of и 
mxn
 r J
 mxn 
r
* 2 
PROOF. (1) Suppose that Ь is not an open subset of И .Then there r r
 mxn
 e
 mxn 
exist a Dimatnx game (Α,Β) r F and a sequence (A ,B ) , (A ,B ),... 
mxn 
in И \ F converging to (Α,Β). Take, for each k£ W, a maximal Nash 
mxn mxn 
k k 
subset S for the game (A ,B ) such that S is not a one-point set or 
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к ν 
S is not a regular maximal Nash subset. Take a (p ,q ) t relint(S ). 
Since S χ S is compact, we may suppose that the sequence 
1 1 2 2 (p ,q ),(p #q ),... converges, say, to (p,q). Then, in view of lemma 
3.1(1), (p,q) £E(A,B). Because (A,B) < F , (p,q) is a regular and 
к к isolated equilibrium point. Hence, by lemma 3.1(3), (p ,q ) is a regular 
and isolated equilibrium point, for к sufficiently large. This, however, 
r* 
contradicts our assumptions about the set S. . So г must oe open. 
к mxn 
(2) Let G be the class of all mxn-matnces A for which the following 
mxn 
properties hold for all suitable values of h с W: 
(ι) the matrix obtained by ad3oining the row 1 to any hx(h+l)-sub-
matrix of A or A is nonsingular,-
(n) every hxh-submatrix of A is nonsingular. 
Since G is dense in M (cf. Karlin [1959], lemma 3.5.3), it follows 
mxn mxn 
2 
that G x G is dense in W . S o the theorem is proved if we can 
mxn mxn mxn 
show that G χ G c F* . 
mxn mxn mxn 
Let (A,B) e G xG and let S<=E(A,B) be a maximal Nash subset for the 
mxn mxn 
game (A,B) with (p,q) erelint(S). Rearrange the rows of the matrices A 
and В in such a way that C(q) =(.!,...,γ}, where γ := |c(q) |. Now suppose 
that γ+l < |M(A;q)|. 
Then we have for every (γ+l)x(γ+l)-submatrix D of the matrix ÍAÍS) 1], 
that Dq =0, where q := (q , . .. ,q,-pAq ). This is impossible since 
det(D) ^  0 and q ^  0. So, we may conclude that |c(q) | + 1 > |M(A:q) | > |c(p) |. 
Similarly, one shows that |c(p)| > ]м(р;В)| > |c(q)|. So 
|c(p) | = |M(A;q) | = |c(q) | = |м(р;В) | , that is 
(p,q) e Ε*(А,В) . (3.3) 
Furthermore, it follows that A(S) =A (Ξ) is a square submatrix of S. So, 
by (n) , det(A(S)) ^ 0 . In view of lemma 2.7, this implies that dim L(p) =0. 
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In the same way, one proves that dim K(q) = 0, from which one may con­
clude that 
S = {(p,q)}. (3.4) 
Since S is an arbitrary maximal Nash subset for the game (Α,Β), it fol­
lows from (3.3) and (3.4) that (Α,Β) с f-* . [ 
mxn 
г* Observe that, in section 7, we will show that r is, in fact, 
mxn 
2 _ _* 
everywhere dense in ]M . Harsanyi [1973Ы oroved that г is an open 
-* mxn ^ - mxn ' 
2 2
 r
* 
subset of M and that M \ г has Lebesgue measure zero (where 
mxn mxn mxn 
2 
M is to be regarded as a ¿mn-dimensional Euclidian space). 
mxn
 ч
 ^ 
REMARK 3.3. A matrix game At И is regular if and only if both players 
have unique optimal strategies. Bohnenblust, Karlin and Shapley [1950] 
proved that the class of mxn-matrix games with unique optimal strategies 
for both players is open and dense in И 
^
 J r
 mxn 
REMARK 3.4. One can show that the class of all non-degenerate (here and 
throughout this chapter we use this term in the sense of Lemke and Howson 
[1964J) mxn-bimatrix games is contained in F . However, m general, the 
mxn ^ 
two classes do not coincide, as the following example shows. Take 
л..[ 3 2 2 2 and В 2 1 3 1 Then (Α,Β) ^  F , but (Α,Β) is degenerate. 
It also can be proved that the class of all non-degenerate mxn-bimatrix 
2 
games is dense in И . Together with the foregoing this also implies 
the second assertion in theorem 3.2. 
54. NASH-SOLVABLE BIMATRIX GAMES 
In this section, we show that a bimatnx game for which the set of 
equilibrium points is a convex set, has at least one regular equilibrium 
point. We start with a 
54 
DEFINITION 4.1. A bimatrix game is called (Aasft-)solvable if the set 
of its equilibrium points is a convex set. (Cf. Nash L1950a], Millham 
[1972].) 
If a bimatrix game (A,B) is solvable, then, obviously, E(A,B) is a 
Nash subset for (A,B). This implies that for such bimatrix games the 
set of all equilibrium points of the game is the only maximal Nash sub­
set for the game. Moreover, it is a regular one, as we show now. 
2 
THEOREM 4.2. Let (A,B) i m oe a soLjoble bznatrix game. Then E(A,B) 
ιτι
κ
η 
гв a regular maximal lash subset for the game (А,в) . 
PROOF. Let (p,q) L relint(E(A,B) ) . We want to show that C(p) =M(A,q). 
The rows of the matrices A and В can be rearranged, if necessary, in 
such a way that M(A;q) = Ι,.-.,μ}, where μ := |M{A,-q)|. Now consider, 
for each к с И, the matrix В =[b ] . ., where 
i] 1=1,3=1 
b := (1 - H b +т-(— E^.b. ) , for all ι t U and 3 <_ К . Choose, for 13 к 13 к μ h=l h3 τι -' η 
к к к 
each к £ IN, an equilibrium point (ρ ,q ) of the bimatrix game (A,3 ) . 
Since S χ S is compact, we may suppose that the sequence (p ,q ), 
2 2 (p ,q ) , . . . converges, say, to (p,q). Then lemma 3.1(1) implies that 
(p,q) eE(A,B) and that there exists а К с m such that, for all к>К, 
C(p) <:C(pk) <=M(A;qk) cM(A;q) and С (q) cc(q k) см(р к;В к) <=м(р;В). 
Consequently, (ρ ,q) с E(А,В ), for all к>К. Now, for each к ¿К, put 
~k 1 к 1 1 m 
ρ : = ( ! - — > Ρ +-, (1 , 0 , . . . ,0) £ S . Then, f o r e a c h 3 с U , we have 
к к μ μ J η 
• і^с t 1 Ir 1- 1 1 h 
p K Be = (1 - f ) p Be + i -(I , 0 , . . . ,0) Ве^ 3 k r з k μ μ з 
, . 1. к t , 1 1 _ μ . 
= 1 -— ρ Be +- Σ, .b, 
к з
 к
 V h=l h3 
= ( 1 - r-) Σ p b + Σ , ρ ( Σ^ ,Ъ, ) 
к ι = 1 ι і з к μ 1=1*1 h=l h3 
_ m k
r
 1 1 1 μ , 
= Γ . ρ L ( 1 - τ-) b + Σ b 1=1 1 к 13 к y h=l h3 
_ m к, к к к t 
= Σ . p b = p B e . 
ι = 1 ι і з 3 
From this it follows that 
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М(рк;В) =М(р к,В к) 3C(q), for all к > К. 
However, С(р ) = C ( D ) оС(— 1 ) cM(A;q) uM(A;q) =M(A,q), where the last 
c
 - ρ μ 
~ к 
equality follows from lemma II.4.1. Now we may conclude that (p ,q) t E(A,B), 
^k 0 for all k>K. In view of lemma II.4.1, we have that C(p ) <-c(p), for all 
к > К. So M(A;q) ={!,... ,μ) c C(p ) <- С (p) <- M(A;q) , for all к > К. From this 
it follows that C(p) =M(A;q). 
О О О О * О О 
Similarly, one proves that C(q) =M(p,-B) so that (p,q) t Ε (А,В) . As (p,q) 
was arbitrarily chosen, this implies that all the equilibrium points of 
relint(E(A>B)) are regular. С 
Recalling that a matrix game is solvable, we can apply theorem 4.2 
to get the following well-known result of Bohnenblust, Karlin and Shapley 
[1950] 
COROLLARY 4.3. Let A e M . Then the set of essential ctrateqies of 
mxn
 J J 
player 1 (2) гп the game A eoinoides uith the set of equalizer strate­
gies of player 1 (2) in the game A. 
PROOF. We show that the set of essential strategies of player 1 coin­
cides with the set of equalizer strategies of player 1. 
Take (p,q) trelint(E(A,-A)). Then, by theorem II.4.1, 
U С (ρ) =C(p) =M(A;q) = П M(A;q) = П {ι с H ; e Ас^ = ν (A) }. D 
p^O (A) q 02(A) qt02(A)
 m Д
' 
Note tnat, in general, the class of all solvable mxn-bimatrix games 
2 is neither an open nor a closed set in И , as the following examples 
m
x
n 
show. 
Let, for all к с M, A : = l/k 0 0 1/к 
к к к к 
and В :=А . Then (А ,В ) is, for all 
к к 
к e и, a non-solvable game, wnile lim (Α ,Β ) is a solvable bimatnx game. 
к 
If, for all к e Ν, A : = -1 -l/k 
-1 0 [ϊί]· and В := I " * I, then (A ,Β) is a solva­
la 
ble bimatnx game, for all к с IN, but lim (A ,B) is not a solvable bi-
k-*M 
matrix game. 
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§5. BIMATRIX GAMES WITH A UNIQUE EQUILIBRIUM POINT 
In this section, we investigate the class U of all mxn-bimatrix 
mxn 
games with a unique equilibrium point. For related work in this area, 
see also a recent paper of Heuer [1979]. 
THEOREM 5.1. Let (A,B) ' U .If E(A,B) ={(p,q)}, then 
mxn 
(1) (p,q) is a regular equilibri urn point, so U с F , 
Ш^П ГПХГ1 
(2) |с(р) I = |c(q) I, 
(3) the essential submatriees for {(p,q)} are square; if A > 0 and B<0 
then the essential submatriaes are nonsingular. 
PROOF. Since U is a subset of the class of all solvable mxn-bimatrix 
mxn 
games, (1) follows from theorem 4.2. The rest follows from (1) and 
corollary 2.9. L 
COROLLARY 5.2. (cf. Kreps [1974]). Let (p,q) f s"1 χ s". Then there exists 
an mxn-bimatrix game with (p,q) as its unique equilibrium point if and 
only if lc(u) | = |c(q) | . 
PROOF. From theorem 5.1(2) it follows that |c(p)| = |c(q)| if (p,q) is 
the unique equilibrium point of some bimatrix game. If, on the other 
hand, strategies ρ and q with |c(p)| = |c(q)| are given, then one sees 
in Karlin [1959], page 70, how to construct a matrix A with 
E(A,-A) = {(p,q)}. Π 
We finish this section with some topological observations about U 
mxn 
2 
THEOREM 5.3. The set Ü is an open subset of и 
mxn
 r
 •' mxn 
2 
PROOF. I f Ü i s n o t an open s u b s e t of И , t h e n t h e r e e x i s t a b i m a t r i x 
mxn mxn 
1 1 2 2 2 game (A,B) eU and a s e q u e n c e (A ,B ) , (A ,B ) , . . . m W \ U which 
mxn mxn mxn 
c o n v e r g e s t o (A,B). S i n c e U с F and F i s an open s e t , we may 
mxn mxn mxn 
к к * 
suppose that (A ,B ) e F , for all к e И; so, for each к e U, there 
mxn 
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. , к к. ,~к ~к. _,,Κ „к. , к к. , ,~к ~к. _ „η „п 
exist (ρ ,q ),(ρ ,q ) с Ε(Α ,Β ) with (ρ ,q ) φ (ρ ,q ) . Since S χ S is 
1 1 2 2 
compact, ъе may suppose tnat the sequences(p ,q ),(p ,q ), . . . and 
(p ,q ),(p ,q ),... converge, say, to (p,q) and (p,q), respectively. 
Then (p,q),(p,q) tΕ(А,В), so (p,q) = (p,q). By lemma 3.1(2), there exists 
а К f IN such that, for all к > К, 
С (ρ) = С (pk) = С (pk) , С (q) = С (qk) = С (qk) , 
M(A;q) =M(A k,q k) =M(A k;q k) and M(p;B) =M(p k;B k) =M(p k;B k). 
^k ii к ^к к к 
This implies that (p ,q ) and (p ,q ) are elements of E(A ,B ), for all 
к к käK. Because the number of equilibrium points of (A ,B ) is finite, we 
^k k ~к к 
may conclude that ρ =p and q =q , for all к>К. This, however, con-
k к ~k ~k 
tradicts the fact that (p ,q ) φ (ρ ,α ) , for all к г К. So li must be 
m
x
n 
open. ( 1 
2 
REMARK 5.4. The set (J is, in general, not dense in l·! . Let 
mxn mxn 
A : = 
1 0 
0 1 
and В :=A. Then (A,B) / (J and (Λ',Β') i U , for all games 
(Α',Β') e m with d((A,B),(Α',Β')) < \ . 
REMARK 5.5. Let E: li •* S κ S be the map which assigns to each 
mxn
 r 
(A,B) e II the equilibrium point of the game (A,B) . Then E is a con-
mxn 
tinuous mapping on U , as follows from lemma 3.1(1). 
mxn 
56. STABLE EQUILIBRIUM POINTS 
In this section, we shall investigate stable equilibrium points. 
These were introduced by Wu Wen-tsun and Jiang Jia-he [1962], who called 
these equilibrium points essential equilibrium points. They used the 
term essential equilibrium point because their investigations were 
based upon the notion of essential fixed point. Several results of these 
authors will be proved in this section without using the theory of 
essential fixed points. 
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2 
DEFINITION 6.1. Let (А,В) f И .An equilibrium point (p,q) eE(A,B) 
mxn 
is called stable if there exists, for every ε > 0, a 6 > 0 such that for 
2 
each game (A'.B'JrW , with d((A,B),(A',B')) <6, we have that 
mxn 
ΕίΑ',Β') ΊΒ ((p,q)) fifí. 
[В ((p,q)) := {(ρ',ς') e s"1 x 5 П; || (p,q) - (ρ',q') ||
 1 < f }.J 
Let Ε (A,В) denote the set of all stable equilibrium points of the 
game (A,B) . A bimatnx game (A,B) is called stable if Ε (Α,Β) =E(A,B). 
Note that there are bimatnx games without a stable equilibrium 
point. For example, take for A and В the nxn-matrix (n r H\{1}) with 
stab 
all coefficients equal to one. Then Ε (Α,Β) =p. 
The following theorem relates the concept of stability with that of 
regularity. 
THEOREM 6.2. If a stable equmbrñ.vun point (p,q) of an nxn-bimatrix garte 
(Α,Β) is an element of the relative interiov of some maximal Nash subset 
for that game, then (p,q) e E (А,В). 
PROOF. Suppose that (p,q) £ relint(S), where S is a maximal Nash subset 
for (Α,Β). The rows of the matrices A and В can be rearranged, if neces­
sary, in such a way that M(A;q) ={l,...,y}, where ν := |M(A;q)|. Let, 
for each к e К, В be the matrix introduced in the proof of theorem 4.2. 
Since (p,q) is a stable equilibrium point and lim (Α,Β ) = (Α,Β), there 
к.-*» 
, η(1) η(1). , η(2) η(2). m η 
exists a sequence (ρ ,q ),(ρ ,q ) , ... in S χ S converging 
to (p,q) such that (p ,q ) rE(A,B ), for each к с ÏJ. 
We can proceed as in the proof of tneorem 4.2, with (ρ,σ) in tne 
о о 
role of (p,q) , to show that C(p) =M(A;q). In a similar way, it can be 
proved that C(q) =M(p;B), so (p,q) is a regular equilibrium point of 
the game (Α,Β). Π 
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Before we can show that every stable and regular equilibrium point 
must be an isolated one, we first need a 
LEMMA 6.3. If (p,q) is a stable and regular equilibrium point of an 
mxn-bimatrix game (А,в), then |c(p)| = |c(q)|. 
r
* 2 
PROOF. Since r is a dense subset of M , we can find a sequence 
mxn mxn 
1 1 2 2 r* (A ,B ),(A ,B ), . . . in г converging to (A,B). Now, (p,q) is a stable 
mxn 
equilibrium point, so there exists a sequence 
, n(l) n(l). n(2) n(2) m „ η . 
(ρ ,q ) , (ρ ,q ) ,.. . in S χ S converging to (p,q) such that 
, n(k) n(k). „, n(k) „ntk) 
(p ,q ) e E(A ,B ) , for all к с К. 
Now, (p,q) s Ε (А,В), so lemma 3.1(2) implies the existence of а К с И 
such that, for all к>К, 
С (ρ) =C(p n ( k )) = M ( A
n ( k )
; q n ( k ) ) =M(A;q) and 
C(q)=C(q n ( k ))=M(p n ( k );B n ( k ))=M( P;B). 
Since, by corollary 2.9, |c (p" (k))[ = |c(qn ( k ) ) | , for all к e И, this 
implies that |C(p) ¡ = |c(q) |. Π 
THEOREM 6.4. If (p,q) is a stable and regular equilibrium point of an 
mxn-bimatrix game (Α,Β)., then (p,q) is an isolated equilibrium point. 
PROOF. Let S - Ε(Α,Β) be the (unique) maximal Nash subset for the game 
о о 
(Α,Β) that contains (p,q). Let (p,q) с relint(S). We must show that 
o o l i l i 
(p,q) = (p,q). In view of the foregoing lemma, |C(p)| = |C(q)|. Without 
loss of generality, we may suppose that С (ρ) =C(q) ={1,...,γ}, where 
γ := |c(p) j. Now we define the γχγ-diagonal matrices 
Δ(ρ)=[5(ρ). ] Y 1
 Ύ
1 and A(q) =[5(q). .]
 Ύ
1
 Ύ
1 , ij ι=1,]=1 13 1=1,3=1 
as follows 
о о 
δ (ρ) . . := δ /ρ , for all i,j с W , and 
13 13 1 γ 
о о 
б (q) :=δ. /q., for all 1,3 с Ж . 
13 13 ι Ύ 
Consider, for each e S 0, the matrices 
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Α(ε) := A + ε 
A(q) О 
О О 
ΓΔ(ρ) О 
e M and В ( ε ) : = D + ε 
mxn Lo О mxn 
Then (p,q) e Ε(Α(ε),Β(ε)), for all ε > 0. Let, for ε > 0 , 
e e 
A (ε) (Β (ε)) be the γχγ-submatrix of A(e) (Β(ε)) which can be found 
in the upper left corner of Α(ε) (Β(ε)). For e> 0, det Ae(f) (det Ββ(ε)) 
is a polynomial in ε of degree γ with leading coefficient 
о о — l o о — 1 — 
(q-.-.q ) ((р....ρ ) ). So an ε> 0 can be found suchthat 
det Αθ(ε) /0 and det Βθ(ε) ¿0, for all ε e (Ο,ε). This implies that, for 
_ о о 
all ее (Ο,ε), (p,q) is the unique equilibrium point of the game 
(Α(ε) ,Β(ε) ) with 
C(p) =C(|) ={1,...,γ}. (6.1) 
Since (p,q) £E (A,B) , there exists a sequence ε.,ε.,... in (Ο,ε), 
converging to zero, and a sequence (ρ(ε-),д(г.)),(ρ(ερ),q(e_)),... in 
«m „η , ^. ^ S χ S such that 
(pU k) ^ (ε κ)) e E(A(Ck) fB(Ek)) , for all к e U, and 
lim (ρ(ε. ),q(E. )) = (p,q). (6.2) 
-хю л К 
Now (p,q) e E (А,В), so lemma 3.1(2) implies the existence of а К e К 
such that, for all k>K, 
C(pU k)) =C(p) =C(p) and C(qU k)) =C(q) =C(q). 
In view of (6.1), this is only possible if 
(ρ(ε ),q(tk)) = (p,q) , for all к > К. 
So, by (6.2), (p,q) = (p,q) . Consequently, S = {(p,q)} and (p,q) is an 
isolated equilibrium point of the game (A,B). J 
COROLLARY 6.5. If (p,q) is a stable equilibviwn point of a bimatrix 
дате, then (p,q) is an isolated (and regular) equilibrium point, or 
(p,q) is an element of the relative boundary of some maximal Nash sub­
set for that game. 
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THEOREM 6.6. An isolated ецлъЬЪгглт point of a binatrix name is stable 
%f and only bf it is a regular ецліІіЪгъит point. 
2 
PROOF. Let (A.B) с M and suppose that A > 0 and В > 0. 
mxn 
(a) If (p,q) is an isolated and stable equilibrium point, then it fol­
lows from theorem 6.2 that (D,q) is a regular equilibrium point. 
(b) If {(p,q)} is a regular maximal Nash subset for the game (Α,Β), 
then it follows from corollary 2.9 that A := [a 1 , . , , and 
i] ifC(p),DrC(q) 
В := fb ] are square and nonsmgular submatnces of A and 
13 icC(p) ,3eC(q) ^ 4 
В, respectively. Rearrange the rows and columns of A and B, if neces­
sary, in such a way that C(p) =C(q) ={1,...,γ}, where γ := |c (ρ) | . 
From theorem II.3.8 we can conclude that 
p = ( l У Ζ У В J " 1 ^ Y 1 Β ,.,.,Γ Ύ в ,Ο,.,.,Ο) and 1=1 ]=1 i] 3=1 1] 3=1 γ]' 
q= (Σ Y 1 l
 У
. A ) " l ( i . Y 1 A 1 , . . . , L
Y
1 A , Ο , . , . , Ο ) . 
ι=1 з=1 із ι=1 il ι=1 ιγ 
Let W := {M . IM 
γχγ 
ti -ι 
1 0 has full rank}. Then W χW is an open subset 
2 ν ν 
of И . Let f: W x W -»• Κ χ ]R be the continuous map defined as 
γχγ 
f (Μ,Ν) = (д(МЬ) ,д(М) ) , M,N f W, 
where 
g(M) := (Σ Ύ. Σ Ύ 1 M ) ~ 1 { T γ ι Η ,,...,Τ Υ, Μ ). 1=1 з = 1 1D 1 = 1 Ιΐ 1 =1 -^Ύ 
Note, that (Α,Β) F W Χ W and that f(Α,Β) = (ρ ,...,p ,q ,...,q ) > 0. Con-
~ ~ 2 
sequently, there exists a &. > 0 such that, for all (Α',Β') с Wl with 
d( (Α,Β) , (Α',Β') ) <δ 1, (Α',Β') t W x W and ίύ',Β') > 0. 
Now l e t г > 0. Since f i s a continuous mapping, t h e r e e x i s t s a 6 .€ (0,5.) 
~ ~ 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ 
such t h a t for a l l ( А , , В , ) с Ж
х
 vvith d ( (Α,Β) , (A' ,B' ) ) < 6, 
| | f (À,B)-f (Α',Β') lij < ε. 
2 
For every game (Α',Β1) e И close to (Α,Β), let 
ρ' := (g ((Β Μ 1 1) ,Ο,.,.,Ο) a S1" and q' := (g (A' ) ,0,... ,0) с s". (6.3) 
2 
Then there exists a δ e (0,δ_) such that for all (Α',Β') e И with ¿ mxn 
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d((A,B),ίΑ',Β1)) < & 
e A'(q') 
ι 
p'B'e 
ejA'tq')*1 for all ι 6 {2,...,v}, 
< e 1A'(q
,) t for all i¿{!,...,γ) and 
p'B'e^ for all з e {2,...,γ}, 
for all ] ¿{1,... ,ν), p'B'e 
where ρ' and q' are defined as in (6.3). 
2 
This implies that for all games (Α',Β') e И with d ( (Α,Β) , (Α',Β') ) <δ, 
mxn 
(р'гЧ1)» a s defined in (6.3), is an equilibrium point of the game (Α',Β') 
with || (p,q)-(p' ,q') || . < e. Consequently, (p,q) ε Ε (Α,Β). [' 
The following is now immediate. 
COROLLARY 6.7. (1) The number of regular stable equilibrium points of 
a bimatrix game is finite. 
(2) The class of all stable mx-n-bimatrix games coincides with the class 
of all regular mx-n-bimatrix games. 
(3) The class of all stable mxn-bimatrix games is an open and dense sub-
2 
set of 1Λ . (Cf. Wu Wen-tsün, Jiang Jia-he [1962], theorem A). 
mxn 
PROOF. Part (1) follows from theorem 6.4 and the fact that a bimatrix 
game has only a finite number of maximal Nash subsets. In view of corol-
lary 6.5, for a stable bimatrix gane all equilibrium points nust be 
isolated and regular. The rest of part (2) is an immediate consequence 
of theorem 6.6. Combining part (2) and theorem 3.2, one proves (3). D 
REMARK 6.B. A bimatrix game with isolated equilibrium points does not 
necessarily have a stable equilibrium point, as the following example 
shows. 
Take A := 
2 2 0 
2 2 0 
1 1 0 
and В : = 
2 2 1 
2 2 1 
0 0 0 
Then E(A,B) = { (e3,e3) } и { (p,q) e S
3
 x Ξ
3
; p 3 = q 3 = 0}. So (e3,e3) is the 
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only isolated equilibrium point of (A,B) , but (e,,e ) /Ε (A,B) . There­
fore, (e,,e.-) is not stable and Ε (Α,Β) =φ. 
If all the equilibrium points of a bimatrix game are isolated, then 
there is at least one stable equilibrium point. This was proved by 
Wu Wen-tsun and Jiang Jia-he [1962]. We shall give a new proof of this 
result, without using the theory of so-called essential fixed points. 
THEOREM 6.9. A bimatrix game with only a finite number of equilibvivm 
points has at least one stable equilibrivm point. 
PROOF. Suppose that (Α,Β) is an mxn-bimatnx game with only a finite 
number of equilibrium points. For the convenience, we give the proof 
for the case that (Α,Β) has two equilibrium points. Thus, let 
E(A,B) ={(p,q),(p,q)}. If E S t a b(A,B) =φ , then 
3
ε>0 Vx^-k-W , ,
 nl [E(Äk,ik) η B M ^ q ) ^ ] (A ,B )cU1(A,B) 
and (6.4) 
Э
г>0 \
е
»
Э
 ~k ~ν l ^ rEùk,Sk) ΠΒ~(;,5) =¿] (А ,В bUj (Α,Β) 
[U (Α,Β) := {(Α',ΒΜ t И ; d((A,B) , (Α',Β1)) < ε}.] 
ε m
x
n 
Take ε f (0,πιιη{ε,ε.Ο so small that В (p,q) η В (p,q) =ίί. Suppose tnat 
q e B (q) \ B, (q) . Let, for α e {'s,!}, q(a) be the unique point on the 
ε ^ε 
line segment between q and q with ||q-q(a) || . =a. Now, consider, for 
each к с H , the two-person game <S ,S ,L1,L.>, where 
L1(p,q) 
pA q 
~k t 
pA q 
t 
pAq 
if ρ с Ξ , qe cl(B, (q) ) , 
if ρ r S™, q t cl(B^t(q)) , 
if p e S , qí-B^íi) JB o(q), 
ε ε 
XpA'qCj) 1"+(l-X)pAq(l) " if ρ ε S'", q г В (q) \ cl (В, (q) ) 
ε *2ε 
(where \c (0,1) is chosen in such a way that 
q=Xq(is) + (l-A)q(l)) , 
m ~ ~ 
analogously defined if ρ £ S , q c B (q) \cl(B, (q) ) , 
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L2(p,q) : = 
pB q if qc S , pecKB, (ρ) ) , 
pB q if q α Ξ , ρ e cl (Β, (ρ) ) , 
pBq if q £ s", ρ/Β (ρ) J Β (ρ), 
elsewhere analogously defined as above. 
Then, for each k t M, L. and L„ are continuous functions on S χ S and 
the functions ρ •* L (ç,q') on S and q •*• L (p',q) on Ξ are concave 
for each q' с S and ρ' e S , respectively. Using theorem 7.2.2 in 
Parthasarathy and Raghavan Γ1971 J, we may conclude that, for each k e U, 
the game, as constructed above, has a non-empty equilibrium point set 
E(Sm,Sn,L*,L*). 
Furthermore, we obtain that 
m „η .k k. (1) E(S ,S ,Ι,.,Ι,.ίηΒ, (p,q)=(¡$, for each k с U , 
(2) E(S m,s n,Lj,L2) -B l 5 e(p,q) =ф, tor each kc U . 
k k ш η k k — — 
We give a proof of (1). Suppose that (p ,q ) e E(S ,S ,L ,L ) г в, (p,q) , 
for some k с И. Tnen it follows that 
k--k k t k k k. .
 Tk k. -k k. t . , _m . 
ρ A (q ) = L (p ,q ) > L (p,q ) = pA (q ) , for each ρ ε S ,and 
k-k. k. t
 Tk, k k. . Tk. k . k-k t _n 
ρ В (q ) = L (p ,q ) > L-(p ,q) = ρ В q , for each q с S . 
k k —k —k — — 
Then, however, it follows that (ρ ,q ) £E(A ,B ) η В, (p,q) , which con­
tradicts (6.4). Using the fact that, for each pair (p,q) с S m χ S , 
k t k t 
lim L (p,q) =pAq and lim L (p,q) =pBq , 
k-«° i k-«» z 
1 1 2 2 
we obtain that any limit point of the sequence (p ,q ),(p ,q ) , . . . , 
where (p ,q ) £E(S ,S ,L. ,L_) , for each k e И, is an equilibrium point 
of the game (A,B). But this is impossible, since, for each k e U, 
k k - - ~ ~ (p ,q ) /B, (p,q) и В, (p,q) , as follows from (1) and (2). [_) 
^ε *2ε 
From the theorems 6.2 and 6.9 we infer 
COROLLARY 6.10. A ЪгтаЬ гх game with only a finite number of equilibrium 
points has at least one regular equilibrium point. 
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§7. ON THE ODDNESS OF THE NUMBER OF EQUILIBRIUM POINTS OF A STABLE 
BIMATRIX GAME 
2 S xS We consider, for m,n e К, the map E: W -»· 2 wmch assigns 
mxn 
2 
to each (A,B) f И the compact set Ε(Λ,Β) of all equilibrium points 
mxn 
of the game (A,B). 
The proof of the second part of the following lemma can be found in 
Jiang Jia-he [1963]. It is repeated for the convenience of the reader. 
~ „m -П 2 S xS LEMMA 7.1. (1) The mav E: И •+· 2 -¿s upper semioontinuovs. 
mxn r 
2 (2) A bimatrix game (A,B) t ж is stable if and only if (А,в) is a 
2 Б шхЗ п point of оопіігигЬу of the map Ε: M -+2 
PROOF. (1) The proof follows immediately from lenma 3.1(1) and theorem 
1.2.5. 
(2) First suppose that (A,B) is a stable bimatrix game. Let ε > 0. Say, 
1 1 к к E(A,B)={(p ,q ) , . . . , (p ,q )} for some к f TJ. Since all equilibrium 
points of (A,B) are stable, there exists a 6 > 0 such that for all ι £ ]N 
(pSq 1) e U (ΕίΑ',Β1)), for all bimatrix ganes (А',В') с И with 
с mxn 
d((Α,Β),(A',B')) <б. Consequently, 
Е(А,В) cu (EIA',В')) , 
2 
for all binatrix games (Α',Β1) с IM with d( (Α,Β) , (Α',Β') ) <δ. This 
mxn 
implies, in view of (1), the continuity of E at the game (Α,Β) (cf. 
remark 1.2.3). 
^ «m „n 2 S xS 
If E: ]M -»-2 is lower semcontinuous at the game (Α,Β) , then, 
mxn 
for any L > 0, there exists a δ >0 such that 
Ε (Α,Β) с υ^ΕίΑ',Β') ) , 
2 
for all bimatrix games (Α',Β') c m with d((Α,Β),(Α',Β')) < δ . 
mxn 
Therefore, for every (p,q) <:E(AfB), there exists an equilibrium point 
(p' .q') с EIA' ,Β') with || (p,q) - (p ' »q' ) || , < с . This means that (Α,Β) is 
a stable bimatrix game. ¡] 
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REMARK 7.2. Jiang Jia-he Γ1963 I proved that F = И \ U N(e), whore 
3 v
 mxn mxn 
2 t f Q + 
N(c) :={(A,B) t M ; corresponding to each 6 > 0 and any ε'< e, there exists 
mxn 
? 
a game (Α',Β') f И , with d((Λ,В),(Α',Β')) < δ 
m
x
n 
and E(A,B) /U , (Ε (Α' ,Β')) } 
2 is, for any ε > 0, a closed subset of M that contains no non-empty 1
 mxn '
 J 
2
 r
* 2 
open subsets of И . That is to say, г is everywhere dense in M 
r
 mxn ' mxn
 1
 mxn 
In the following lemma, we describe the behaviour of the cardinality 
of the equilibrium point set of regular binatrix games, if we take limits. 
LEMMA 7.3. Let (A.B),(A ,B , ( A ,B ) ,... fee a seqvence in F with 
mxn 
к к (А,В) =lim (Α ,Β ). Then there existe α К с U suah that 
к-*» 
|Е(А,В) I = | (Е(Ак,вк) | for all к > κ. 
PROOF. Take an ε > 0 such that Ε (Α,Β) Ί B_ ((p,q)) ={(p,q)}, for all equi-
k к * librium points (p,q) of (A,B). Since (A ,B ) с F , it follows from 
mxn 
к к lemma 7.1(2) and remark 1.2.3 that lam d (E(A ,B ),E(A,B)) =0. There-
]с->-СО Η 
fore, there exists an L с U such that, for all k > L , 
E(Ak,Bk) с U В ((p,q)) and 
(p,q)fE(A,B) 
E(A ,B ) η В ( (p,q) ) Φ φ, for eacn (p,q) f Ε(Α,Β) . 
We will show now that there exists an ε £ (Ο,ε) and a Kt W such that, 
for all (p,q) eE(A,B), 
|E(Ak,Bk) Γ B-( (p,q)) ¡ = 1, for all k> K. (7.1) 
Suppose that no such pair (ε,Κ) exists. Then there are an equilibrium 
, . , n(l) nd), , n(2) η(2)
λ 
point (p,q) eE(A,B) and sequences (p ,q ), (p ,q ), . . . and 
,~n(l) ~n(l), ,~n(2) ~n(2), m η _ _ 
(p ,q ),(p ,q ) ,. .. in S χ S converging to (p,q) such 
that, for all к £ ]N, 
, n(k) n(k). ,~n(k) -nik), „--nik)
 n
n(k), . (Ρ ,q ) , (P ,q ) £E(A ,B ) and 
. n(k) n(k). , ,~n(k) ~n(k), (p »q ) Г (p »q ). 
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In order to keep the notation simple, we suppose that n(k) =k, for all 
к f И. Since (p
r
q) t Ε (А,В), by corollary 2.9, ]c(p) | = |c(q) |. Witnout 
loss of generality, we may suppose that С (ρ) =C(q) ={1,...,γ}, wnere 
γ := |c(p) |, and that A > 0 and B > 0 . From corollary 2.9, it follows that 
the matrix M := [a ] , , has full rank. Therefore, the matrix 
13 i=l,]=1 
M := [a ] , , has full rank, as well, for к sufficiently larqe. 
ij i=l,D=l 
For such к we have that 
к к t t 
M (q ) = a 1 , for a constant а Φ 0 and 
Y 
к ~k t t 
M (q ) =b 1 , for a constant b ¿ 0. 
Y 
к ~к к к 
Here, for convenience, we have written q (q ) for the vector (q1f...,q ) 
^к ^к к к """к ν к ~k 
((q. ,...,q )). Since det(M ) ¿ 0 and q ,q с S , this implies that q =q , 
к ~k 
for к sufficiently large. Likewise, one can show that ρ =p , for к suf­
ficiently large. This contradicts (7.2). Now, it follows from (7.1) that 
|E(A,B) I = |E(Ak,Bk) J , for all к > К. (J 
The following theorem generalizes the two-person version of theorem 
1 of Harsanyi [1973b]. 
THEOREM 7.4. A stable (or regular) bimatrix game has an odd number of 
equilibribm points. 
PROOF. Let (A,B) f F and let (A ,B ),(A ,B ), be a sequence of non-
mxn 
degenerate bimatrix games converging to (A,B). Then, by the foregoing 
lemma, there exists a Ke И, such that [E(A,B) | = |E(A ,B ) | . Since Lemke 
and Howson [1964] proved that the number of equilibrium points of a 
non-degenerate bimatrix game is odd, the theorem is proved. Π 
REMARK 7.5. There are non-stable bimatrix games with an odd number of 
equilibrium points. Take 
A : = 
1 0 -1 
0 0 - 2 
0 0 - 1 
and В := 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 -2 -1 
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Then Ε(Α,Β) = {(e ,e ) e S x S ; ι * U } and E*(A,B) = {(e ,e )}. So 
REMAIN 7.6. There are bimatnx games with an even number of stable equi-
libnun points. Take 
2 0 - 1 
1 0 0 
0 0 1 
and В 
2 1 0 
0 0 0 
-1 0 1 
Then E(A,B) = { (e^ej) , (e3,e3) } j { (p,q) с S x S ; p 1 =p 3, q^ = q 3} and 
E S (A,B) ={(e1,e1),(e3,e3) }. 
In the following theorem, the class of bimatnx games with at least 
one isolated stable equilibrium point is considered. 
THEOREM 7.7. The set of all mxn-bimatvix acmes with an isolated stable 
2 
equilibrium point is open and dense in и 
PROOF. From theorem 3.2 and theorem 6.6, we may conclude that the set 
2 
D := {(Α,Β) e И ; (А,В) has an isolated stable equilibrium point} 
mxn 
2 is dense in ]M . Next suppose that D is not open. Then there exist an 
1 1 2 2 
mxn-bimatrix game (Α,Β) eD and a sequence (A ,B ) , (A ,B ),... conver­
ging to (Α,Β) such that 
(7.3) 
Let (p,q) be an isolated stable equilibrium point of (Α,Β). Then there 
,. converging to (p,q) 
(Ak,Bk) /D, for all к с И. 
. n(l) n(l), , n(2) n(2) 
exists a sequence (p ,q ) , (p ,q 
such that 
n(k) n(k) ) c E ( A n ( k ) , B n ( k ) ) . for all к f M. (p »q 
Since (p,q) is a regular and isolated equilibrium point of (Α,Β), it 
follows from lemma 3.1(3) that there exists а К e U such that 
. n(k) n(k). 
(p ,q ) is a regular and isolated equilibrium point of 
/.n(k) „"(к). , ,. , . „ „ , n(k) n(k), 
(A ,B ), for all к > К. Hence (p ,q ) is an isolated stable 
equilibrium point of (A ,B ), which contradicts (7.3). So D must 
be open. D 
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г* REMARK 7.8. The set r is disconnected. To see this, we write 
mxn 
F* = U С (А,В) с F* ; ;ЫА,В) I =k}. 
mxn , ,, mxn ' ' 
к odd 
It follows from lemma 7.3 that the set С(А,В) с F ;|E(A,B)I =к} is 
* 
open for all к г П. So we have written г as a (finite) union of 
mxn 
disjunct open sets. Consequently, the number of equilibrium points is 
r* locally constant on г 
§8. AN INDEX THEORY FOR STABLE BIMATRIX GAMES 
In tnis section, an index theory is formulated for isolated stable 
equilibrium points. See also Shapley L1974]. 
2 
Let (Α,Β) ι. M be a bimatnx game with A > О, В > 0. For an isolated 
mxn 
stable equilibrium point (p,q) of (Α,Β) , let A be the mxn-matnx we 
obtain from A if we exchange, for each ι /C(p) , the i-th row of A with 
a row of zeros. Also, let В be the mxn-matnx we obtain from В if we 
exchange the j-th column of В with a colu-nn of zeros if ]/C(q). Now, 
define the index matrix I(p,q) of (p,q) to be the (m+n)χ(m+n)-matrix 
D(p) В 
А*
-
 D(q) 
where D(p) (D(q)) is the mxm-diagonal (nxn-diagonal) matrix with 1 in 
the (k,k)-th cell if ki'C(p) (k/C(q)) and 0 in the (k,k)-th cell if 
ktC(p) (k f C(q)). Note that I(p,q) is a nonsingular matrix because 
det I(p,q) =± det A (S) det В (S) ^  0, where S = {(p,q)}. The index 
-c(p,q) of (p,q) is defined to be the sign of the determinant of the 
index matrix of (p/q) : ^.(p,q) : = sign fdet I(p,q)], where 
ƒ 1 χ > 0 
sign (χ) = j if 
-1 χ < 0 
The following theorem generalizes a part of theorem 4.5 of Shapley 
ri974j. 
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THEOREM 8.1. Let (А,В) É F . 'Fhen íkeve is exaoihj one more еа іЪі-
Ъггъст point wizh index -1 than with index +1. 
1 1 2 2 
PROOF. Let (A ,B ),(A ,B ),... be a sequence of non-degenerate mxn-bi-
matrix games converging to (A,B) . By lemma 7.3, we can find а Кг К 
such that |E(A ,B ) I = |E(A,B) |, for all к 2 К. Obviously, we may suppose 
к к 
that A,A > 0, B,B > 0, for all k>K. Let (p,q) ( E(A,B). In view of 
corollary 2.9, we may suppose, without loss of generality, that 
C(p) =C(q). Since (p,q) is stable, we can find a convergent sequence 
, n(l) n(l). , n(2) n(2h „m η .. .
 t , . 
(p ,q ) , (p ,q ), in Ξ xS with limit (p,q) and 
, n(k) n(k) n(k)
 o
n(k) 
(p ,q )<-E(A ,B ), for all к с К. Using lemma 3.1(2), we 
can find an L ' IN such that C(p ) = С (ρ) = С (q) = С (q" ), for all 
к>L. Because the matrices [a ] „, , „, . and fb ] _, . _, . 
13 iFC(p) ,]rC(q) i] icC(p) ,]f.C(q) 
are nonsingular, there is an M с Usuch that the corresponding sub-
matrices of A and В are nonsingular, for all к SM. From this 
ι j 4.1. *. , n(k) n(k) , 
we can conclude that -tip ,q ) ='(.(p,q), for all 
k>K(p,q) :=max {K,L,M}. Put K*:=max {K(p,q) ; (p,q) cE(A,B)}. Then 
the number of equilibrium points of the game (A,B) with index -1 equals 
* * 
К К 
the number of equilibrium points of the game (A ,B ) with index -1. 
The same is true for the equilibrium points with index +1. Now the 
proof is complete if we apply theorem 4.5 of Shapley [1974]. Q 
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CHAPTER IV 
EQUILIBRIUM POINTS OF SEMI-INFINITE BIMATRIX GAMES 
51. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we combine the approaches used in chapter II and 
in a paper of T13S Γ1979] in the study of the set of equilibrium points 
of the mixed extension of a bounded semi-mfmite bimatnx game. 
To this end we consider, as in the case of a finite bimatnx game, 
Nash subsets, i.e. sets of equilibrium points that have the inter-
changeability property. The equilibrium point set is the union of the 
maximal Nash subsets. We show that a maximal Nash subset is the Carte­
sian product of a compact convex set and a closed, convex set with a 
finite or countably infinite number of extreme points. In section 4, 
these extreme points are characterized in terms of square submatrices 
of the payoff matrix of the first player. 
Finally, m section 5, the relationship between the set of equili­
brium points of a bounded semi-infmite bimatnx game and the equilibria 
of the finite subgames is considered. 
The results presented in this chapter were obtained jointly with 
Tijs and have been published m Jansen and Τ13Ξ Ll981bJ. 
§2. SEMI-INFINITE BIMATRIX GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM POINTS 
Let A = I a 1 , . and В = I b ] . .be two bounded mx™-matrices ij i=lfj=l 13 1=1,3=1 
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(m £ U ) with real coefficients. Corresponding to the pair (Α,Β) , we con-
in 0o ш с 
sider the two-person games in normal form <S ,S ,E ,E»> and <S ,S ,E ,E >, 
where S°°:={qe¿ ; q > 0 , Σ °°,σ = 1 } , 
3 = 1 'з 
Ξ := {q L S ; there exists an η с U such that q = 0 for all j > n } , 
m ^
3
 4-
Ε,(ρ,σ) :=Σ. . Σ . p.a .q.=pAq and 
1 ι=1 j=l ι ij j 
E (p,q) := ρΒσ , for all ρ r S™ and q< S . 
These games are called the mixed extension and the c-rrrixed extension, 
respectively, of the mx^-bimatrix game (Α,Β). The set of equilibrium 
points of the (c-)mixed extension of the game (Α,Β) is denoted by 
Ε(Α,Β) (Ε (Α,Β) ) . 
1 2 
EXAMPLE 2.1. Let A = [0 0 0 . . . ] and B = [0 — — . . . ] . Then Ε (Α,Β) = φ 
and Ε (Α,Β) = φ. 
с . 
Tijs [1975],[1980] proved that for a bounded mx^-bimatrix game (Α,Β) 
— — m ^ 
and any ε > 0, there exists a pair (p,q) с Ξ χ S such that 
pAq = max pAq and pBq > max pBq - ε. 
ptS qeS 
The set of all these (0,ε)-equilibrium points of the c-mixed extension 
of (Α,Β) is denoted by Ε ' ε (Α,Β). E ' (Α,Β) is the set of all (0,ε)-
equilibrium points of the mixed extension of (Α,Β). 
In this chapter we shall make use of the following equivalence, 
which can be proved in a way similar to the proof of lemma 1.3.3. 
LEMMA 2.2. Let (Α,Β) Ъе a bounded semi-infinite mx^-bimatrix game and 
lev (p,q) e Smxs°°. Then (p,q) t E (А,в) if and only if c(p) см(А;д) and 
C(q) с Μ (ρ; В) , where Μ (ρ; В) := { j с W; рВе > рВе , for all к f и } . 
3 к 
For the description of the relationship between E(A,B) and Ε (Α,Β), 
we need the following result of Blackwell and Girshick [1954], p.48. 
LEMMA 2.3. Let ν.,ν,,... be a bounded sequence of elements in ж . 
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If q t Ξ , then there is a q с S such that 
OO CO _ , 
Σ . q ν = i. ,qv<L conv {v, ,v„, . . . i . 
THEOREM 2.4. Let (A,B) be a bounded m^'^-bimaLrix game. Ihen 
E(A,B)=cl(E (A,B)). Consequently, ΕίΑ,Β) ^  φ iff E (A,B)^0. 
PROOF, (a) We show that E(A,B) ccl(E (A,B) ) by proving that for each 
С II II 
(p,q) cE(A,B) and each t>0 thore is a q t S with ||q-q || < e and 
(p^ ) e E (А,В) . Let ε > 0. As in the proof of theorem 3 of Ti]s 1 1979J, 
one can find, with tne aid of lemma 2.3, a q с S with ||q-q || . < ε, 
C(q ) "C(q) and Aq = Aq . Tnen M(A;q ) =M(A;q). Consecuently, by lemma 
2.2, (p,q ) f E
c
(A,B). 
1 1 2 2 (b) Now we show that cl (E (A,B) ) C E ( A , B ) . Let (p ,q ) , (p ,q ) , . .. be a 
sequence in E (А,В), converging to some (p,q) t S m x S . Then, for all 
к € К, 
e A(q k) tSp kA(q k) t, for all if Ν , (2.1) 
ι m 
p kBe t Sp'Stq1*)11, for all 3 с К. 
t "θ 
In view of tne fact that, for a bounded mx^-matnx Μ, χ »->• e Mx (χ t S ) 
00 
is a continuous function on S , (2.1) implies that, for all 
(1,3) e TJ x U, 
m 
„ t ^ . t . „ t ^  „ t 
e Aq < pAq and pBe S pBq . 
So (p,q) £ E(A,B) . С 
§3. THE STRUCTURE OF MAXIMAL NASH SUBSETS 
In this section, we only consider bounded semi-mfmite bimatnx 
games (A,B) with E(A,B)^^. 
m
 αί 
Let (А,В) be such a bimatnx game of size mx«. For (p,q) cS x S , 
let K(q) := ,ρ ' S1"; (p,q) f Ε (А,В) } 
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L(p) := {qr S ; (p,q) > Ε(Λ,Β) }. 
Then K(q) is a convex, compact subset of S and L(p) is a closed, con-
vex subset of Ξ , as one easily verifies. 
We have already defined the concepts of Nash subset and maximal 
Nash subset for the case of a finite bimatrix game. In the infinite 
case, we define tnese notions analogously. 
REMARK 3.1. If S is a maximal Nash subset for a bimatrix game (Α,Β), 
then S = TT.(S) X T ( S ) , where 
TTjtS) :={peS ; there exists a q t S with (p,q) с S} and 
π,ίΞ) := {qc S ; there exists a pi S with (p,q) e Ξ} 
are called the factor sets of S. Since the factor sets of a maximal Nash 
subset are convex and closed, a maximal Nash subset is a closed and 
convex set. 
THEOREM 3.2. Let (Α,Β) be a bounded semi-infinite m>«*>-bimatrix game 
and let S be a maximal Nash, subset for the game (А,в) . If 
ρ с relint π (S) , then π (S) = L(p) and S = ir (Ξ) χ L (ρ) . 
PROOF. This theorem can be proved in the same way as theorem II. 2.3. ι] 
§4. EXTREME EQUILIBRIUM POINTS 
We start with a generalization of a result of Mills [1960]. 
LEMMA 4.1. Let (Α,Β) be a bounded mx<*>-bimatrix game and let 
(p,q) e S χ S . Then (p,q) e Ε(Α,Β) if and only if there exist scalars 
α and β such that 
e Aq <a, for all ι t U , 
ι ^
 J
 m 
pBe < β, for all 3 £ U, and (4.1) 
pAq + pBq = a+0. 
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PROOF. If (p,q) ι E(A,B), then (4.1) lb satisfied if one takes α= pAq 
and β=pBq . If the quadruplet (p,q,a,3) satisfies (4.1), then for 
i
n
eC(p), e Aq =α, as one can prove as follows. If e Aq <a, then 
10 "^O 
α+β = pAq +pDq =p e Aq + Σ p e A q + Σ pBe q 
10 10 ^ I Q 1 1 3 :, :, 
<p α+ Σ p a + Σ q ß = a+B, 
1 1 Ί 
which is impossible. Hence, 
a = pAq and pAq >e Aq , for all ι с И . (4.2) 
Similarly, if ] f C(q), then pBe =3. So В= pBq and pBq >pBe , for 
all ] e К. Together with (4.2) this implies that (p,q) с E(А,В). L 
Inspired by this lemma, we introduce the convex and closed set 
CO £ 
Q :={(q,a)fS x]R;eAq <a, for all ι e TJ }. 
Α ι m 
Lindenstrauss [1966] proved that a closed, bounded and convex sub­
set of Ζ has extreme points and that such a set is the closed convex 
hull of its extreme points. In view of this result and remark. 3.1 it 
is meaningful to investigate the extreme points of a maximal Nash sub­
set. 
As in the finite case, an equilibrium point of a bounded semi-
infinite bimatnx game is called an extreme equblvbrivm point if it is 
an extreme point of some maximal Nash subset for that game. If (p,q) 
is an extreme equilibrium point of (A,B), then we call ρ (q) an extreme 
strategy for player 1 (2). 
LEMMA 4.2. Let (A,B) be a bounded mx™-binatrix game. If (p,q) zs an 
extreme equilibriun point of (А,в), then 
(1) (q^Aq*1) с ext(Q A), 
(2) C(q) га a finite set; even |c(q) | < m, 
(3) the rank of the matrix м= . " j L/Äere 
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м:
=
^
а
 ] „/. ч г-, ч equals |c(q)| + l. 
о 
PROOF. Suppose that (p,q) cext(S) and p- relint π (S), where S is a 
maximal Nash subset for (A,B). Then, by theorem 3.2, 
о о о 
(p,q) e ext (π (S) * L(p) ) = ext π. (S) χ ext L(p) . So q ' ext L(p) . 
(a) Assertion (1) can be proved as lemma 11.3.3(2). 
с - с 
(b) Suppose that q/S . In view of lemma 2.3, there exists a qc S such 
that Aq = Aq and C(q) <• C(q). This implies that M(A;q) =M(A;q),· so 
о 
(p,q) e E(A,B). Now consider, for ε> 0, the vector 
q U ) := (l+t)q-8q. 
Then, for ε > 0 sufficiently small, q(c) с S . 
Moreover, C(qU)) c-C(q) uC(q) =C(q) and AqU) = (l+e)Aq -8Aq = Aq . 
о 
Consequently, (p,q^)) È E ( A , B ) , for ε sufficiently small. However, 
-1. -1- - о 
q= (1+ε) q(ε)+ε(l+e) q and q(e),qcL(p). Since q^q(£) / this contra-
0
 с 
diets the fact that qc ext L(p) . So q € S i.e. C(q) is a finite set. 
(c) Assertion (3) can be proved in the same way as in the proof of 
theorem II.3.8. 
(d) That |c(q)|<m, follows from (3). Г., 
In the following theorem we associate the extreme strategies of 
player 2 with certain square submatrices of A. Compare this result 
with theorem II. 3.8. 
THEOREM 4.3. Let (A,B) be a bounded w*>-bimatr>ix game. If (p,q) ( E(A,B) 
and pAq ^ Oj then the following tuo assertions are equivalent 
(1) q is an extreme strategy for player 2y 
(2) there exists a nonsingular square submatrix к of A such that 
t „ t -l.t j , t ,. -l.t,-1 q K = PAqK 1 K and pAq = ( 1 ^ Ij,) . 
[Here q is the vector obtained from q by removing the coordinates cor-
K 
responding to the columns of A which play no role in K.] 
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PROOF, (a) We show that (2) implies (1). Let S be a maximal Nash sub-
o 
set for (A,B) containing (p,q) and let p< relint π (S). Suppose that 
л ν о л ν л ν 
tnere are q,q e L(p) with q = ^ q+ kq. Then C(q) с С(q) and C(q) с C(q) . 
о о л с V 
Since (p,q) , (p,q) , (p,q) г Ε(Α,Β) , for icM(A;q), we have 
t , At , vt , о At , о vt о t t 
e Aq = ^ e Aq + 'îe Aq < 'spAq + ipAq = pAq = e Aq 
At о At vt о vt л 
and therefore e Aq = pAq and e Aq = pAq ; so M(A;q) <= M (A,q) and 
ν 
M(A;q) cM(A;q). Consequently, 
At At vt vt 
e i K q K = p A q a n d е і К Ч
к
=
Р
А
Ч ' 
л ν 
for all suitable values of i. Because К is nonsingular,and q and q 
К К 
л ν л ν 
are probability vectors, this implies that q =q . So a = q. Therefore, 
К. К 
о 
q ext L(p) . 
(b) Suppose that (1) holds. Let M be the matrix as defined in lemma 
4.2(3) and let γ := |c(q)|. Since rank M=γ+l by that lemma, we can 
find γ+l rows of M (including the last row) which are linearly inde­
pendent. These rows forn a nonsingular (γ+l) χ (γ+l)-submatnx 
К : = 
κ -η 
1 oj 
~
 a
 t ~ t t 
of M. Now (q„,pAq ) is the unique solution of the system Kx = e . The 
theorem is proved if we use the fact that К is (det к) times the 
adjoint matrix of K. [1 
With the aid of theorem 4.3, we can prove the following result. 
THEOREM 4.4. Let (A,B) be a bounded mx^-bimatrix game. Let S be a maxi­
mal Nash subset for· (А,в) with, ρ t relint π (S) . Then 
L(p) =cl(conv(ext L(p))) 
and ext L(p) is a finite ov a oountably infinite set. 
о 
PROOF. The first assertion about L(p) is a consequence of remark 3.1 
and the result of Lindenstrauss mentioned earlier. Further, theorem 
о 
4.3 associates with an extreme point of L(p) a certain nonsingular sub-
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matrix of A. It is еачу to see that with a nonsingular square submatnx 
of Л there corresponds at most one such an extreme point. Because the 
set of square submatrices of A is countably infinite, we can conclude 
о 
that ext L(p) is a finite or countably infinite set. [ 
REMARK 4.5. Also π (S) is the convex hull of its extreme points. This 
is a consequence of the theorem of Krein-Milman. Note that the set 
of extreme points of π (S) may be uncountable. An example of this pheno­
menon can be found in the proof of theorem 2 of Tijs [19791. That the 
о 
set of extreme points of L(p) may be countably infinite is illustrated 
by the example where A and В are two lx">-matrices with all coefficients 
1 <*» 
equal to zero. Then E(A,B) = S χ S and ext He.) = {е.,e,...}. 
REMARK 4.6. It follows from the proof of theorem 4.4 that the set 
extreme strategies of player 2 is at most countably infinite. 
Let (A,B) be a bounded semi-infinite bimatnx game and let 
(p,q) e (А,В). Since {(p,q)} is a Nash subset, we can find, with the help 
of the lemma of Zorn, a maximal Nash subset containing (p,q). Conse­
quently, every equilibrium point of (A,B) is contained in a maximal Nash 
subset and E(A,B) is the union of such subsets. 
THEOREM 4.7. The set of equblibrivm points of a bounded semi-infinite 
bimatrix game is a union of maximal Nash subsets. 
Now we give an example of a bounded semi-inf mite bimatnx game with 
a countably infinite number of maximal Nash subsets. 
EXAMPLE 4.8. Let A= 
0 0 .. 
0 0 . . 
and let В be the 2»«»-matrix with, for 
all n e m , b, =cos(2 ηπ) and b„ =sin(2~niT). In ¿n 
Let p n := (cos(2_nTT) + sin(2"nw))~1(b. ,bn ). Then, for all η t U, 
In 2n 
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(ρ ,e ) cE(A,B). Furthermore, tae equilibrium points (ρ ,β.ί,ίρ ,θ.)
; 
are contained in different maximal Nash subsets. 
55. APPROXIMATION BY FINITE SUBGAMES 
In t ms section,we study the relation between the set of equi­
librium points of a bounded semi-infinite bimatnx game (A,B) and the 
equilibria of the games (A.,B.),(Α-,Β»),..., where, for η с W, 
Г - I m n -ir, r i _ i m n 
A •= [a ] and В := [b ] , . 
η i] 1=1,3=1 η i] i=l,j=l 
THEOREM 5.1. Lel (А,В) be a bounded semi-infinite m^'^-bimatvix game. 
Then 
limsuD E(A ,B ) =E(A,B), 
n-«.*
 n n 
Where E(A
n
,B
n
)~ := { (p,q) ; q := (q,0,0, . . .) e S°°, (p,q) t E(A
n
,B
n
) }. 
PROOF. (1) Let (p,q) £E(A,B). We show that E(A,B) сli
m Sup E(A ,B ) by 
proving that, for each ε > 0, there is an n(c) £ Hand a q e S , with 
||q-(q ,0,0,...) Il, < ε and (p,q ) с E (A , . ,Β . ,) . As in part (a) of the 11
 ε "1 ε η (ε) η (ε) 
proof of theorem 2.4, one can find a q £ S with ||q-q || . < ε and 
(p,q ) eE (A,B). Now we can write q =(q ,0,0,...), where q с S for 
some η £ U. Obviously, (p,q ) £ E(A ,B ), because 
pA q = pAq >e Aq = e A q , for all ι с U , and r
 n^t е ^ε ι ε ι η^ε m 
ρΒ q = pBq > рВе = pB e , for all 3 e И . 
η ε ε з η ] η 
і^ г _ / "t1) ~η(1). , η(2) ~η(2). , m „ = 
(2) Let (ρ ,q ) , (ρ ,q ) , . . . be a sequence in S xS conver­
ging to (p,q) such that, for all к ε Π, 
. η(к) ~n(к), , . ~ 
We can write q = (q ,0,0,...), where q ε S . Now 
~n(k).t
 Λ
 , n(k),t^ п(к)
л
 , n(k).t 
eA(q ) u = e A „ . ( q ) S p A ^ . f q ) 1 ^ 1 n(k) ^ * n(k) 
n(k) ~n(k) t
 c
 ., _, 
= ρ A(q ) , for all 1 с N . 
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So e.Aq <pAq , for all i f К . To prove that pBq >pBe. for a fixed 
j ( U, note that for all n(k) > j 
n(k) D ,~n(k).t n(]c) , n(k) t^ n(k) t n(k) t 
Ρ B(q ) =p B
n ( k ) ( q ) >p В п ( к ) е . = Р Ве з. 
Taking limits, we obtain pBq >pBe.. So (p/q) cE(A,B). Π 
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CHAPTER V 
ON CHARACTERIZING PROPERTIES OF THE VALUE SET AND 
THE EQUILIBRIUM POINT SET OF A NON-COOPERATIVE TWO-PERSON GAME 
§1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1963, Vilkas gave an axiomatic definition of the value of a 
matrix game. Extensions to other classes of zero-sum games were given 
by Ti]s [1975],L1981 ] and by Hazen [1976]. An attempt to extend his 
results to finite non-zero-sum games was made by Vilkas Γ19681 (cf. 
Vorobev [1970], p.96). We will show in section 2 that this attempt 
was not successful. In section 4 of this paper, we consider, for boun­
ded measurable non-cooperative two-person games, two properties,called 
the adjunction property and the maximum property, lie show that the 
value multi function on classes of games, whicn are closed witT respect 
to adjunction of one strategy, is the smallest multifunction with the 
two above-mentioned properties. In section 5, two systems of charac­
terizing properties for the equilibrium point set of a finite bimatnx 
game are given. 
The results presented in this chapter, were obtained jointly with 
Tijs and have been published in Jansen en Tijs [1981a]. 
§2. DISCUSSION OF A PAPER OF VILKAS 
Let (A,B) e W . Let v: S χ S >- ]R be the map defined as follows 
mxn 
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v(p,q) := (pAq ,pBq ), for (p,q) f S xS . 
Then the continuity of ν and the compactness of E(A,B) imply that the 
set of едигІгЪггыт payoffs 
V(A,B) := {(pAqt,pBqt); (p,q) с Ε(А,В)} 
2 is a compact subset of Ж . 
2 2 
Let ΊΛ := U И .In his paper, Vilkas investigates the Value 
mxn 
m.neU 
• · 9 2 
multbfunetbon V: W -»· Ж which assigns to a bimatnx game (A,B) the 
set V(A,B) of equilibrium payoffs. Vilkas studies the family F of 
2 2 
multifunctions F from ΊΛ into Ж satisfying the following three pro­
perties: 
. . 2 (1) (nonotomobty) If (A,B) , (K,L) e И and A = K and B > L (A > К and 
mxn 
В = L) , then there exists an f с ΓίΑ,Β) and a geF(K,Ij), such that 
f 2 > g 2 ( f ^ g , ) . 
2 (2) (dojmnanae) I f (A,B) € ΊΛ and e A ï e. A, f o r some i , k ι U 
mxn í k m 
(Be > Be, , for some η,k t N ) , then FfA.B) = FÍA',Β'), where A' and j k n 
B' are the matrices obtained from A and B, respectively, by removing 
the k-th row (column). 
2 
(3) (objectivity) If (A,B) с W and all coefficients of A (B) are 
mxn 
equal to a constant с e TR, then f. = с (f_ = c), for all feF(A,B). 
Vilkas [1968] suggest that F={v}. In fact, he proves in theorem 1 on 
p.523 that Fc{v}. The following examples will show that F=^, because 
V does not satisfy the monotonicity property (examples 2.1 and 2.2) and 
the dominance property (example 2.3). Hence, V/F. 
EXAMPLE 2.1. Let (A,B(t)) be the bimatnx game, where 
3 1 
0 0 and B(t) = 
0 -1 
-1 t 
(-"ss t< hi 
and let (A ,B(t)) be the bimatnx game with A = f3 1 L4 2 and B(t) as 
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above. Then V(Ä,B(t)) contains one element v= (3,0) and V(A ,B(t)) 
contains also one element ν = (2,t). Now it follows from the fact that 
A >A and ν =2 < 3 = v., that V does not satisfy the monotonicity pro-
* * * 
perty. Note further, that ν» < ν , ν =v_, ν >v for tf [-^,Ο), t = 0 
and tr (0,41, respectively. 
0 
EXAMPLE 2.2. Let A 
0
 4 A' - [ 0 l' 
1 2j' [-b 2 
-10 10 
10 -10 
Then and В = 
A' differs from Л only in one cell, A' >A and the first coordinate of 
the unique element of V(A,B) equals h, which is greater than the first 
coordinate V 3 of the unique element of νίΑ',Β) . This again shows that 
the monotonicity property fails for non-zero-sum games. 
EXAMPLE 2.3. To show that V does not satisfy the dominance property, 
2 1 
2 0 
and В = 
ί]· appea-we use the bimatrix game (A,B) with A = 
ring in Vilkas Г1968], p.525. Let (Α',Β1) be the bimatrix game with 
A' = L2 1] and B' = [0 1], which we obtain by excluding the second 
pure strategy of player 1. Note that the second row of A is dominated 
by the first row: e A Se. A. Then 
V(A,B) = {(1,1)} и {(2,t); 2/3<t<2} and 
VÍA'.B') = {(1,1)}, 
which shows that V does not have the dominance property of Vilkas. 
§3. SOME PROPERTIES OF NON-COOPERATIVE TWO-PERSON GAMES IN NORMAL FORM 
In the following we look at bounded measurable two-person games 
Г = <X,Y,K,L>, where the strategy spaces X and Y are non-empty measu­
rable spaces, with o-algebras of subsets X and У respectively, and 
where the payoff functions Κ: Χ χ γ - ^ Κ , ί : XxY->-B are bounded 
measurable functions with respect to the product σ-algebra of X and У. 
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We suppose that X and У contain the one point sets of X and Y, respec­
tively. The class of these games is denoted by BM. 
For Г=<X,Y,K,L>f BM, we write Е(Г) for the set of equilibrium 
points of the mixed extension <P ,p ,E ,E > of Г, where Ρ (Ρ ) denotes 
Λ Y К L» Χ Y 
the family of probability measures on X (Y) and where, for 
(y,v) t Ρ
χ
χ Ρ
γ
, 
Ε (μ,ν) = IS K(x,y) αμ(χ) dv(y) 
Js. 
Ε (μ,ν) = SI L(x,y) dy(x) dv(y). 
We call the subset VC) := { (E,, (μ, ν) ,Ε
Τ
 (μ,ν) ) ; (μ,ν) еЕ(Г)} of Ι*2, the 
Value set of the game Г. 
In the following two theorems we derive two important properties 
2 
of the value nul ti function ν ВЯ •+• TR . 
THEOREM 3.1. (Maximum property of У) Let Γ = <X,Y,K,L> <r BM. Suppose 
(χ,у) e Χ χ Y satisfies 
(ι) K(x,y) = max К(х,у) and 
XÍX 
(il) L(x,y) = max L(x,y). 
ycY_ 
Then (K(x,y),L(x,y)) t (Г). 
PROOF. Let e- (e-) be the probability measure with mass 1 in χ с X 
χ у 
(ye Y). Then (ι) and di) imply that(e-,e-) £Ε(Γ) and consequently, 
(K(x,i),L(x,y)) = (E (e-,e-),ET(e-,e-)) t (Г). Π 
Λ. X У Li X y 
Before we can formulate the second property of V, we need a 
DEFINITION 3.2. Let r = <X,Y,K,L> be an element of BM and let α f Ρ , 
β e Ρ„. Then the two-person game in normal form Γ =<Xu{x },Y,K ,L > 
with x^^ X, 
Κ (χ,у) = K(x,y) , L (χ,y) = L(x,y) , for ail χ e X, y £ Y, and 
К (х
ш
,у) = I K(x,y) da (χ) , L (х
ш
,у) = Ι Их,у) da (χ), for all у £ Y, 
α
 " Χ
 α
 " Χ 
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will be called the one-point-adjunotion of Γ with respect to a. The 
one-point-adjunction of Γ with respect to В will be the game 
α о о 
Г = <X,Y и {yœ},K ,L >, where У^/Y, 
о о 
Κ (χ,у) = К(х,у) , L (χ,у) =L(x,y), for all χ с X, yt Y,and 
Κ
3(χ/Υ ) = ƒ K(x,y) dß(y), Lß(x,y ) =ƒ L(x,y) dß(y), for all X( X. 
» γ " γ 
It is straightforward to show that for Г с BM also Г and Г are 
α 
elements of BM, where we provide Xu {x } with the σ-algebra 
Χ υ {S и {χ }; S ε Χ} and Υ и {y } with the σ-algebra V и {τ ь {у }; Τ с У). 
со оо -* •'со 
ñ о 
In the following we will denote (Г ) = (Г ) by 
Γ (α,β) =<XU {x^}, Y о {yœ},K(a,B) ,L(a,ß)>. 
THEOREM 3.3. Lei Γ = <X,Y,K,L>t BM, a с Ρ and β с Ρ . Then 
(i) VC ) = (Г), 
a 
(іі) ν(Γβ) = (Г) and 
(ііі) ν(Γ(α,β) ) = (Г) {Adjunction property of V) . 
PROOF, (i) Suppose (μ,ν) сЕ(Г) and let μ с Ρ , ι be the probability 
measure with ν (U) =μ(υ-{χ }) , for all measurable subsets U of Xu {x }. 
Then (μ,ν)(-Ε(Γ ), Ε,, (μ,ν) = Ε (μ,ν) andE
r
 (μ ,ν) = Ε
τ
 (μ ,ν) . This 
α α 
implies thatV(r) с ν (Γ ). 
Conversely, suppose (μ,ν)с Ε(Γ ) and let μ be the probability 
measure μ'+μίίχ })α on X, where μ' is the restriction of μ to X. Then 
it follows that (μ,ν)οΕ(Γ) andE (μ,ν)=Ε (μ,ν) andE (u,v)=ET (μ,ν), 
К К L L 
a a 
So (Г ) су(Г) and (i) is proved. 
α 
(ii) can be proved similarly as (i), and (iii) is an immediate conse­
quence of (i) and (ii). J 
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§4. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE VALUE MULTIFUNCTION 
DEFINITION 4.1. A subfamily С of BM will be called closed with respect 
to one-point-adjunation, if, for all r = <X,Y,K,L>c С and all а с Ρ , 
β e P„, we have Γ f С and Г с С. 
Υ α 
Now we formulate the main result of this chapter. 
THEOREM 4.2. Let С be a subfamily of SM, uhiah is closed with respect 
2 
to one-point-adjunction and let F: С -> ж be a multifunction with the 
following properties : 
P.l (Maximum property) For each r = <x,Y,K,L>t С and (x,y) с χ χ Y with 
K(x,y) = max К(х,у) and L(x,y) =max L(x,y) (4.1) 
xcX ycY 
we have (K(x,y),L(x,y)) f Р(Г). 
P.2 (Adjunction property) For each Τ = <x, Y,K,L> r C, acP , ßcP , we 
have ρ(Γ(α,3)) = FtD. 
2 
P.3 (Minimum property) If G: С •+ ю -¿sa multifunction, satisfying the 
maximum property and the adjunction property y then 
С(Г) ог(Г) , /or еасй Г e С. 
T/zen F = V. 
PROOF. V satisfies, in view of theorems 3.1 and 3.3, the maximum pro­
perty and the adjunction property. So, in view of P.3, we have 
(Г) эг(Г), for each Г e С Conversely, let (u,v) <г (Г), where 
Г = <X,Y,K,L> t C. Then there exist α r Ρ and β < Ρ such that (α,β) с Е(Г) 
and Ε (α,β) = u, Ε
τ
(α,β) =ν. But then P.l can be applied with Γ(α,β) 
in the role of Γ and (x ,y ) in the role of (x,y). So 
(u,v) = (Κ(α,β) (χ ,y ),L(ci,3) (χ ,y ) ) ε F (Γ (α, β) ) . 
ΟΟ OD 00 Ш 
Then (u,v) e FtD in view of P.2. Hence, (Г) с р(Г), for each Г с С. D 
In view of theorem 4.2, subclasses of 8M, which are closed with 
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respect to one-point-adjunction, are interesting. We mention sone. 
2 
1. Tne class И of (finite) bimatrix games. 
2. The class of two-person games, where at least one of the strategy 
spaces is finite (cf. Tijs [19751, p.60). 
3. The class of games <X,Y,K,L>, where X and Y are compact metric 
spaces and where the payoff functions К and L are continuous (cf. 
Hazen [1976], p.28). 
Llf d is the metric on X, then we can take an arbitrary at X and 
take d , defined by d (Χ,Χ') =d(x,x,) if (χ,χ1) с Χ* Χ, 
d (χ ,χ) =d(a,x) + 1, for all χ с Χ, and 
a « 
d (χ ,χ ) = 0, 
а » я> 
fi β 
as metric on Xu {χ }. Then К ,L ,K ,L are bounded and continuous 
ο» α α 
for all α Ρ and β с Ρ .J 
4. The class 2 of zero-sun games <X,Y,K,-K> in BM. 
5. The class Ζ I/ of zero-sum games in BM with a real value. 
For Zl/ we have also the following result. 
THEOREM 4.3. Let f Ζ1/->·Κ Ъе a (sinale-valued) function with the 
folloúing properties: 
Z.l Гог each Γ = <χ,Υ,Κ,-κ>
 ( Zf and (x,y) c x x Y , satisfying (4.1) 
(L=-K), we have K(x,y) = f (χ. Υ,к,-К) . 
ζ.2 For each Γ = <x,Y,K,-K> t ZI/, ас Ρ and β t Ρ , we have 
f(r(a,ß)) =f(r). 
Then f (Γ) is the value vaKD of the game Г, for each Γ e ZU. 
PROOF. Similarly, as in the proof of theorem 4.2, it follows that 
{ а1(Г)}с {f(Γ)}. Since val and f are functions, val = f. Π 
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§5. CHARACTERIZING PROPERTIES OF THE EQUILIBRIUM POINT SET OF A 
BIMATRIX GAME 
In this section, we consider the multifunction E that assigns to a 
bimatnx game (A,B) the set E(A,B) of its equilibrium points. 
For a bimatnx game (A,B) e M and ρ- S , q e S , we look in the 
m^n 
following at the (m+1) χ (n+1)-bimatnx game (A ,B ), where 
РіЧ РіЧ. 
A : = 
p . q 
Ά 
-PA 
A q f 
p A q 1 . 
a n d В : = 
p . q 
В 
-PB 
Bq 
p B q 
Let S := и S m x S n . Note that tne multifunction E: И -»-Ssatis-
m,n( U 
fies the following properties. 
2 
E.l For each (Α,Β) ε И we have 
if a = max a ,b = max b , then (e ,e ) e Ε(Α,Β). 
o o •
L
 о о о J o о о 
2 
Е.2 For all m,η f U and each (Α,Β) e И , we have 
mxn 
(p,q) с Ε(Λ,Β) if and only if (e ,,e ,) f E(A ,B ). 
m+1 n+1 p,q p,q 
Characterizing properties of the multifunction E are given in the 
next theorem. 
2 
THEOREM 5.1. Let G: и •+ S be a multi function, such that for each Ъг-
matvix game (Α,Β) e и we have G(A,B) с s1" χ Ξ . Suppose, furthermore, 
that G satisfies the following conditions: 
2 
Q.l (Maximum property) If for a game (Α,Β) ε W we have 
a = max a ,b = max b , then (e ,e ) e.G(A,B). i ] . 1 3 1 3 - - - -0 0 1 -Ό ο ο 1 
^ 2 
Q.2 (Adjunction property) For all m,ne Hand each (Α,Β) e И , we have 
mxn 
(p,q) ε G(A,B) if arA only if (e ,.,θ .)eG(A ,B ). 
' m+1 n+1 p,q p,q 
2 
Q.3 (Мгпътит property) If H: и -»-S is a multifunctton with 
Н(А,в) с s χ S , if (Α,Β) has size mxn, and which satisfies the 
maximum property and the adjunction property, then 
2 
G(A,B) C H ( A , B ) , for each (Α,Β) г и . 
Then G = E. 
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and 
wh 
PROOF. The multifunction E satisfies, in view of E.l and E.2, the 
maximum property and the adjunction property. Hence, by Q.3, we have 
2 2 
G(A,B) C E ( A , B ) , for all (A,B) f ΊΛ . Take a bimatnx game (A,B) f И 
mxn 
let (p,q) с ΜΑ,Β) . Then, by E.2, we havo (e ,,e , ) Ê E ( A ,B ), 
m+l n+l Pf<3 Р/Ч 
ich, in view of Q.l, implies that (e ,,e .)tG(A ,B ). But then 
m+l n+l p , q p , q 
2 (p,q)
 l G(A,B) by property Q.2. So E(ArB)c G(A,B), for all (A,B) W . Π 
Now we want to replace 0.1 by three properties, which have some 
similarity with the axioms of Vilkas 
R.l (Pseudo monotonicity property) For each pair of bimatnx games 
* •* * • 
(A,B) and (A ,B) with A < A , a =a and (e ,e )cG(A .B). 1
 Э ! 3 ! D 
о о о о о о 
we have (e ,е ) e G(A,B). 
^ ^о 
R.2 (Weak domnance property) For each pair of bimatnx ga-nes (A,B) 
and (Α',Β1), where (Α',Β') is obtained by eliminating a dominated 
row of A or a dominated column of B, the set G(A',B') is (essen­
tially) a subset of G(A,B). if (p,q) rG(A',B') and, for instance, 
the last row of A is dominated, then (p',q) G(A,B), where 
p' := (p,0). 
R.3 (Objectivity) For each Ixl-bimatnx game (Α,Β) , G(A,B) ={(e 1,e l)}. 
Note that the multifunction E satisfies the properties R.l, R.2 and 
R.3. We have the following result. 
2 
THEOREM 5.2. Let G: И -»-S be a multifunction such that, for each bi-
matrix game (Α,Β) cm , we have G (Α,Β) es χ S , and suppose G satis­
fies R.l, R.2 and R.3, Q.2 and Q.3. Then G=E. 
PROOF. Again, it is sufficient to show that E(A,B) C G ( A , B ) , for all 
2 (Α,Β) e И . 
2 (a) Let (Α,Β) t И be a bimatnx game with (e ,e ) e Ε (Α,Β) . Let 
mxn ι л 
о о 
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A = La I , , be the mxn-matrix, such that for all π с U , i] і=1,з = 1 J η 
* * 
a = max a and a = a i f ι ψ ι . 
I O 3 ι ID ID ID о 
By u s i n g R . 2 , r e p e a t e d l y , and by u s i n g R . 3 , we o b t a i n 
G(A*,B) э с ( [ а * ] n . , [ b ] n i ) = > G ( [ a * ] , [ b ] ) = { ( e ,e ) } . 
ι J 3=1 1 3 3=1 1 3 1 3 1 3 
о о о о о о о о 
Now applying R.l, gives (e ,e ) с G(А,В). 
х
о ^о 
(b) Now let (p,q) с E(A,B). Then (e .,e .) с E(A ,B ). In view of 
ra+1 n+1 p,q p,q 
part (a) of this proof, we obtain that (e ..e .) cG(A ,B ) and 
m+1 n+1 p,q p,q 
by Q.2 we may conclude that (p,q) ' G(A,B). Hence, E(A,B) C G ( A , B ) , for 
all (A,B) < ЛИ . [] 
Note that property R.3 can be omitted from theorem 5.2, if we 
2 
demand that the multifunction G satisfies G(A,B) фф, for all (A,B) с M . 
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PART II 
OPTIMAL THREAT STRATEGIES OF ARBITRATION GAMES 
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CHAPTER VI 
BARGAINING PAIRS AND BARGAINING SOLUTIONS 
§1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we consider situations where two participants have 
the possibility of cooperating in several ways for their mutual benefit. 
Specifically, we assume that the "players" are faced with a set of al­
ternatives about which they can bargain and negotiate in order to reach 
an outcome agreeable to both of them. If the players cannot make a 
unanimous decision, then some fixed outcome results. 
Such bargaining problems occur in many (economic) situations. Also 
problems of this type often arise as a facet of more complex situations, 
such as arbitration games. In the next chapter, where we are dealing 
with such games, we shall not only consider this bargaining aspect but 
also the possibility of using threats. 
Like Nash [1950b], we suppose that each player has some utility 
function so that a particular outcome can be identified with a pair of 
real numbers, where the i-th component is the utility for player 
ic {1,2}. Therefore, the set of all possible outcomes can be represented 
2 
as a subset S of Ж . Because the bargainers may randomize between the 
outcomes, we assume that S will be a convex set. Furthermore, we suppose 
that player ic {1,2} receives the amount a < Ж if the negotiations break 
down, where a ·= (a ,a_) с S. In view of the above, from now on, we repre­
sent a bargaining problem as a pair (a,S). 
94 
In the literature, many solutions for such problems have been pro­
posed, where a solution can be seen as a rule which assigns to each 
problem (a,S) some element of S. Of course, each solution has its own 
advantages and disadvantages (cf. Roth [1979J, Schmitz [1978]). 
In this chapter, continuity properties of solutions play a central 
role. It appears that there do not exist lower semicontinuous solutions 
(proposition 4.1), if we provide the family of bargaining pairs with the 
natural metric, where use is made of the Hausdorff distance, nor does 
there exist an upper semicontinuous weak solution (proposition 5.1) of 
the bargaining problem. 
In section 2, we give some technicalities about the family of com-
2 
pact subsets of Ж . 
In section 3, a list is given of some well-known bargaining solutions. 
In section 4, we concentrate on upper semicontinuous solutions. 
Almost all solutions proposed in the literature appear to be upper semi-
continuous, and many of them are even continuous on an open and dense 
subclass of the set of bargaining pairs (propositions 4.3-4.7). In 
theorem 4.11, four conditions on bargaining pairs are given, each of 
them guaranteeing that each upper semicontinuous solution is, in fact, 
continuous in the corresponding bargaining pair. Theorem 4.13 shows that 
this list of conditions is complete. In theorem 4.14, open subclasses 
of bargaining pairs are described, where the coordinate functions φ. and 
φ of an upper semicontinuous solution φ are continuous. A strong metric 
can be found such that all upper semicontinuous solutions become con­
tinuous (theorem 4.15). 
In section 5, lower semicontinuous weak solutions are discussed. The 
main results are contained in the theorems 5.5, 5.7-5.9. 
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Finally, in section 6, extensions to non-compact bargaining pairs 
are indicated. 
The results presented in this chapter, were obtained jointly with 
Ti]s and are based on Jansen en Tijs [1980a]. 
§2. THE FAMILY OF NON-EMPTY COMPACT (CONVEX) SUBSETS OF K 2 
2 
In the following, the family of non-empty compact subsets of И is 
denoted by С and the family of convex sets in С by K. We suppose that С 
is provided with tne Hausdorff metric d introduced in section 2 of 
H 
2 
chapter I. Note that we provide Ж with the maximum norm. 
It is well known (cf. Salinetti and Wets [1979], cor.ЗА) that a 
sequence S.,S , ... in К converges to S с fi in the Hausdorff metric if 
and only if 
limsup Ξ esc liminf Ξ . 
π*»
 n
 η-H» n 
2 
Here liminf S consists of those points χ с Ж , for which there exists a 
n-x» 
sequence s ( 1) ,s (2) , . .. such that s(n)cS , for each η с W, and lim s(n)=x,· 
2 n-«° 
limsup S consists of those points χ e Ж , for which there are a sub-
n-M» n 
sequence n(1),n(2),... of 1,2,— and s(n(1)),s(n(2)),... such that 
s(n(k))cS ,, ., for each к ί U, and lim s (n(k) ) =x. 
For each Ξ f К, the Pareto set of S 
{ρ e S; for each s t S with s ä ρ, we have s = ρ} 
is denoted by P(S) and the weak Pareto set of S 
{w ( S ; for each s ε S with saw, we have s. = w. or s 5 = w,} 
is denoted by W(S). 
The following lemmas shall often be used in the sequel. 
LEMMA 2.1. Let S ,S_,... be a sequence in К converging to ScK. Then 
limsup W(S ) c(0(S) . 
n-M° n 
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PROOF. Let w с limsup W(S ) . Then there is a sequence w(n(l)),w(n(2)),... 
n-»-™
 n 
with w(n(k) ) с W(S , . . ) , for all к f U , and lim w(n(k) ) = w. Suppose w / W ( S ) 
η IK)
 k ^ œ 
Then there is an seW(S) with s > w. Because lim S = S , there is a 
n-*» n 
sequence s(l),s(2),... with s(n) t S , for each η с К, and lim s(η) = s. 
n
 n-«° 
But then s(n(k)) >w(n(k)), for к sufficiently large, which contradicts 
the fact that w(n(к)) È W(S „ . ). Hence, wс W(S) . С 
n(k) 
LEMMA 2.2. Let S.,S.,... Ъе a sequence in К converging to S e К. Then 
lirainf P(S )3 P(S). 
n-x»
 n 
PROOF. Take ρ e Ρ(S). We have to show that there is a sequence 
p(l),p(2),... converging to p, with p(n) e P(S ) , for each η e U . Since 
lim S = S , there exists a bounded sequence s(l),s(2),... converging to 
ρ and s(n) ( S , for each ηt W . Now take for each s(n) a p(n) e P(S
n
) 
with p(n) > s ( n ) . We are finished if we can show that each convergent 
subsequence <p(n(k));ke U > of <p(n);ne U > converges to p. Suppose 
lim p(n(k)) = q. Then q >lim s(η(к)) = p. Since q t S and ρ с Ρ(S), we 
к-н» k-*= 
have q = ρ. С 
In chapter IX, the next two results shall be applied. 
LEMMA 2.3. For each S,Tc C, conv(S) , conv(T) e К and 
d„(conv(S) ,conv(T)) < d (S,T). 
Π η 
PROOF. The first observation in the lemma is an obvious one. 
Let ρ :=d__(S,T). Then, for each η e Tl, 
Η 
S C B (Τ) с в _. (conv(T) ) . (2.1) 
ρ+η * p+n 1 
The convexity of conv(T) implies that В .(conv(T)) is convex. There-
P+n - 1 
fore, in view of (2.1), conv(S) с в (conv(T)), for all ne W. Similar-
P+n _ 1 
ly, conv(T) с в .(conv(S)), for all η € U. Consequently, 
p+n"1 
-1 -1 
d„(conv(S) ,conv(T) ) < p+n =d„(S,T)+n , for ail n e К, 
π n 
and the lemma is proved. D 
97 
2 
LEMMA 2.4. For a bounded set Τ tn Ж , conv(cl(T)) = cl(conv(T)). 
PROOF. See Rockafellar [1970], theorem 17.2. L] 
For an element S < К, we define 
p(S) := ( m m ρ , max p.) , p(S) := ( max p., min p.) 
p<-P(S) pfP(S) - ptP(S) pcP(S) 
W(S) := Cwr ('J(S) ; w 2 = i 2 ( S ) ; , W(S) := {w - W(S) ; w = ρ (S) }. 
N o t e , t h a t U.'(S) =W(S) υ Ρ ( Ξ ) ι U!(S). F u r t h e r m o r e , l e t t h e (.jurnp-)function 
J : W(S) -* P(S) be d e f i n e d a s f o l l o w s 
j s ( w ) = 
P ( S ) w( aus) 
w i f w ^ P(S) 
.p(S) wfW(S) 
§3. BARGAINING PROBLEMS 
DEFINITION 3.1. A bargaining pair is a pair (a,S), where S is a non-
2 
empty compact, convex subset of TR and where a c Ξ. The point a is called 
the disagreevent point or the status quo (point). The set of all bar­
gaining pairs is denoted by Б. 
Recall that an element (a,S) с В corresponds, intuitively, to a 
situation, where two players are involved and where a is the level of 
utility that player ι receives if they do not cooperate with each other, 
while S contains all the attainable points when they do cooperate. Of 
course, for se S, s is the utility of outcome s for player ic {1,2}. 
The players are interested in finding an outcome in S agreeable to both 
of them. 
Note that in contrast to many authors, we allow a to be an element 
of the Pareto set of Ξ. Some complications arise from doing so, but one 
reason why we do this is that such bargaining pairs arise, in a natural 
way, in the theory of arbitration games. 
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2 
DEFINITION 3.2. A map φ : В •+ Ж will be called a bargaining solution or, 
simply, a solution, if the following properties are satisfied: 
B.l $(a,s) L P(s), for each (a,S) с 8 (Párelo optimality) 
3.2 ф(а,3) >a, for each (a,S) с 8 (individual rationality). 
Such a solution can be seen as an arbitration procedure or as a 
model of the bargaining process. 
In the literature many solutions are proposed and most of them have 
nice additional properties. We mention some of those solutions. 
EXAMPLE 3.3. The Nash solution φ : В -»· В assigns to an (a,S) e В the 
N N N 
unique point φ (a,S) = (φ (a,S),φ (a,S)) of P(S) with the property that 
Ν N 
(φ (a,S) - a^ (φ (a,S) - a2) = max (p - a^ (p2 - a2) . 
pf P(S) 
For an axiogiatic characterization of this solution, we refer to Nash 
Γ 1950b]. 
KR 2 
EXAMPLE 3.4. The Kalai-Hosenthal solution φ : В •+ Ж assigns to 
(a,S) e 8 the unique element in [a,u(S)] η P(S). Here 
U.(S) := (max s , max s.) 
st S sfS 
is the Utopia point or ideal point of S. For a description of this 
solution, see Kalai and Rosenthal [1978] and Raiffa [1953]. 
EXAMPLE 3.5. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution φ : В -»• Ж assigns to 
(a,S) tB the unique element in [a,(i(a,S) ] η P(S) , where u(a,S) is the 
utopia point of the set {seS; s 2 a}. For an axiomatic characterization 
of this solution, we refer to Kalai and Smorodinsky [1975] and Roth [1979]. 
Y (t ) 2 
EXAMPLE 3.6. The Yu(t)-solution φ : В •+ Ж , for t £ (1,»], assigns to 
(a,S) f В the unique element in P(S) with minimal distance to U(a,S) in 
the norm || || . Properties of this solution are given by Yu [1973] and 
Roth [1977]. 
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EXAMPLE 3.7. The Hash (τ) solution φ . В ->• Ж , for te (0,1), assigns 
to (a,S) e 8 the unique point φ (a,S) of P(S) with 
,xN(t) ,t.,N(t), „. , 1-t , ,t, , 1-t 
(φ (a.Sj-a^ (φ (a,S)-a2) = max (Pj-aj) (Рг^г' 
peP(S) 
For a description of this solution, see Harsanyi and Selten [1972], 
Kalai [1977] or Roth [1979]. 
Throughout this thesis also the next solutions play a role. 
EXAMPLE 3.8. For χ с {1,2}, let the solution ψ 1: 8 -»• IR be defined as 
follows. For (a,S) f 8, ψ (a,S) is the element in {pe P(S) ; ρ a a} with 
maximal i-th coordinate. 
In the next chapters,we shall mostly be interested in regular 
solutions. 
2 
DEFINITION 3.9. A bargaining solution φ : В -+ TR is called regular if, 
for all (a,S),(b,S) e 8 with φ(a,S) = φ (b,S), we have 
ф(Ха+(1-Х)Ь,3) = φ(a,S), for all λ с (0, 1) . 
Note, that the solutions φ,φ ,φ (te (0,1)), ψ and ψ are 
KS Y (t ) 
regular and that φ and φ (te (I,0»]) are not. 
KS 
EXAMPLE 3.10. Let S := conv {(0,0),(1,1),(0,2)} and let φ = φ . Then 
ρ := (|,j) с P(S) and 
Φ
-1
«?) = Î(y,l),p] υ {(χ,у) e [Ο,Ι] 2; y = j - 3(|-x) 2}, 
KS 
which implies that φ is not a regular arbitration function. 
EXAMPLE 3.11. Let S := conv {(0,0),(1,0),(1,1),(0,2)} and let 
ф = ф
т )
 ( f (!,-]) . Then ρ := φ-|) r Ρ(Ξ) and 
φ"
1
 (ρ) =[(0,0), (0,1)] и [(0,1)
 r
p ] , 
Y (t) 
which implies that φ is not regular. 
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§4. UPPER SEMICONTINUOUS SOLUTIONS 
We provide В with the metric d Β χ В •+ Ж, defined by 
d((a,S) , (b,T) ) =max { |¡a-b||a),dH(S,T)}, for all (a,S) , (b,T) e В. 
Note that the set В = {(a,S) e В; a/U(S)} is an open and dense subset 
of B. Unfortunately, the following proposition holds. 
PROPOSITION 4.1. There does not exist a continuous solution. 
PROOF. For each П Е Н , let a(n) = ( l/n,0) , S = [ (l/n,0) , (0,1) ] . Then 
lim (a(n) ,S ) = (a,S) , where a= (0,0) and S = [ (0,0) , (0,1) ] . For each 
^
 n
 2 
solution φ : В •+ Ж we have that ф(а(п),5 ) =a(n), because a(n) e P(S ) 
and (B.l) and (B.2) hold and that ф(а,3)= (0,1), in view of (B.l) and 
the fact that P(S) = {(0,1) } . Hence, lim ф(а(п),S ) = (0,0) J (0,1) = ф(a,S) . 
So ф is not continuous. D 
Note that in fact we proved that there do not exist lower semicon-
tinuous solutions. Therefore we concentrate on upper semicontinuous 
solutions. 
2 
DEFINITION 4.2. A solution ф: В ->· К is called upper· semiaontinuous if 
for each sequence (a,S) , (a (1) ,S, ) , (a (2) »SO , . .. in В with 
lim (a(n),S ) = (a,S), we have, for ι e {1,2}, 
η 
η-κ» 
φ (a,S) δ lirasup φ (a (η) ,S ) , 
η-*» 
or equivalently if, for each ie {1,2} and each t t B, 
φ"
1
«-·»^) = {(a,S) £ Β; φ (a,S)<t} 
in an open subset ôf B. 
In the following propositions, we examine the upper semicontinuity 
of various solutions, proposed m the literature. 
N 2 
PROPOSITION 4.3. The Nash solution φ : В -»• H is upper semicontinuous. 
Ν о 
The restriction of φ ίο В is continuous (cf. Kalai and Smorodinsky [1975 J, 
p.517). 
101 
2 
PROOF. Lot υ: В •* IR be the multifunction defined by 
vUjS) = {w< W(S) ; (w -a ) (w -a ) = max (pj-aj) (p2-a2) }. 
2 p<P(S) 
Let, for it {1,2}, π : Ж •* К be the projection with π (χ) = χ . Then 
Φ (a,S)=max {t, t <_ r ov(a,S)}. 
ι ι 
(1) First we Drove that ν is a closed multifunction. Let <(a(n),S ) ;n U > 
η 
be a sequence in В with lim (a(n),S ) = (a,S) and let <w(n),n К > be a 
2 η«» 
sequence in Ж , converging to w and witn w(n) ¡ ν (a (η),S ), for each ne U. 
Then wcW(S), by lemma 2.1. By lemma 2.2, for each pc P(S) , there is a 
sequence <p(n) ;n t U > with p(n) Í P(S ) , for each η с U, and lim p(n) = p. 
n-K» 
Now the fact that 
(WjlnJ-a^n)) (w2(n)-a2(n)) > (pj (n)-aj (n) ) (p2 (n)-a2(n) ) , for all w U, 
implies that 
(Wj-aj)(w2-a2) > (pj-a.)(p2-a2). 
Since ρ was arbitrarily chosen, this implies that W L v(a,S). Hence, ν is 
a closed multifunction. 
(2) Again, let <(a(n),S );ni_D>be a sequence in В converging to (a,S) . 
Ν N 
Let t= limsup φ (a(n) ,S ) . We have to show that φ (a,S) >t. Take a sub-
η-κο i n ι 
sequence <(a(n(k) ) ,S ,, . ) ;k t И > of <(a(n) ,S ) ;n f U> with 
n(k) η 
lim фМ(а(п(к) ) ,S „ . ) = t. Since фМ(а(п(к)) ,S ... ) <r π - v(a (n(k) ) ,S ... ) 
ι n(k) ι n(k) ι n(k) 
and, by (1), π ο ν is a closed multifunction, we have that t e " 0 ν(a,S). 
But then фЫ(а,3) > t. 
(3) To prove the other assertion in the theorem, we note that, for each 
(a,S) e В , we have ν (a,S) ={φ (a,S)}. From the fact that ν is a closed 
and locally bounded multifunction and from the fact that В is open, it 
follows that φ is continuous m each (a,S) e В . [] 
A similar result as in proposition 4.3 also holds for the Nash (t) 
solution φ Ν ί 1 : ) (t
 t (0,1)) . 
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KR 2 
PROPOSITION 4.4. The Каіаг-Posenthal solution φ : Ъ •+ Ж is upper semi-
i .KR cO „2 . , . 
oontznuous ana φ : о ->· Ж гс conbvnaous. 
2 
PROOF. Let μ: В > Ж be the multifunction, defined by 
p(a,S) = {wc W(S) ; w с [a,u(S) ]}. 
KR KR о 
Now φ (a,S) =max {t; t π °p(a,S)} and и(а,3)={ф (a,S)} if (a,S)eB . 
The proof now runs along the same line as the proof of proposition 4.3. 
We only show nere that y is a closed multifunction. Let 
<(a(n)/S );nc U> be a sequence in 8 with lim (a(n),S ) = (a,S) and let 
n-+«> 
w(n) с μ (a (n) ,S ) and lim w (n) = w. For each η < U, t h e r e i s aX t [ 0 , l ] 
n
-x» 
with w(n) =λ a(n) + (l-À )Lí.(S ). We may suppose, witnout loss of qenerality, 
η η η 
that the sequence <λ ;nr U > converges, say to Ac [Ο,Π. Because 
lim a(n) = a and lim U(S ) = u(S) , we obtain that w=Xa+(l-X)u(S). So 
w t [a,u(S)1 and also w ' W(S), by lemma 2.1. Thus w e μ(a,Ξ). U 
Using the fact that (a,S) •+ Lt(a,S) is a continuous map on B, one 
can prove the following result. 
KS 2 
PROPOSITION 4.5. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution φ : В -* ж is upper 
o ΚΞ 
semieontinuous. In each point of Б the function φ is continuous (cf. 
Kalai and Smorodinsky [19751, p.517). 
The proof of the next proposition is left to the reader. 
У (t) 2 
PROPOSITION 4.6. The Xu(t)-solutboa φ : В ->- ж , for t< (I,»!., is an 
upper semicontinjous solution, which is continuous in each point of В . 
1 2 
PROPOSITION 4.7. The solutions ψ and ψ are upper semieontinuous. There 
are points in Β , where ψ is discontinuous. 
2 2 
PROOF. We only look at ψ . That ψ is upper semieontinuous, follows 
from the fact that 
2 
ψ (a,S)=max {t; t <• т^ » λ (a,Ξ) } , 
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where λ is the closed multifunction with X(a,S) = {wс W(S);wS a}. That 
2 
ψ is upper semicontinuous, follows from the fact that 
2 
ψ (a, S) = min {t; t<:TT°K(a,S)}, 
where к(а,5) = { ρ ί Ρ (S),-pïa} and κ is a lower semicontinuous multi­
function by lemma 2.2. 
To prove, for i = 2, the second assertion in the theorem, take a(n) = (0,0) 
and S =conv { (0,0) , (0,1) , (l,^^-) }, for each η с Л, 
η η 
S = conv { (0,0) , (0,1) , (1,1) }. Then lim (a(η) ,S
n
) = ((0,0) ,S) and 
η >-œ 
lim ψ (a(n) ,S ) = (0,1) τί (1,1) =ψ (a,S) and obviously (a,S) с 6°. [] 
η-χ»
 η 
2 
EXAMPLE 4.8. The function φ: В •+ Ж with 
{ψ (a,S) if u. (S) is rational 1 
ψ (3,3) otherwise, 
is an example of a solution, which is not upper semicontinuous. 
2 
THEOREM 4.9. Let φ: В -*• ж be an upper sentioontinuous solution. Let 
(a,S),(a(l),S.),(a(2),S_),... be α sequence in В with 
lim (a(n),S ) = (a,S) and suah that lim ф(а(п),5 ) exists. Then 
n-)-<» n n-*» n 
lim ф(а(п) ,S ) e ((/(S) and 
η-*»
 n 
Φ (a, S) = J (lim φ (a (η) ,Ξ ) ) . 
ь
 η-χ»
 η 
PROOF. It follows from lemma 2.1, that lim ф(а(п),5 ) сW ( S ) . In view of 
the upper semicontinuity of φ. and φ-, we have 
ф(а,3) > lira ф(а(п) ,Ξ ) . (4.1) 
η-«»
 n 
If lim φ(a(n),S ) ε P(S), then (4.1) and the fact that φ(a,S) e P(S), 
η-*»
 n 
imply that ф(а,Б)=1іт ф(а(п),3 ) . 
η-κ»
 n 
If lim ф(а(п),5 ) cW( S ) , then (4.1) implies that ф(а,3) = p(S), because 
η-χ»
 n 
ф(а,5) € P(S) and because of the fact that p = p(S), for each ρ e P(S) 
with p > we W(S) . 
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In a similar way one proves that ф(а,3) =p(S), if lim <f>(a(n),S ) '"W(S). 
Now the theorem is proved by using the definition of j . Π 
COROLLARY 4.10. Let φ be an upper semLeontinuous solution. Let Se К and 
let a,a(1),a(2),. .. be a sequence in S, such that lim a(n) = a. Then 
n-w° 
lim φ(a(n),S) = φ(a,S). 
PROOF. For each η e U, φ(a(η),S) e P(S). Let ζ be a limit point of the 
sequence <φ (a (n) ,S) ;n e U > . Since P(S) is closed, ζ c. P(S) . By theorem 
4.9, ζ = φ(a,S). But then lim φ(a(η),S) = φ(a,S) . D 
n-x» 
The following theorem describes four conditions on (a,S), each of 
them guaranteeing that each upper semicontinuous solution is continuous 
in (a,S). Theorem 4.13 shows that this list of conditions is complete. 
2 
THEOREM 4.11. Let ψ: 8 -»· m be an uppev semicontinuous solutbon. Let 
(a,s) с В. Then φ is continuous in (a,s), if one of the following four 
conditions is satisfied: 
c.l P(S) =W(S), 
C.2 a> (pjiS) ,p2(S)) , 
C.3 a 1 >p (S) and W(S) = {p(S) }, 
C.4 a 2 ïp2(S) and W(S) = {p(S)}. 
PROOF. Let (a(1),S.),(a(2)»S.),... be a sequence in 8, converging to 
(a,S) . We have to prove that lim φίαίηί,Β ) =ф(а,Б). Since the sequence 
φ(a(l),3.),φ(a(2),S7),... is bounded, it is sufficient to show that each 
convergent subsequence of this sequence converges to ф(а,3). Let 
(a(n(l)),S ..) ,(a(n(2) ) ,S . _ . ) , . . . be such a convergent subsequence. 
Then by theorem 4.9, t = lim ф(а(п(к)),5 ,,.)eW{S) and 
' jc-wo η (к; 
φ (a,S) =_ƒ (lim ф(а(п(к)),3 ,.»)). We are finished if we show that t e P(S) . 
S ^to η(κ; 
If (C.l) is satisfied, then teW(S)=P(S). If (C.2) is satisfied, then 
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x t f o l l o w s from t h e f a c t t h a t a = } i m a ( n ( k ) ) and ф ( а ( п ( к ) ) , 3 ) > a ( n ( k ) ) 
]^-><» π \ κ. ι 
that t > a > (ρ (S) ,p_(S) ) , which implies that 
2 -
t« P(S) =W(S) г {χ с Ж ; χ >ρ (S),χ >P 2(S)}. If (C.3) is satisfied, then 
lim φ, (a(n(k)) ,S ,, . ) > lim a, (n(k)) = a. > p, (S) . Hence, 
ICH» 1 η (κ) к-н» '^ 1 1 
lim ф(а(п(к)) ,S „ , ) t P(S) и W(S) = P(S) . 
k^o n(k) 
Similarly, (С.4) implies that lim ф(а(п(к)),3 ) f P(S) uW(S) = P(S) . D 
к-н» η ( К ) 
REMARK 4.12. It is not difficult to show that the set of bargaining pairs 
(a,S), satisfying (C.l), is a dense subset of B. 
THEOREM 4.13. Let (a,S) с В be a bargaining pair, which satisfies none 
of the conditions (c.l)-(C.4). Then there exists an upper semicontinuous 
solution ψ: В -*• Ж~, which is not continuous in (a,S) . 
PROOF. Obviously, (a,S) satisfies one of the following two conditions 
D.l a ^ p (S) and W(S) ^  {p(S) }, 
D.2a 2<p 2(S) and W(S) ^  {p(S)}. 
2 
Suppose that (D.l) holds. We will prove that 4. is not continuous in 
(a,S). Let w be the element in W(S) with minimal first coordinate. Let 
β_: Ж-*- ДК be the function with 
x > p (S) 
В (x) 
η 
^•(p (S)-x) i f w* < x < p 1 ( S ) 
. - ( P j t S j - W j ) x < w 1 . 
2 2 
L e t λ : Η •+ К be t h e map w i t n λ (χ. , x 0 ) = (χ. ,x_+B (x. ) ) . F o r e a c h 
η η 1 2 1 2 η 1 
η с U , l e t ( a ( n ) , S ) e В be d e f i n e d by a ( n ) = λ (a) and S = conv(X (S)) . 
η η η η 
1 - * 
Then l i m d ( ( a ( n ) , S ) , ( a , S ) ) = l i m — ( ρ , ( S ) - w , ) = 0 . F u r t h e r m o r e , f o r a l l 
n-*<» n η-*» n 1 l 
η t U , λ (w ) = p ( S ) . Now l e t [ = m m {p. (Ξ) - a , , p , (S) -w, } . Then t h e f a c t 
η η 1 1 1 1 
t h a t , f o r a l l η f К , 
2 r *i г * ι - 2 
ψ (a (η) ,S ) = max {.а^ (η) ,w, } = max { a . , w } < р ( 3 ) - г = ф , ( а , 5 ) - е , 
2 2 i m p l i e s t h a t l i m ψ (a ( n ) , S ) ^ ψ (a ,S) . 
η
κ » η 
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Sxmilarly, if (D.2) holds, tnen ψ is not continuous in (a,S). LÌ 
Now, we investigate the continuity of the coordinate functions 
φ. = ir. <> φ and φ = τ ο φ of an upper semicontinuous solution φ. Let 
Β(φ) = {(a,S) с 8; φ (a. S) ^ p(S)}, Б (φ) = { (a. S) f В; φ (a, S) jí ρ (Ξ) } and 
8(φ) =Β(φ) с В(ф). The following holds. 
2 
THEOREM 4.14. Let φ: В -+ TR be an upper semicontinuous solution. Then 
(1) В(ф), В(ф) and В(ф) are open subsets of B. 
(2) For each (a,S) с Β(φ), Φ is continuous in (a,S). 
(3) For each (a,S) с Β(φ), φ. is continuous in (a,S). 
(4) ψ ¿3 continuous in each point (a,S) t В(ф) . 
PROOF, (a) Note, that В(ф) = {(a,S) с В; ф (a,Ξ)-р^ (S) <0}. Since ф1 is 
upper semicontinuous and the map (a,S) ·->• ρ (S) is continuous, we have 
that (a,S) ·->- φ (a,S)-p. (S) is upper semicontinuous. Hence, В(ф) is an 
open subset of B. Similarly, it follows that В(ф) is open. But then 
alo В(ф) is an open set. 
(b) Now we want to ^ rove (2). Take (a,S) с В(ф). Let <(a(n),S ) ;n f H> 
be a sequence in B, converging to (a,S). Let 
(a(n(l)),S .,.),(a(n(2)),S ,„,),... be a subsequence for which 
n(IJ n(2) 
ζ = lim ф(а(п(к)),3 ,, . ) exists. By theorem 4.9 and (1), we obtain 
k-x» n<k> 
Z L P ( S ) U W ( S ) . Now, for each w ε Ρ (S) j W(S) , we have π ° j (w) = π (w) . 
This implies, in view of theorem 4.9, that 
φ 0(3 /5)=ποφ(3,5)=π-ο J „(lim φ (a (η (к) ) ,S ) = π_(ζ) . 
^ ¿ ¿ S к-цю η ( к ) ζ 
So we may conclude that <φ (a(n),S );neU> converges to φ (a,S) . 
(c) Similarly, as in (b), one can prove assertion (3). Assertion (4) is 
a straightforward consequence of (2) and (3). Г 
Let us look at a metric d on B, which induces a stronger topology 
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on В than d, and which is, for all (a,S),(b,T) с В, defined by 
d((a,S),(b,T)) =max {d( (a,S) , (b,T) ) ,dH (P(S) ,P<T) ) } . 
Then we have 
2 
THEOREM 4.15. Each solution φ : В -*• m , whiah is upper semieontinuous 
with respect to the d-metrio, is continuous with respect to the d-metric. 
PROOF. Let (a,S) ,(a(1) ,3.) ,(a(2) ,S ) , . .. be a sequence in В such that 
lim d((a(n) ,S ) , (a,S) ) =0. We have to prove that lim ф(а(п),5 ) = φ (a,S) . 
η-«»
 n
 n-x»
 n 
Take a subsequence (a(n(l)),S ...),(a(n(2)),S . _ . ) , . . . such that 
n( 1) n(2) 
<ф(а(п(к)),8 );к£ІІ> converges, say to z. Then Zf P(S), because 
η (КJ 
φ (a (η (к)), S ,, . ) с Ρ (S ) , for each к с И, lim d íP(S ),P(S)) = 0 and 
n(k) n(k) fc+a, H n(k) 
because P(S) is closed. Furthermore, φ(a,S) > ζ , because φ is an upper 
semieontinuous solution. But then 2 = ф ( а / 3 ) . Hence, the only limit point 
of <ф(а(п) ,S ) ;n £ H > is ф(а,5) . Thus, ф(а,5) = lim φ (a (η) ,S ) . D 
η-χη 
In view of the propositions 4.3-4.6, the following corollary is 
immediate. 
COROLLARY 4.16. The solutions φ , φ , φ , φ and φ are d-con-
tinuous. 
§5. LOWER SEMICONTINUOUS SOLUTIONS 
Another approach to the bargaining problem is the construction of 
2 
functions φ: В -* К , satisfying 
W.l ф(а,5) eW(S), for each (a,S) с В (weak Pareto optimality) , 
W.2 φ (a,S) >a, for each (a,S) e В {.individual rationality), 
ф(а,5) = a, for each (a,S) € В with a f UI(S) . 
Such functions are called Weak solutions. The hope that there are con­
tinuous weak solutions, is destroyed in the following 
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PROPOSITION 5.1. There does not exist an upper semiaontinuous weak 
solution. 
PROOF. For each η £ U, let a(n) = (-l/n,0) , S = I (-l/n,0) , (0,1) L a= (0,0) 
2 
and S = L (0,0) , (0,1) ] . For each weak solution φ : В ->• К , we have 
lim ф(а(п),3 ) = (0,1) and φ(a,S) = (0,0). Hence, φ is not upper semi-
continuous. G 
DEFINITION 5.2. A weak solution is called lower semiaontinuous if for 
each sequence (a,S)
>
(a(l),5.),(a(2),5
:
,),... in В with lim (a(n),S ) = (a,S), 
n-*» 
we have, for 16 {1,2}, 
φ (a,S) < liminf φ (a(n),S ). 
1
 η-M» 1 n 
EXAMPLE 5.3. For ie {1,2} and each (a,S) £ B, let ш1(а,5) be equal to a, 
1 2 if aeWCS); if a ^  W(S), then let ω (a,S) (ω (a,S)) be the element of 
{we W(S);wS a} with smallest second (first) coordinate. The maps 
1 2 2 2 
ω : В -* Ж and ω : В ->• Ж appear to be lower semicontinuous weak 
2 
solutions. We only prove that ω is lower semicontinuous. 
2 
That ω is lower semicontinuous, is due to the fact that 
2 
ω (a,Ξ) = min {w.; weW(S), w > a } , 
and that the multifunction (a,S) **• {w. ; weW(S), w > a} is closed. 
2 
Concerning ω,., note that 
2 , max {p2,· ρ e P(S) , ρ > a} ifa^W(S) 
ω (a,S) 
' a 2 if а с W(S 
2 
That ш is lower semicontinuous in points (a,S) with a^W(S), follows 
from the fact that the multifunction 
(a,S) и- {p2,. pe P(s) , p>a} 
is lower semicontinuous. For an (a,S) eB with aeW(S) and a sequence 
<(a(n) ,S ) ;n e U > in B, converging to (a,S) , we have 
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2 2 
lim io„(a(n),S ) ì lirainf а _ ( п ) = а _ = ч ) . ( а / 3 ) . 
η » · »
2 n
 п и »
2 2 2 
2 
Hence, also ω. is lower semicontinuous. 
The proof of the next theorem is similar to the proof of theorem 4.9. 
THEOREM 5.4. Let φ be a lower nemiaontinuous weak solution. Suppose that, 
for a sequence (a,S)((a(l),S1),(a(2),S-),... гпВ, lim (a(n),S ) = (a,S) 
1
 ¿
 п-и»
 n 
and lim ф(а(п),5 ) exists. Then we have: 
пн»
 n 
(i) I ƒ lim ф(а(п) ,S ) <- P(S) \{p(S) ,p(S) }, then <j>(a,S) = lim ф(а(п) ,S ) . 
(n) If lim ф(а(п) ,S ) f W(S) , then φ (a,S) <- fw (S) ,lim ф(а(п) ,S ) ], 
п-и»
 n
 n->-">
 n 
where w(S) = ( min w., max w_). 
wcW(S) wLW(S) 
(in) If lim ф(а(п) ,S ) * W(S) , then φ (a,S) <- [w(S) , lim φ (a(n) ,S ) ], 
n-x»
 n _
 n-V" n 
where w(S) = ( max w., min w ). 
w
c
U(S) wtW(S) 
THEOREM 5.5. Let φ be a lower semaontinuous ¿eak solution. Let 
(ad) ,S. ) , (a(2) ,3,) , .. . be a sequence in Ъ, converging to (a,S) . If 
ф(а,3) t P(S), then lim ф(а(п),S ) = ф(а,5). 
η-)-™ n 
PROOF. By the lower semicontinuity of φ and by lemma 2.1, we have that 
φ(a,S) < (liminf φ (a(η),S )
r
liminf φ (a(η),S )) 
n-^co
 l n
 n-«o
 ¿
 n
 (5.1) 
< (limsup φ (a(n),S ),limsup ф(а(п),5 ))<W(S). 
п н »
1 n
 П М о ^
 n 
Since ф(а,3) ( Ρ ( Ξ ) , the inequalities in (5.1) may be replaced by equa­
lities. Consequently, lim ф(а(п),Б ) exists and is equal to ф ( а , Б ) . С 
п-ию 
EXAMPLE 5.6. Let S = conv {(0,0),(1,0),(0,1),(1,1)}. Let a = (0,1) and let, 
- 1 1 2 
for each η <. U , a(n) = (0,1-n ) . Let ω : В -> H be the lower semicon-
tinuous weak solution, introduced before. Note, that 
lim ш 1(а(п),5) = lim (l,l-n _ 1) = (1,1) ^  (0,1) =u) 1(a,S). 
П-ию n-x» 
Hence, the condition that ф(а,3) с P(S) in theorem 5.5, is not superfluous. 
2 
THEOREM 5.7. Let φ: В -»• ж be a lower semicontinuous weak solution. Let 
(a,S) с В. Then φ is continuous in (a,S) if one of the four conditions 
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(Cl) - (С.4), mentioned in theorem 4.11, holds. 
PROOF. Let (a(1),5.),(a(2),5,),... be a sequence in 8, converging to 
(a,S). Then we nay suppose, without loss of generality, that 
t =lim φ(a(n),S ) exists. Then t f W(S), by lemma 2.1, and φ(a,S) < t, 
η>·»
 n 
by the lower semicontinuity of φ. 
If (C.l) holds, then ф(а,3) < t, ф(а,3) f P(S) and tс P(S) imply that 
ф(а,5) =t. 
If (С.2) holds, then t r P(S) and φ (a,S) e P(S) ; hence φ(β,Β)=ί. 
If (C.3) holds, then t F P(S) uW(S) = P(S) . Since also φ (a,S) > a, this 
implies that ф(а,3) с P(S) и W(S) = P(S) . So ф(а,3) = t. 
Similarly, (С.4) implies that ф(а,5) =t. Г, 
THEOREM 5.8. Let (a,s) be a bargaining pair, which satisfies none of 
the conditions (c.l)-(c.4). Then there exists a lower semicontinuous 
2 
weak solution ω: В -»• ж , which is not continuous in (a,s) . 
PROOF. As noticed before, (a,S) satisfies one of the conditions (D.l) 
or (D.2), as formulated in the proof of theorem 4.13. 
2 2 2 
If (D.l) holds, take ω=ω . Then lim ω (a (η),Ξ ) ¿ u. (a,S) if 
n-Ho n 
a(n) = μ (a) and S =conv(u (S) ) , where 
η η η 2 μ (χ, ,x_) = (χ, ,x„-3 (x, ) ) , for each (χ, ,x„) с It , 
n i ¿ i ¿ n i i < ¿ 
and g is the function, introduced in the proof of theorem 4.13. 
η 
If (D.2) holds, then ω is not continuous in (a,S). С 
2 
THEOREM 5.9. Let ф: 8 •+ Ж be a lower semicontinuous ueak solution. 
Lev 8м(ф) = {(a,S) € В; ф(а,3) ¿W(S)}, Вм(ф) = {(a,S) e В; ф(а,3) /W(S)} 
and В"(ф) =8"(ф) п8"(ф). Then В"(ф), В"(ф) and 8 W^) are o-pen subsets 
of B. Furthermore, 
(1) Φ is continuous in each point (a,S) t Б (ф), 
ui 
(2) φ is continuous in each point (a,S) e Β (φ), 
(3) φ is continuous in each point (a,S) r Β (φ). 
PROOF. The set 8"(ф)={(а,3) <_ 8; φ (a,S)-p (S) > 0} is open, because 
(a,S) "• φ (a,S)-p_(S) is a lower semicontinuous function on B. 
Similarly, Β (φ) is open. Then also Β (φ) is open. 
Now we want to prove (1) . Take (a,S) t Β (φ) . Let <(a(n),S );nell>be 
a sequence in B, converging to (a,S) . Let <(a(n(k)),S );k£U> be a 
η (кι 
subsequence with lim i(a(n(k)),S )=z. By theorem 5.4 ( m ) , z^W(S), 
k-«o η ík) 
because φ (a,S) /WtS) . If ζ t P(S) \{p(S) }, then ζ = φ (a,S) , by theorem 
5.4(i). If zcW(S), then ζ = φ (a,S) , by theorem 5.4 (il) . Hence 
lim φ (a(n(k)),S , .)=φ (a,S) in both cases. This implies that φ is 
U-KO 2 η ( к ) ¿ ¿ 
continuous on Β (φ). 
Similarly, one proves assertion (2) of the theorem and assertion (3) 
follows immediately from (1) and (2). L 
REMARK 5.10. In theorem 4.14, we saw that there exists a metric d on B, 
for which all solutions, which are upper semicontinuous in the old 
metric, are d-continuous. A similar result cannot be expected for lower 
semicontinuous weak solutions. Even for the strong metric d on Б with, 
for (a,S),(b,T) f В, 
d*((a,S) , (b,T)) =max {d((a,S) , (b,T)) ,d (W(S) ,W(T))}, 
the solution ω is not continuous: take (a,S) and (a(n),S) as in example 
* 1 1 
5.6. Then lim d ((a(n),S),(a,S)) =0, but Ιιπιω (a(n) ,S) ^  ω (a,S). 
η-*» n-xo 
2 
REMARK 5.11. One can also consider maps φ : В -s- ]R , satisfying 
W.l ф(а,3) eW(S), for each (a,S) ε В, 
W.3 φ (a,S) =a, for each (a,S) e В with atWfS) 
ф(а,3) > a, for each (a,S) с В with a^W(S) (strong individual 
(which is stronger than W.2). rationality) 
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For the subclass of weak solutions, satisfying W.3, the obvious modifi­
cations of proposition 5.1 and the theorems 5.4-5.9 still hold. But, 
1 2 
since ω and ω do not satisfy W.3, we have to change the proof of 
theorem 5.8 as follows. Instead of ω , we take φ with d_ near to 1, 
where φ is the solution, introduced in the following 
2 
EXAMPLE 5.12. Let deD={x6]R ; x > 0 , x > 0 and x.+Xj = lb For (a,S) с В, 
let r(a,S) be the unique point in {a+td с S;t>0} with largest second 
coordinate. For each de D, the map φ : В -»• TR , defined by 
>
I ( d )(a,S) 
r(a,S) r(a,S) с W(S) 
w(S) if rjU.S) < w (S), forali (a,Ξ) с В, 
w(S) r2(a,S) < w2(S) 
is a lower semicontinuous solution satisfying W.3. For d= C J , ^ , see 
Isbell [1960J. 
§5. NON-COMPACT BARGAINING PAIRS 
In the foregoing, we restricted our attention to bargaining pairs 
(a,S), where S is compact. Many results can be extended to non-compact 
bargaining pairs, if we concentrate our attention on an appropriate 
ТУ* rr* 
family Б of bargaining pairs and if we topologize В carefully. In 
t/* 2 
the following, К is the family of closed convex subsets of H with 
non-empty Pareto set. We will say that a sequence S ,S_,... in К con­
verges to S e К , if liminf S => S "> limsup S (cf. Hildenbrand [1974], 
n-«°
 n
 η-H» n 
p.18-19). Now 8 ={(a,S);a e S and S e К } is called the set of closed 
bargaining pairs. Note, that 8 с 8 . We will say that the sequence 
<(a(n)/S ) ,n e К > in В converges to (a,S) с В , if lim ||a(n)-a|| =0 
and lim S = S. 
η-»
 n 
г.* 2 A solution of the bargaining problem is now a map φ : о -+ TR with 
ИЗ 
φ (3,5) ι P(S) and φ (a,S) >a, for each (a,S) с В . It is straightforward 
to generalize almost all lemmas, propositions and theorems in section 
KR * 
4 (exceptions are proposition 4.4, because ф is not defined on 8 , 
and theorem 4.14) by modifying the proofs. Essential is 
LEMMA 6.1. Let (a(l),3.),(a(2),S.),... fee a sequence in В converging 
to (a,S) . Then <ф(а(п),5 ) ;n с и> is a bounded sequence. 
PROOF. Since P(S) ^ ^, there exist a (ν.,υ-) > 0 and асе Ш such that 
ν s.+VpS_ < c, for all (s ,s,,)rS. Then, for η large, 
aj-1 sajín) < Ф1(а(п) ,Sn) < ν ~ (c-v2(a2-l)) 
and a2-l S a2(n) < Ф2(а(п) ,Sn) *! v2 (c-Vj (aj-1) ) . 
Hence, <ф(а(п),3 ) ;n ε ÏJ> is a bounded sequence. Π 
Also many of the results in section 5 for weak solutions can be 
τ,* 2 
extended to weak solutions ф : о -> Ж . 
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CHAPTER VII 
VALUES AND OPTIMAL THREAT STRATEGIES FOR ARBITRATION GAMES 
§1. ARBITRATION FOR COOPERATIVE TWO-PERSON GAMES 
Let Γ= <XFY,K.,K > be a two-person game in normal forn. In the 
(non-cooperative) game Γ, the players 1 and 2 choose, independently of 
each other, a strategy xcX and y e Y, respectively. Because, in that 
case, К (x,y) is the payoff to player ic {1,2}, 
Rjd") .= { (K^x.y) ,K2(x,y)) ; (x.y) ( X x Y} 
is the set of all possible payoff pairs, if there is no cooperation. 
We call R (Г) the non-oooperative payoff space of the game Г. 
If one allows the players to cooperate, then they have the possibi­
lity of jointly choosing a probability measure on Χ χ Y with finite 
carrier. These elements of Ρ are called correlated stvawgies. For a 
χ χ Y 
Ζ £ Ρ
χ χ γ 1 the (expected) payoff t o player i t {1,2} i s 
ED = 1 W W ' 
i f ζ = Σ . p e , . w i t h p = ( p , , . . . , p ) « Ξ and (x ,y ) <· X x Y. 
3 = 1 * ] (x ,y ) η * п з ' З 
Acting cooperatively, all payoff pairs in the set conv R-d') are 
attainable. For the mathematical convenience, we will concentrate on the 
closed, convex set R(r) := cl conv R (Г) . We call R(r) the cooperative 
payoff space or payoff region of the game Г. 
REMARK 1.1. If Γ=<Χ,Υ,Κ ,K2> is a mixed extension of a game <U,V,L ,L2>, 
then R(I ) = cl conv Κ
η
(Γ) , where R-tH := { (L (u,v) .L-(u,v) ) , (u,v) с U x ν}, 
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as we will show now. In fact we prove that conv ^гДП = conv R1 (Г) . Note 
that conv R
n
(I) is the set of all possible payoff pairs if the players 
use correlated strategies on UxV. 
(a) The inlcusion conv К
П
(П c conv R.ÍD follows from the fact X and Y 
contain all the degenerate probability measures on U and V, respectively. 
(b) For the proof of the other inclusion, let г с R (Г). Then there 
exist probability measures μ ' X and ν с Y on U and V, respectively, such 
that r= (/L.dtpχv),/L-d(yχv)). We show that there is a ρ e Ρ with 
Ib do = /L ά(μχ ν), for if {1,2}. Let λ be the probability measure on 
2 
Ж defined by 
-1 2 
λ(Β) := (μ χ ν) (L (Β)), for each Borei subset В of Ж . 
Then, for ι^{1,2}, (cf. Hildenbrand L1974], p.50) 
/-τ άλ = /π °L ά(μχν) =/L d ( μ χ ν ) , 
2 
where π : Ж •+• Il is the pro3ection map with π (t) =t , for ic {1,2}. 
LetW:=L(L~ (C(À) ) ) , where 
2 
C(A) := {te Ж ; λ (В) > 0 for each open set В containing t}. 
Then C U ) =cl W. In view of theorem 2 of Ti]S and Borwein [1980], there 
exists a p e Ρ 2 with C(p) cw and /π dX =/π dp, for each ie {1,2}. Choose 
(u.,v),...,(u ,v ) e U x V and a ρ e S in such a way that 
Ρ = Σ , Ρ
 е
т , , . Then, for ρ : = Υ. . p e , and ι ч {1,2}, 
3=1 *] L(u ,ν ) ]=1 *} (u ,ν ) 
j"L dp = Σ η, ρ L (u ,ν ) = /π dp = /π dA = /L d(y χ ν) . 
ι D=1 3 ι 3 1 ι ι ι 
Hence, reconv R (Г). So conv RjiF) сconv R
n
(Π and the proof is com­
plete. 
By using correlated strategies, each point of R(r) can be approached 
as nearly as the players want. It is clear that for a game Γ, for which 
the Pareto set Ρ(Γ) of К(Г) is non-empty, this set contains the most 
attractive payoff pairs for the players. However, for games with more 
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than one Pareto point, the problem for the players arises which Pareto 
point to choose, or better, which correlated strategy. Hence, we dis­
tinguish two classes of games: simple ones and non-simple ones. 
DEFINITION 1.2. A game Γ and its payoff region R(r) are called simple 
if Ρ(Γ) = ci or if Р(Г) consists of one point. 
Following Nash [1953] and Raiffa [1953], we will suppose that the 
players of a non-simple cooperative game Г solve their problem with 
the aid of an arbitrator, who, in turn, makes use of a so-called 
arbitration function φ: Κ(Γ) •+ Р(Г). Then the situation proceeds as 
follows. 
Step 1. Independently of each other, the players assign an χ t X and a 
ye Y and deliver these threat strategies to the arbitrator. 
Step 2. The arbitrator calculates the payoff φ(Κ.(χ,у),К2(χ,у)) and 
chooses a correlated strategy ζ, such that, for player i' (1,2), 
the expected payoff with respect to ζ equals φ K(x,y) if that 
is possible; otherwise, ζ is choosen in such a way that the 
expected payoff for player ie {1,2^ is as close to φ K(x,y) as 
he wants. 
Step 3. The players are obliged to use the correlated strategy z. 
From a strategic point of view, for the players, this situation 
corresponds, essentially, to the non-cooperative game in normal form 
Γ =<Χ,Υ,Φ 1Κ,Φ 2Κ>^ 
2 
where φ K(x,y) is the i-th coordinate of φ(Κ. (χ,у),К_( х,у)) e Ж .This 
game is called the arbitration game corresponding to the game ? and the 
arbitration function φ. 
Such an arbitration game has many similarities with zero-sum games. 
In both cases, for example, the preference relations of the players are 
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strictly opposite. In section 3, this fact will be used to define the 
concepts of value and (f-)optimal strategy (¡ > 0) for an arbitration 
game. 
The central problem η this chapter is that of the existence of 
ε-optimal strategies, for each ε>0, or, more generally, the problem of 
the existence of a value. We will give a number of existence theorems 
in section 6. These include all known existence results, obtained by 
Nash 1195·31, Raiffa [1953], Burger [1956], Owen [1971] and Kalai and 
Rosenthal [1978]. Most of these older results are obtained by using 
fixed point theorems, which implies that in these theorems strong con­
ditions are placed upon the strategy spaces and payoff functions. With 
the aid of our proof technique, in whicn families of suitable dummy 
zero-sum games play a role, it appears that we need only very mild con­
ditions on the game paraireters to guarantee the existence of a value. 
The price is some technical work done in section 4. 
The results presented in this chapter, were obtained jointly with 
Tijs and are based on Tijs and Jansen [1979 1, [1980b] and [1981]. 
§2. THE PARETO SET OF A CLOSED CONVEX SUBSET OF R 2 
For a simple arbitration game Γ (i.e. Γ is a simple game), the 
Φ 
problem for the players described in section 1, is easily solved, because 
for each claim с <U (Г) := sup {r ; r' R(I)} of player ι<:{ΐ,2,μ, there 
exists a correlated strategy for wmch the expected payoff for player ι 
is at least с . This follows immediately from the next result. 
ι 
2 
LEMMA 2.1. Let I\ be a sirrple arbitration aame. Then, for each с с к 
φ 
with c<íi(r)J there exists an ггК(Г) such that r>c. 
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PROOF. Take Ξ'β(Γ), such that з.с[с.,и(Г)] and t< К(Г), such that 
t_ t [с-,и9(Г)1. If s ï c or tac, then we are finished. Otherwise, let 
m. := sup {χ. ι Ж; (χ.,t.) К(Г)}с (-»,»] and 
m. := sup {x2e Ж; ( Ξ . , Χ ^ ( R(')}r (-»,»]. 
If пц e [c., œ], then take r= (s. ,c„) and then r > c and rt R(I). 
If пц < c_ and m 6 [с ,=>], then take r = (c. , t_) ( К(Г). Tnen also r S с. 
Hence, if we can show that it is impossible that m < с and m- < с , then 
2 
the proof is complete. Suppose that m. < с and m_ < с . Let χ с Ж be 
such that χ > (s. ,m_) and χ jí (s. ,m ) . If x. = s. and x» > m_, then χ / R(' ) , 
by the definition of m_. If x. > s-, then there is a convex combination 
ζ of χ and (m],t2) such that z. = s. and z 7>m ; ). Note that t, 2 c. ϊ m». 
Then, however, ζ/Κ(Γ) . Since (πι.,ί») с RtD, we may conclude that 
x/R(r). We have shown that (s. ,η^) < Ρ(Γ). Similarly, it follows that 
(m.jt-) ( Р(Г). However, (s ,m-) ^  (πι.,ί-) and this contradicts the fact 
that RtD is simple. Q 
In view of lemma 2.1, we introduce tne next 
DEFINITION 2.2. For a simple arbitration game Γ , we call и(Г) the 
У 
(arbitration) value of that game. Notation: v(I\). 
Φ 
Some well-known properties of non-simple payoff regions, wmch we 
shall need in this thesis, are gathered in the next lemma. The proof of 
this lemma is left to the reader (cf. Owen [1971], p.4). 
LEMMA 2.3. Let Γ be a non-simple arbitration game and Іеъ 
I := {x e Ж; there is а у( Ж such that (x,y) £ Р(Г)}. 
For each, χ ^  Ij denote the unique element ye жыіік (χ,у) с Р(Г) by р
г
(х) . 
Then the following holds: 
(1) I is a olosed convex subset of ж, 
(2) the functions ρ : I ->· Жапа ρ : р
г
(і) •+ жаге monotonically 
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decreasing, oonoave, continuous functions, which are left and right 
differentiable in the interior points of the domains, 
(3) Ρ(Γ) = {(x,p
r
(x)); xc I}. 
DEFINITION 2.4. Let TV and I be as in lemma 2.3. 
Φ 
—2 
Then the point ρ(Γ) := ( inf ρ , S U D p ?) r ]R will be called the left, 
рсР(Г) P L P I D _ 2 
upper point of Р(Г) and the point р(Г) := ( sup p., inf p.) Í Ж the 
рсР(Г) _ ρίΡ(Γ) 
right lower point of P C ) . Further, Ρ(Γ) := Р(Г) и{р(Г),р(Г)} and 
Р(Г) :=Р(Г) \ {¿(Г) ,р(Г)} 
Note, that и(Г) = (pj (Г) ,р 2 (Г) ) and that Р(Г) = Р(Г), if Р(Г) is 
compact. 
DEFINITION 2.5. The function ρ : [ρ (Γ),ρ (Γ)] ·+ 5 , with 
p
r
(D (Γ)) :=ρ,(Γ) = u m ρ (χ) andp^íp.íD := ρ (Γ) = lim ρ,(χ) 
Γ
 ι -= x+PjtD г г - 1 -¿ xtp (Γ) • 
will be called the Pareto function corresponding to Γ. 
Note, that Ρ(Γ) = { (x,p (x) ) ; χ с Lpj (Г) ,p (П ]} and that 
(Pjín.pjd-)) с I с [ ρ ^ η , ρ ^ Γ ) I. 
Finally, Ш(Р(Г)), W(R(r)), W(R(r)) and _ƒ' shall be abbreviated 
- К (. ) 
as И Г ) , И/(Г), Й(Г) and / , respectively. 
§3. ON THE VALUE AND OPTIMAL THREAT STRATEGIES OF AN ARBITRATION GAME 
For an arbitration game Γ corresponding to a non-simple game 
Γ=<X,Y,K.,K_> and an arbitration function φ, we call the expressions 
Vjtr ) := sup inf φ K(x,y) and 
xtX ycY 
Vjtr ) := sup inf φ K(x,y) 
ycY xtX 
the security levels of player 1 and player 2, respectively. 
In (1) and (2) of the following lemma, the position of 
_2 
ν(Γ\ ) := (v. (Г . ) ,v,,(I\) ) e Ж is described. 
φ 1 φ ¿ φ 
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LEMMA 3.1. Let Γ = <Х,У,ф1К/ф2
к>
 ^
е а
'
п
 arbitration дате with a non­
simple payoff region. Then 
(1) ν ^ Γ ) г р ^ Г ) and
 2(Г ) >р 2(Г), 
(2)
 2 ( Г ф ) < р г ( 1 Г ф ) ) , 
(3) if (Г ) ^  Р(Г) , then there is a pc р(Г) with р> (Г ) . 
PROOF. The inequalities in (1) follow immediately from the definition 
of Л Г ) and ν (Г ) . For the proof of (2), suppose that
 2(Г ) > p ( Л Г )) 
Then there exists a b e Ж with _(І,)>Ь>р_(
 1(Г,)). Now v„ (Г^) > b implies 
¿ ф Г і ф ^ Ф 
* 
that there is а у с Y such that 
ф K(x,y ) > b, for all X e X. 
Likewise, b>p_{v. (Γ )) implies the existence of an χ с X such that 
ф K(x*,y) > p~ (b) , for all y r Y . 
Hence, фК(х ,y ) > (b,p (b)) сР(Г), which is a contradiction. Conse­
quently, ν 2(Γ ) <P-ÍVjCr )). 
Now suppose that (Г ) ¿Р(Г). Then, in view of (2), 2 ( Гф' < Р г ' 1 ( Гф ) )" 
So there is а с f Η with ν 0(Γ, ) < с < p n (vi (Г. ) ) . Take p= (ρ,, (с) ,c) . Then 
¿ φ Γ φ Γ 
pe Ρ(Γ), because ρ"1 (с) e (ν1 (Γ ) ,ρ^
1
 (ν 2 (Γ ) ) ) с (¡^ (Γ) ,ρ 1 (Γ) ) . Further­
more ρ > ν ( Γ , ) . D 
φ 
DEFINITION 3.2. We say that a point ρ г Ρ(Γ) is attainable for player 1 
if, for all qe Р(Г) with q. < p1 , there exists an χ t X such that 
ф ^ х ^ у ) >q , for all у e Y. 
Similarly, реР(Г) is attainable for player 2 if, for all qc Р(Г) with 
q. > p., there exists а у e Y such that 
Ф7К(х,у ) >q,, for all χ e X. 
We will base our definition of the value of an non-simple arbitra­
tion game on the following lemma. 
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LEMMA 3.3. Let Γ = <χ,Υ,φ1κ,φ-Κ> be an arbitration game with a non-
simple payo ff region. Then 
о о 
(1) ν(Γ ) с Р(Г) if and only if there exists a (unique) point pt Ptl") 
attainable for both players, 
(2) (Г ) =р(Г) if and only if all Pareto points are attainable for 
player 1., 
(3) (Г ) =р(Г) if and only if all Pareto points are attainable for 
ρ layer 2. 
о 
PROOF, (a) If v ( r j < Р(Г), then, obviously, ν(Γ\) is attainable for both 
Φ Φ 
players. 
о 
(b) Thore is at most one point ρ ε Р(Г) attainable for both players, as 
о 
we show now. Let p,qc Р(Г), р ^ Ч be attainable for both players and 
о 
suppose that p. < q 1. Choose r f Ρ(Г) in such a way that p. < r < q. . Then 
* * 
there exist an χ Í X and a y с Y with 
φ K(x ,у) ϊ г. , for all ус Y, and 
Ф 2К(х,у*) > r 2, for all χ f X. 
о 
This implies that ν (Γ ) > r , for if {1,2}. Since re Ρ(Γ), by lemma 
3.1, this is only possible if г = (Г ) . Because r was arbitrarily chosen, 
this is impossible. 
о 
(c) Let p< Р(Г) be attainable for both players. Choose, for 
„ о 
ε с (0, min {ρ (Γ)-p.,ρ. (Γ)-p.}), q,rcP(r) in such a way that 
p.-cSq. < p. < r < ρ +c. Since ρ is attainable for both players, there 
* * 
exist χ t X and y t Y such that 
* 
φ K(x ,y) S q >p.-e, for all у с Y, and 
Ф2К(х,у ) > r,> p„(p.+c), for ail χ с X. 
Consequently, (Г
А
) > (ρ -t. ,ρ (ρ.+ε) ) , for all с small enough. Hence, 
(Г ) ϊ ρ . By lemma 3.1, this implies that ρ = ν(Γ,). 
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(d) Now part (1) of the lenma follows from (a), (b) and (c). 
(e) If ν(Γ,) = ρ ( Γ ) , then, clearly, all Pareto points are attainable lor 
player 1. Suppose that all Pareto points are attainable for player 1. 
Then v. (I ) ^  p,, for all ρ < Ρ(Γ) . 1 φ 1 
Consequently, ν.(Г.) > sup p. = ρ , ( Γ ) . In view of lemma 3.1, this implies 
1
 * ρ-Ρ(Γ) 1 - 1 
that ν(Γ ) = D . ( Г ) . Now the proof of part (2) of the lemma is complete. 
γ -1 
Part (3) can be proved in a similar way. Π 
DEFINITION 3.4. We say that an arbitration gane Γ is strictly determined 
if v(rj u Ρ(Γ) . In that case, ν (I\) is called the (arbitration) valve 
Φ ι Φ 
for player i< {1,2} and v(" ) is called the (arbitration) value of the 
arbitration game Γ . 
DEFINITION 3.5. Let Γ = <X,Υ,φ.Κ,φ K> be a strictly determined arbitra-
2 * * 
tion game with (Г,) с JR and let e > 0. A strategy χ с X (у e Υ) is 
called an г-оріітаі (threat) strategy for player 1 (2) if, for all у с Y 
(χ f Χ) , 
φ
χ
Κ.(χ*,γ) г ^ Г )-ε (ф2к(х,у*) >ν 2(Γ )-ε). 
A strategy is called optimal if it is c-optimal, for all ε> 0. 
The set of e-optimal strategies for player ι in a strictly determined 
game ", will be denoted by О (Г ) and the set of optimal strategies for 
player ι by О (Г ). 
In this thesis, we mainly consider arbitration functions φ: Κ(Γ) -* Ρ(Г) 
which are regular, i.e. 
R.l ф(г) > r, for each r t Κ(Γ) , 
R.2 φ is continuous, 
R.3 for each ρ t Ρ(Γ) , φ (ρ) := {r e R(r) ,- φ (r) = ρ} is convex. 
Regular arbitration functions were introduced by Raiffa [1953]. 
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The following lemma says that, for a regular arbitration function 
φ, property R.3 is equivalent with the property that φ. and φ_ are 
quasi-concave as well as quasi-convex. 
LEMMA 3.6. Let Γ be a non-simple arbitration game and let φ· К(Г) •+ Ρ (Г) 
be an arbitration function satisfying the properties R.l and R.2. Then 
R.3 is satisfied if and only if 
{г с RID , φ (r) > с} and {r e R(r) ; φ (r) < c} 
are aonoex sets, for all с с ж and all ic {1,2}. 
PROOF. The implication to the right has been proved by Burger [1956], 
p.154. For the other implication, we observe that, for each ρ e Ρ(Γ), we 
have φ (r) = ρ if and only if <!>.(r) > p. and ф-,(г) >?-,- Hence, φ (ρ) is the 
intersection of the convex sets {re RID; ф^г) Spi) and 
{rsRtr); ф„(г) >P2}/ which implies that φ (ρ) is convex. D 
We continue by relating bargaining solutions and arbitration functions. 
2 
Let φ: В •+• Ж be an upper semicontinuous bargaining solution and let 
Γ=<Χ,Υ,Κ ,K„> be a two-person game in normal form. Then the arbitration 
г 
function φ : R(r) •* Ρ(Γ) given by 
ф
Г(г) :=ф(г,К(Г)), for all геК(Г), 
is called the arbitration function induced by the solution φ. Note, that 
Γ 
φ is the restriction of φ to the subset of bargaining pairs 
г 
8 := { (r,R(r) ) ,- rf R(r)}. Instead of φ , we will often write φ in the 
Γ following. Using that the continuity of φ is a consequence of corollary 
VI.4.10, the following result is immediate. 
2 
LEMMA 3.7. Let φ: В •* ]R be an upper semicontinuous regular bargaining 
ρ 
solution and let Γ be a two-person game in normal form. Then φ is a 
regular arbitration function. 
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Let us consider an arbitration game Γ , where Γ= <X,Υ,Κ.,-K.> is 
a zero-sum game and where φ is an arbitration function satisfying R. 1. 
2 
Then Κ(Γ) = Р(Г) = cl conv {(Κ (χ,у),-Κ1(xry)) г Ж ; (χ,у) с X х Y} and 
Г =Г. Consequently, 
V 
ν. (Г ) = sup inf φ К(χ,у) = sup inf Κ. (χ,у) = val(Г) and 
* χ у χ у 
ν (Г,) = sup inf -Κ.(χ,у) = -inf sup Κ.(χ,у) =-val(Γ). 
^ Ф у х у х
1 
Hence, Г possesses a value if and only if ν(Γ,) e Ρ(Γ). Furthermore, the 
following three assertions are equivalent: 
(1) Г possesses a real value (i.e. аІ(Г) e Ж ) , 
(2) (Г.) с Р(Г), 
Φ 
(3) Е е(Г) j¿(ZÍ, for all ε > 0. 
The equivalence of (1) and (3) has been proved by Tijs Γ1977] and the 
equivalence of the assertions (1) and (2) is shown as before. 
Before we can formulate a similar statement for arbitration games 
Γ , where Γ is not necessarily a zero-sum game, we need a 
DEFINITION 3.8. Let ε > 0. A point (x£,y£) t X x Y will be called a 
defensive z-equilibrium point of the arbitration game Γ , if 
E.l ф.К(х,у ) ίφ.Κίχ ,y )+ε, for each χ с X, 
?2Κ(χειΥ) < ф 2 * 
bl f 
E.2 φ,Κ(χ ε^) < φ Κ(χ ε^ ε)+ε, for each у £ Y, 
D.l φ.Κίχ ,у)>фК(х ,y )-ε, for each у с Y, and 
D.2 φ „Κ (χ, y ) ϊφ,Κίχ ,¥")-£, for each χ e Χ. 
LEMMA 3.9. Let Γ be a non-simple arbitration game. Then, for each 
ρ<:Ρ(Γ), there exist a continuous function f : (0,») -»- [0,ra) satisfying 
(1) lim f (χ) = 0 and 
x+O Ρ 
(2) if, for г с К(Г) and ε > 0, Φ 1 (r) > Pj-e, then φ (r) < p2+f (ε) . 
PROOF. Without loss of generality, we may suppose that ρ.-ε2ρ (Γ), if 
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р. (Γ) < К. Then the inequality φ, (г) > ρ.-ε implies that ф^Сг) < p (ρ - F ) . 
о 
(a) Suppose that p< Р(Г). Then there exists an a< 0, such that 
s 2 < afs.-p. )+p 2, for all s c R C ) . Let^(t) •= a (t-p.)+p2, for all tt Ж. 
Then 
μ (Pj-e) <£(p 1-e) =p 2-ac. (3.1) 
If h > 0 f then a = h"
1[-e(p1+h)-£(p1) J >h
_ 1
rp
r
(p 1+h)-p r(p 1)l, so 
a > lim h~ [ p_ (p,+h) -p„ (p. ) ] = D /•>„ (p. ) . Together with (3.1), this implies 
h+O Г 1 Г 1 г Г 1 
that ф_(г) < ρ +сГ-D p
r
(p.)]. So in this case we can take 
f (χ) ^ x l - D ^ t p j ) ] . 
(b) If ρ = ρ(Γ), then the inequality <p.(r) > p (D-r implies that 
ф-(г)<р (Г). So in this case, we can take f (
x
)
 :
= 0, for all x > 0 . 
(c) Ι ί ρ = ρ ( Γ ) , then ф 2(г) < р 2(Г) + [р г(р 1 (Г)-е)-рг(р1(Г) )] . Now we can 
take for f any continuous function on (O,™) with, for χ small enough, 
f (х):=р
г
(р 1(Г)-х) -р г(р 1(Г)) . D 
Now the next result is immédiate. 
COROLLARY 3.10. Let Г be a non-simple arbitration game. Then the fol­
lowing two assertions are equioalent: 
(1) for each ε > 0., there exists a defensive r-equilibrium point, 
(2) ΕΓ(Γ\) ¿¿, for all ε > 0. 
Φ 
This result will be used in the proof of the following equivalency. 
THEOREM 3.11. Let Γ be a non-simple arbitration game, where 
Γ = <x,Y,K. ,K2>. Then the following assertions are equivalent: 
(1) (Г,) с Р(Г), 
Φ 
(2) ЕЬ(Г ) ¿φ, for all ε > 0. 
Φ 
PROOF, (a) Suppose that ν(Γ ) с Р(Г) . Let ε> 0. Since ρ is continuous 
in ν_(Γ.), there is a δ t. ( Ο , ^ Γ Ι such that 
2 Φ 
p Z ^ t ) € (-»,ν^Γ J+ÍJEI, for each t Г [ν 2(Γ Α)-6,») η ρ Γ(Ι) (3.2) 
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Choose χ* с 0°(Γ
Λ
) and у* ._ 0 2 (Г ) . Then by (3.2), ф1К(х,у*) < Vj (Г J+'je , 
for each χ ' X. Hence, 
φ K(x,y*) < VJC.J+'SE < Ф1К(х*,у*)+>5с+6 < Ф1К(х*,у*)+Е. (3.3) 
In a similar way, one proves that φ,Μχ ,y) < ф„К(х ,y )+e. Together with 
φ' 
(3.3), this implies that (x ,y ) e E (Г.). We have proved that assertion 
(1) implies (2). 
(b) Now suppose that (2) holds. Then, by corollary 3.10, there exists, 
for each e > 0, a defensive ε-equilibrium point (x ,y ) t Χ χ Y. It follows 
with the aid of E.l that 
ν (Γ ) <inf sup φ K(x,y) < sup φ K(x,ye) < φ K(xF,yE)+e 
ι φ У
 x
 ι χ
1 l 
and it follows fron D.l, that 
v. Г . ) = sup inf ф.К(х,у) > inf ф.К(х£ ,у) > ф . К ( х Е , у Е ) - е . 
• • - Ф х у
1
 y 1 ι 
So |v. (Г )-ф К(х ,у ) | <ε. Analogously, E.2 and D.2 imply that 
|
 2(Г )-ф_К(х
е
,у
е) I S ε. Since фК(х£:,уЕ) e Р(Г) , the distance between 
ν(Γ,) and Ρ(Γ) is at most f. Because ε > 0 was arbitrary and Ρ(Γ) is 
9 
closed, we may conclude that (Г,) сР(Г). Hence, (2) implies (1). J 
Φ 
The next tneorem can be useful for the calculation of the arbitration 
value and the optimal threat strategies. 
THEOREM 3.12. Suppose that the non-simple arbitration game 
Γ = <χ,Υ,φ κ,φ-Κ> possesses a value ν(Γ ). Then the zero-sum games 
Γ :=<Χ,Υ,φ1Κ,-φ κ> and Γ := <X,Υ,φ.κ,-φ^Ο possess a value. 
Furthermore, v. (Γ ) = val (Г. ) , v. (Г
л
) = -val (I j) and, for ie {1,2}, 
E (Г.) =0. (Г ) χ О, (Г ) =0. (Г.) хО-(Г.) . 
φ l i 2 ι 1 ф 2 ф 
PROOF, (a) Suppose, firstly, that ν(Γ ) e Р(Г) . Let ε > 0 . In view of 
theorem 3.11 and corollary 3.10, there exists a defensive ε-equilibrium 
point (x ,y ) e Χ χ Y. From E.l it follows that 
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с ε ε 
i n f sup φ K(x,y) < sup φ К ( х , у ) < φ Κ(χ ,y ) + t 
у х
1
 χ
 1 ί 
and from D . l i t f o l l o w s t h a t 
s u p i n f φ K(x,y) > i n f φ K ( x E , y ) > φ Κ ( χ ε , γ ε ) - ε . 
χ у
 1
 У
 ί 1 
Then, however , f o r e a c h ε > 0 , 
0 < i n f s u p φ K(x,y) - s u p i n f φ K(x,y) < 2 ε , 
у х
1
 χ у * 
which i m p l i e s t h a t v a l ( Г . ) e x i s t s and i s e q u a l t o v . ( Г ) . 
(b) Suppose now t h a t v C ) = р(Г) / Р(Г) . Then, f o r e a c h с с ( ρ , (Γ) , ρ (Г) ) , 
* * 
t h e r e i s а у e Y s u c h t h a t φ K(x,y ) ä с , f o r a l l χ e X. Then 
φ K(x,y*) < р ^ (с) , f o r a l l χ f X. Hence, f o r a l l с е ( p 2 (Γ) , p 2 (Γ) ) , 
* -1 
v . (Γ ) = s u p m f φ . Μ χ , γ ) < i n f s u p φ K(x,y) < s u p φ . Κ ί χ , γ ) < ρ (с) . 
i f X y 1 у х 1 χ 1 ' 
S i n c e , l i m ρ <c) = ( p
r
 (ο_(Γ)) = p (Γ) = v (Г ) , we may c o n c l u d e t h a t 
с+Р2(Г) ' Z 1 ι Φ 
v a l ( Γ , ) = ν , ( Γ , ) i n t h i s c a s e , a s w e l l . 
ι ι φ 
(c) Suppose t h a t ν ( Γ ) = р ( Г ) ¿ Р(Г) . S i n c e φ К ( х , у ) < ρ (Γ) , f o r a l l 
( χ , у ) e Χ χ Υ, we have t h a t i n f sup φ K(x,y) < ρ (Γ) = ν (Γ ) . Hence, 
y χ 1 -L ! Φ 
val С". )= ν, С.) in this case, also. 
ι ι φ 
(d) Now we have proved that, а1(Г.) = ..(Г,), in all cases. By inter­
changing the roles of the players, one obtains that а1(Г_) =- _(Г ). 
(e) We only show that Е(І\) =0.(Г,) xo,,(I\), because the rest of the 
φ 1 φ ζ φ 
statements can be proved in a similar way. Suppose, firstly, that 
(x*,y*) с ЕСГф). Then 
φ K(x ,y ) > φ K(x,y*), for all χ с X, and 
Ф2К(х*,у*) >ф2К(х*,у), for all yeY. 
Hence, ф9К(х ,y ) < ф-К(х,у ), for all χ € X and 
φ^ίχ*^*) < φ^ίχ*^) , for all yeY. (3.4) 
Consequently, ν9(Γ ) = sup inf φ K(x,y) > inf φ K(x,y ) >ф.К(х ,y ) and, 
ζ φ y
 χ
 Ζ
 χ
 ¿ ¿ 
* * * * 
similarly, ν. (Γ ) > φ.Κ(χ ,y ) . So ν(Γ ) = фК(х ,у ), since 
фК(х ,у ) с Р(Г). Together with (3.4), this implies that 
(х*,у*)е0 1(Г ф)хО 2(Г ф). 
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If, on the other hand, (x ,y ) e O. C.) χθ.(Γ,), then for all χ с X, ус Y, 
Ι φ Ζ φ 
(f^Kíx^y) >ν1(Γ ) and ф2К(х,у*) > ν2(Γ ) . (Τ.5) 
Hence, фК(х*,у*) >ν(Γ ). Since (Г ) f Р(Г), this implies that 
фК(х ,y )= (Г ). Combining this with (3.5), we obtain 
γ 
it * * 
φ.Κίχ,γ ) <φ K(x ,y ), for all χ с X and 
Ф2К(х*,у) <ф2К(х*,у*), for all у с Y. 
So (X*,y*) ε Ε(ΓJ . J 
The following result is well known (cf. Kalai and Rosenthal [1978]). 
COROLLARY 3.13. Let I be a nonsimple arbit-vation game Wbth arbitration 
value ν(Γ.). Then 
Φ 
(1) the equilibriian points of Γ are interahangeable, i.e. if 
(x,y),(x',y·) €Ε(Γ ), then (χ,γ·),(χ\Υ ) < Ε(Γ ) (see II. 2.1) ; 
(2) the equilibrium points of Γ are equivalent, i.e., for all it {1,2} , 
φ^ίχ,γ) =ф
і
К(х,,у') (= ν
ι
(Γ )),¿/ (χ,y) ,ίχ',γ') Ε Ε(Γ
φ
) . 
§4. REGULAR ARBITRATION FUNCTIONS ON NON-SIMPLE PAYOFF REGIONS 
Let Γ be a non-simple arbitration game, where φ: Κ(Γ) -»• Р(Г) is a 
regular arbitration function. Basic for the theory in the next section 
is the following observation. 
LEMMA 4.1. Let К(Г) be a non-simple payoff region and let φ: Κ(Γ) -»· Ρ (Γ) 
be a regular arbitration function. If ρ с Р(Г) and τ с if (р)\{р.,., then 
φ (s) = ρ, for any s in Κ(Γ) of the form s = p+A(r-p), where \c [0,»). 
PROOF. If λ e [0,1], then s e [г,ρ]сR(Γ) and φ(s) = ρ by R.3. Suppose that 
λ с (1,«) , s e R(r) and φ(s) = q, for some q € Ρ(Γ). If q # ρ, then without 
loss of generality, q. < p. . Since рИр(Г), we can find a qr Р(Г) with 
p. < q.. Let t be the point, where the line through q and r intersects 
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t kü I m e ínmui jh ь ana q. ü i iu e : LS ( . o n t i u a o u s , ti e r e і ь а:і oJii.Liil 
ζ R ( r i , l / a n y on l s , t 1, .,ijcli ' n a t ïfb an.j ^ ( ^ ) -· ρ-, • The I m o L.-ito^j-, 
ζ and r i i iLcr fOCts trsp P i r o t o s e t I'( ) \ 11 a p o m t u wit ι u . -· p . , . I'u·. 
c : - m i r . ί α - , , ' - ί ζ ) } . Τ.ιοι, - ¡ ( ¿ J c , ¡ j i ^ ) - ^ . , с , ^ ( ' і - і т c '/ d n i ì 
r i s а convex t .oiu)i¡ iat ioii ο ι ζ and u . Гіііъ c o n i . : ' i d n t ь 1 emina -3.6. IJencc-, 
q = p . . 
This property leads to the following cief i P.LÌ ion. 
DEFINITION 4.2. For an arbitration даме !., wo call an element 
2 
d' Л :=ÍX' R ; x ~ 0 an'i χ , + χ ^ - Ι } ι . ν ' - ώ ! ' lìvxiciùr-l for ρ κ Ρ(Γ) if 
φ (p+ad) = ρ , for each ι · Ü with p+id К ( г ) . 
2 ν 
F o r Χ ι Ж , χ : - (-χ , χ . ) . 
ο 
Some p r o p e r t i e s of D ( p ) , t h e s e t of s ' i i t a b l e d i r e c t i o n s f o r ρ Ρ(Γ) , 
a r e g a t h e r e d i n 
LEMMA 4 . 3 . :,4t Г, ¿іі J h 'il-.i.''nt U: 'V4-
r
 i,i\ii' » j O'.J <znj uill p< Р(Г) . i'^i.'iî 
(1) D(p) .Ό· ,г >.oí.-i«? '¡у, л Г',І>ТІ >j:.l Ч " . , ' - ' І ; .^íhtwt о/ Л^ 
(2) 'Ζ: VÌI " ¿,'_,":<n.'t ' >Ί ρ •* ü(p) iv: P(!') г.; .n/fvr í?_nj.' •'•^linu ι io. 
PROOF, (a) If int β(Γ) - (ZÍ, then P(I ) -R(!) and D(p) - Λ , for all 
р . Ρ(Γ) . Hence, (1) and (2) hold m that case. 
In the following, we suppose that there is an interior point ι; К(Г). 
(b) Take q,r Р(Г) with q. ^  p, < r . Then К := , q,i J ' I i,r i is a connec­
ted subset of К(Г) arid φ. : К •+ Ж is a continuous function. Hence, 
ρ j - rqj/rj] = t ψ (q) ,i
 χ
 (r) J - ф ^ К ) . So there is а к L К with ф(к) = p. 
Then (| к - р і ^ ) " (k-p) f D(p) Φ φ, by lemma 4.1. 
(c) We show that, for each d Dip), there is an α> 0 such that p+id· K. 
ν 
Consider the function f: К -»• IR with f (χ) = <d,x-p>. Since f(q) < 0, 
f(r) ·> 0 and f is continuous on the connected set K, there is an χ г К 
such that f(x) = 0 . This implies that x-p=ad, for some a t Ж. Since 
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l> i\ ) , ρ * χ , χ ι -t ivi P v ' J a i a 0 , . ( 1, IVL ι U. 
l ü ) i'iov/ i/c · . ^ v III l ' U ' 1 ι ^ c i ' их ы L. I e t d , α ' I ) ( - j αϊ ι Ι ν ϋ , Ι ; . 
I n V-LV, o i ve) , t i ι l e d r i · o o ) l i " c n u n b t r s . j л il ι , l ( h t l j t 
! 1 ' ? 
л >+ ι 1 κ π ι α χ - ρ*-ι t Κ. Ljf гч. ы. · , VvithmiL l o a s o f fjc r o r a l 1 1 ' · , 
' 1 1 ' , ι . Τ Η I 4 - |L+ r ι. /\ ( I dl d *• ( " ) r> ο γ R. i . Ik IV. I , 
A t . 1 
1 ! 
t x + n - t ) y " ( ) a n ! i t x K l - t ) y ) - ι l^i R . ' , І к ^ а и ^ е л х ' ) - Г < " ' ' 
' \ ) - j . S J к е l x + ( l - t ) y h ι (t d t i l - * " ) ci") / v.o ю - ь ι idc t i i a t 
\ i H ( 1-t ) α J (j ) , b y u s u i ' ] i f пшіа 4 . 1 . 
U ) Ό Λ »ι f r o v e t h a t D i s u p p e r bt m i r o n t n u o U o i n ρ Ρ ( Γ ) . F o r e a c h 
k 0 k k k k 
k Jy, 4 t r P ( ) , ti D ( ] Í ) a i d s u p p o s e t h a t ! i n ρ - η a n d l i n d = d . 
k > • ' k >•<» 
h o i»i-'* ^ ιον t i i i t ι D ( p ) . I t f o l l o w s f r o m ( с ) , t h < < t , f o r e a c h k И , 
k k k 
t i е г о е х і ^ * α"ι ι, 0 s u c h t h a t у = г +u d К. - ^ і г с е K i s c o r a o a c t , t h e r e k - ' t 
1 2 k k 
i s ι l u m i j o i n t у К o f t n e ь е о а с п г е у , y , . . . S i n c o (ν ) = p , f o r 
ι it h < U ,
 Л
'е 1 a v o ί (• ) = ρ , b y R . 2 . Now ι - \\ < d | | = | | > ! < ; - р | | . a i d 
k i k k - 1 к k. 
! У -V
 l t v - Ρ ) · 
So 1= i.y-i1 1>_;') ' i- Нілісе, \ р+ ly-pl'.d and И у ) = Р imply, in view 
of lemmi 4.1, that d T(p). 
(1) It follows inmediately from the upper semicontinuity of D that D(p) 
is a closed «subset of the compact set /, for each ρ P("). Hence, D(p) 
i s с o m p a c t . ( 
о 
I LMMA 4 . 4 . *• j
 Λ
 Ъь a M I J - . J 'rr. '= uvb 'tniLi. ' ' tiant lr -, Г. * ρ Ρ ( Γ ) , 
ν 
d i D ( p ) -> i ¿ r ·> 0 . 'j.'hcn thcí'e ÍXÍJÍL η * •> 0 г ц>Аг ι Hat 
ν 
(1) jl r je''' r t R i " ) 'ûi-th <d,r-p> -> -δ, ν λ,-ΐι-τ i d ) p.-f, 
ν 
(2) /r>i» ;-'г r. R t D with <d,r-p>< S ÍJC Ä^jr ' (r) ^  ρ +ι . 
PROOF. We orly show that there is a 5 ^ 0 , such that CD holds. 
Take q P(i) with p.-E^q. <- p 1 . In view of lemma 4.3, there is a 
u D(q) witn u. = max d . Let 
d D(q) 
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L := {г (. К(Г) ; r = q+au, for some ar [0,°°) 1. 
2 v 
Let £: Ж •IRbe the affine function with i (r) =<d,r-p>. 
If we can show that 
sup Цт) = sup Ш г ) ; r f ф,1«--^.!} < 0 (4.1) 
r, L 1 1 
-1 ν 
then we can take ó =-sup {-¿(г); г r φ (-""»q. ]} and then <d,r-p> = ¿(r) >-
implies г^ф. (-"»q. ] or ф.(г) > q. >p.-c, and the proof is complete. 
(a) We want to show that for each yt φ (-"jq-J, there is an s с LnLy,p]. 
ν -1 
First we prove that <y-q,u><0 for all у с φ (-»,σ.]. For у = q, there is 
nothing to prove. If ф(у) = q ^ y , then w= Hy-qlL (y-q) f D(q) and then 
ν ν 
w. - u., by definition of u., which implies that <w,u>< 0, and so <y-q,u>S 0. 
ν ν 
Now, let ф.Су) < q. and suppose that <y-q,u>>0. Since <ф (y) -q,u> < 0, 
ν 
there is a ζ « [у,φ (у) ] с R (Г) with <z-q,u> = 0. Then φ(z)=q, because 
u <=" D(q) . On the other hand, by К.3,ф(г)=ф(у). Hence φ (y) = q, which is 
ν -1 
impossible. So ф.Су) < q. implies <y-q,u> < 0. Hence, for all ye φ (-""/q.]» 
ν ν ν 
<y-q,u>S0. Now <p-q,u>>0. So there is an s e [p,yl with <s-q,u> = 0. Then 
s e L. 
(b) Now we prove (4.1). We distinguish two cases. 
Case 1. <u,d><0. Then, for all a > 0, £(q+au) < I (q) . 
So 
r.L 
sup £(r) = £(q) < 0. Take y f φ (-"»Ч,J- In view of part (a) of the 
r.L 1 1 
proof, we can find an s .. Ln[y,p]. Then £(s) ¿&{q) <0 = t{p). Since ¿ is 
affine, s с [y,ρ] and ¿(s) <-£(p), we may conclude that ¿(y) < ¿ (s) . Then 
£(y) <£(q) and we have proved (4.1) for this case. 
ν 
Case 2. <u,d> > 0. We show that there is a beR(r) such that L=rb,q] and 
£(b) = sup ¿(r) . Note that £(q) < 0 and lim £(q+au) =». First we note that, 
rtL a-«" 
for all a e [0,») with q+auс L, we have ¿(q+au) <0; if £(q+a.u) >0 and 
q+a.ueL, then there is a f [0,a.] with ¿(q+a^u) =0. Therefore, there is 
a gaO with q+apU = p+Bd and, consequently, q=<p(q+:i2U) = Φ (p+@d) = p, which 
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is a contradiction. Let a =sup {a> 0; q+aut L} < Ж and take 
b = q+a
n
u t L. Then £(r) <£(b), for all r e L. For у f φ. (-",Τ,] and 
s с [y,pj η [b,q] we have I (s) < £(b) < 0 =£(p) and then £(y) < £(s) < ¿(b) . 
Hence, (4.1) also holds in this case. Π 
The following corollary is immediate. 
о 
COROLLARY 4.5. Let Г. be a non-simple arbitration game and let ρ <. Ρ(Γ) 
and d Í D(p). Then 
ν 
(1) for each r <= β(Γ) ω-ίίΤζ <d,r-p> > 0., we have φ (r) > p . , 
ν 
(2) for each rt R(r) with <а,г-р><0
л
 we have φ (r) < p. . 
§5. THE FAMILY OF DUMMY ZERO-SUM GAMES 
Unless otherwise stated, in this section, Γ is a fixed two-person 
game <X,Y,K ,K_> with a non-simple payoff region and φ: Κ(Γ)-»· Р(Г) is 
a fixed regular arbitration function. 
о 
DEFINITION 5.1. For each реР(Г) and d e D ( p ) , the zero-sun game 
Γ =<X,Y,K ^,-K >, where, for all (x,y) c X x Y , p,d p,d p,d 
К ,(x,y) := <d,K(x,y)-p>, 
ρ, α 
will be called the dummy zero-sum game of Γ corresponding to the pair 
(p,d) . 
With the help of corollary 4.5, one can prove the following result. 
о 
LEMMA 5.2. Let Г, be an arbitration game and let pi Р(Г), deD(p). Then: 
(1) к -,(x,y) so implies φ к(х,у) >p7, 
ρ ,α ¿ t-
(2) κ .(x,y) so implies φ κ(χ,γ) >?.. 
ρ, Q 1 
о 
The reason why the family {Г ,· ρ e Ρ(Γ), dt D(p)} of dummy zero-
Pi d 
sum games plays a crucial role in the derivation of existence theorems 
for arbitration games, is revealed in 
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о 
T-H-OFilM S . f ) . , ί ,
 L - 7 ^ - " j*ti (ΐΊ h t p ?\\ ) , d D ( p ) . 
. . . / · I Г ( І ) ' q j ' Oj ^ - Í d D f q ) , I ^ v i l l i .) 
^ — с , d 
î . v a l i r ) Э, 
τ,с 
τ P ( . ) ' th r j P j 7' 1 a!' ä D i r ) , J ' . 
v i
 φ ) = ρ . 
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PROOF. Let et (Ο,ρ (Γ)-ρ ) . Then, by lemma 2.3(1), there is a qcP(r) 
with q. = ρ 1 - ε . Since val(Γ ) > 0 , for all d c D t q ) , theorem 5.3 implies 
that ν.(Γ,) * q. = p. -E . Hence, ν, (Γ . ) i p.-z, for all suitable values of 
1 φ 1 1 1 φ 1 
t > 0 . So v-tr.) > p. . Similarly one proves that V j d ^ ) - P 7 • A s i n part 
(a) of the proof of theorem 5.4, one can show that the inequality 
(ГІ) > p implies that р = (Г
А
) is the arbitration value of Г
л
. L, 
γ Y 
Now we consider arbitration games Гф with (Г ) с {р(Г),р(Г)}. 
THEOREM 5.7. Lel Г, be an arbitration game. 
(1) If а^(Г ) ^  0, for all p ' Р(Г) and all d ε Dtp), then ν(Γ ) = р(Г) . 
Ρ/ Cl φ — 
(2) I f v a l (Γ J < 0, for all pc Р{Г) and all de D{p)
 3 then v( Г ) = р(Г) . 
p,d - r Φ 
О 
PROOF. We only prove (1). By theorem 5.3(1), ν (Γ ) > ρ , for all ρ e. Ρ (Γ), 
In view of lenuna 3.1, this implies that ν(Γ,) = р ( Г ) . С 
Φ
 £ 
The next three theorems play a crucial role in the derivation of 
existence theorems for arbitrations games. 
THEOREM 5.8. Let Γ be an arbitration game, where Γ = < x,Y,K,,K2> and 
Φ satisfy the following conditions : 
(1) ф: Κ(Γ) -* Ρ (Г) is a regular arbitration function, 
(2) for each at [0,11 , the zero-sum game <χ,Υ,αΚ1 -(1-α)Κ2> possesses 
Then the arbitration came I\ possesses an arbitration value. 
PROOF. We must show that ν(Γ ) с Р ( Г ) . Suppose that (Г.) / Р(Г). Then, 
Φ Φ 
о 
by lemma 3.1(3) , there exists a ρ *. Ρ (Γ) with ρ > ν (Γ ) . Choose d с D(p) . 
Since sup inf ф_К(х,у) =ν_(Γ ) <?-,, for each у с Y, there exists an 
У χ
 ¿
 ¿ (f ¿ 
χ с X such that φ_Κ(χ ,y) <p„. Then lemma 5.2(1) implies that, for each 
у 2 у ^2 
y( Υ, Κ ,(χ ,у) > 0. Condition (2) of this theorem implies that Г 
p,d y r p,d 
has a value. However, а1(Г ,) = inf sup К (x,y) - inf К ,(x ,y) > 0 . 
P' d у χ P' d y P' d У 
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Similarly, the inequality v. (I ) < p. implies that аКГ ) < 0 . Con­
sequently, а1(Г ) =0 and, by theorem 5.4, ρ is the arbitration value 
of Γ . Hence, ν(Γ,) =ρ> ν(Γ,), which is a contradiction. So (Г ) сР(Г). 
Φ Φ Φ φ 
Thus we have proved that Γ, has an arbitration value. G 
Φ 
In the following examples we consider arbitration games Γ for which 
Φ does not satisfy one of the conditions (1) and (2) of theorem 5.8. 
EXAMPLE 5.9. Let Γ be the bimatrix game (A,B), where A 
•-1 o-
B= Then К(Г) = conv{ (0,0) , (1,0) , (2,-1) , (0,-2) } and 
Ρ(Γ) =[ (1,0) , (2,-1)]. Let ф: К(Г) >·Ρ(Γ) be defined by 
2 1 
0 0 
and 
ф(х.у) 
ЩІ+х-у, 1-x+y) if χ > 1 or у < х-І^ 
. (1,0) if χ < 1 and y > x-lh. 
Then φ satisfies R.l and R.3, but not R.2, because ф is discontinuous 
in (Ο,-Ι^). In order to show that Γ does not possess an arbitration 
2 2 с 
value, we write Ξ χ S = T u T , where 
Τ := { (χ,y) f S 2 χ S 2 ; Xj+XjYj S 1 and (х^Ч) (l^yj) > 0 } . 
if (x,y) с Τ 
-
12(-4x1y1+2y1+x1-3) if (χ,у) ¿ Τ 
0 if (χ,у) с Τ 
Then I 1 
Ф1(хАу ,xBy ) = 
and 
Ф2(хАу ,хВу ) 
1![х1(1-4у1)+2у1-1] if (х,у) ¿ Τ 
Consequently, ν(Γ ) = (l,-^) ¿Р(Г) and Γ, does not possess an arbitration 
value. 
В 
го η 
A = and 
Li oj 
. Then Κ(Γ) = conv{(0,0),(1,0),(0,1)} and Ρ(Γ) =[(1,0),(0,1)]. 
EXAMPLE 5.10. Let Г be the bimatrix game (Α,Β), where 
1 0 
0 0. 
Let φ: Κ(Γ) -*• Ρ(Γ) be defined by 
)(x,y) = 
(i-Y,y) if у > -hx+h 
^(Ι+χ,-χ+Ι) if yi-hx+h. 
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, , 1- О , \ ) ' , t иГ . !.!. 1 Χ \ . ι* >Г!ЧОЧ l " n t 1 " , 
\ , ι Ρ m i : M v , \ ) m i ' κ , ^ , ν ) ·• ι ( ч >•> (V, ) - V/ , , 
ν Υ χ X - χ, X ' I 1 
• ι ι . ι i' r ni ' с 1 ι c m . S o ν 11 ( , , ' 4 
* , » ι , - 1 - a ) 
1
 ί Η ι 1 r i * , .1 -> ι η ( 1) , ΟΙ ι ЛП ' 1 ч '( I '1 >t V i l ( , , , ) 0. 
ν , b , - l - i > ) 
Ι t f- Ι a , M > К hi 1 l i ' - inp w i t h f i ) · v i l ( ) . Т1мч>, 
V, ( , — 1 - ) 
ϊ , ' l , b Ι , WC 1 1 Ч 
Γ( l - t d . l i ¡ > - ΐ ι h ' j t - v , ! + Ι ' - Ί | - u p ¡Κ 1 ( χ , ν ) ι Κ , Ι χ , ν ) ¡ . 
( χ , ν ) . Χ>Υ 
o n , bo\ V (v f>r , l o m l i t i o i ( i ) i m p L i e b , t h a i f i ¿i ( o n t i r i f u i Гиге t i ut 
th« ( І Р Г К Н Ь Ч І - t i ί і , Ь ] . By (л) Hid (b) , wi' h и о Г ( а ) 0 a n d f ( ! ) 
-ι ι - i K i t l v , t i n 4 " ! » 1 е : л ι l a , b l , w ; t h r
 v
i ) - 0 . 'f i k e a l a i r (χ , v ^ 
o ; ' i r il c - l r a t e n i f =; m t i n 4 ua i i t 1 Γ , , . riy t l ioo 1-! "i ' ) . / . , χ ' , 
d y * Ο , ( , ) . ! 
Г о г t r i o
 < i r b i t r a t L j n q a m o ϊ , i n oxampl .» г1.">, ι. ' 1 t i o i i (1) o f 
1 І9 
theorem 5.13 is not satisfied and 0„(Γ ) =ф. 
λ Φ 
EXAMPLE 5.14. Let Γ be the c-mixed extension of the 2x°°-bimatrix game, 
where A : = 
4 2 2 2 2І 2 
/ В .= 
o i i i 1 i 
2 3 . 4 
О 2 2 2 lì 2 
Then 
2 2 
К(Г) =conv{ (0,0) , (4,0) , (2,2)} and Ρ (Γ) = Γ (2 ,2) , (4,0) ] . Let Φ: Κ(Γ) -»- Ρ (Γ) 
be the (uniquely deternined) regular arbitration function with 
Í (2,2) if χ > 1 
ф(х,х) = \ (xc [0,2]) . 
[ (4-2x,2x) if x< 1 
Note that condition (2) of theorem 5.13 is satisfied because, for aïh, 
val(aA-(l-a)B) = 4a-2, e ι. О. (aA- ( l-a)B) and e. i О. (aA-( 1-a) Β) , 
and, for α < \, 
val(aA-(l-a)B) = 2ct-l, e r 0 (aA- ( 1-a) B) and e ε Ο (αΑ- ( 1-α) Β) . 
Now theorem 5.7(2) implies that ν(Γ,) = (2,2) . So condition (4) of 
Φ 
2 
theorem 5.13 is not satisfied. Furthermore, О, (Γ ) =S and О-ЛГ,) = φ. 
1 φ ζ φ 
THEOREM 5.15. Let Γ. be an arbitration game, where Г= <x,Y,K ,K7> and 
Φ satisfy the following conditions: 
(1) φ: RU') •* Ρ(Γ) is regular, 
(2) x and Y are compact sers and к and к„ are continuous functions, 
(3) for each α с Г0,1]з the zero-sum game <Χ,Υ,αΚ.-(1-α)Κ > possesses a 
value. 
Then Γ possesses optimal strategies for both players. 
PROOF. Note that the conditions (1) and (3) imply, in view of theorem 
5.8, that Γ, has an arbitration value ν := ν(Γ.). 
Φ Φ 
2 ε ε 
By (2), ν e Ж and by (1) and (2), О. (Г.) and O.dV) are closed subsets 1 φ 2 φ 
of the compact sets X and Y, respectively. Then О,(Γ ) = Π О,(Г ) φ φ 
1 φ
 с>0 1 Φ 
and 02(Γ ) = Π Ο^Γ ) ¿φ. D 
^ ε>0 
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§6. EXISTENCE THEOREMS 
Now we are able to derive, wxth the aid of the theorems 5.8, 5.13 
amd 5.15, a string of existence theorems. We begin by reproving some 
old results about finite arbitration games. 
The next theorem was first proved by Nash [1953], using the fixed 
point theorem of Kakutam for multifunctions. Another proof was given 
by Owen [1971], who, for each point ρ с ΡίΓ), constructed a suitable 
family of zero-sum games and used the minimax theorem of J. von Neumann. 
For this special case, it appears that these zero-sum games coincide, 
о 
for the points ρ e Ρ(Γ), with our dummy games. 
THEOREM 6.1. For a bimatrix game Г= (А,в), the arbitration gane Г -is 
Φ 
strictly determined and both players have optimal strategies, 
PROOF. Let (A,B) be an mxn-bimatnx game. Note that Γ= <S ,S ,E.,E2>. 
For each α с [0,1], the game <S ,S ,αΕ -(l-a)E-> is, in fact,the matrix 
game αΑ-(1-α)Β, and possesses, therefore, a value and optimal strategies 
(see section 1.4). Then, however, Γ „ satisfies all conditions in 
φΝ 
theorem 5.15. D 
Similarly, the following extension of Raiffa [1953] of the Nash 
theorem can be proved with the aid of theorem 5.15. We note that Raiffa 
used the Kakutam fixed point theorem in his proof and that Burger [1956] 
gave a proof, in wnich the fixed point theorem of Brouwer plays a role. 
THEOREM 6.2. For a bimatrix game Γ= (А,В) and a regular arbitration 
function Ф., the arbitration game Г is strictly determined and both 
players have optimal strategies, 
REMARK 6.3. Kalai and Rosenthal [1978] consider arbitration games Г,, 
Φ 
where Γ is a bimatrix game and where φ. and φ, are quasi-concave functions 
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a n d .·" b r i t l i F ^ i s t i > i - r o r o · . 1 l i b A.I a m i S . ' . ' . I n o » ¡ ' rovc i i ι 1.1 Ρ Λ Ι , . Ι Ι ГС · 
o f C j u i l i b r i ^ ) f o r «ui-li q a m t - o . I n і с л of U-mrn Μ ι , t h i s r e -.alt . - о і ь -
c i t i c « w i t h i-ke e x i s t i ' n c o r p s u l t i n t h c o r 0:11 6 . 2 . 
Now we fcish t ' ) « - ' b t i i n new г о ч ч И " w i t h the . і к і cr n u t cr".! ι ^ 
l-hcorpiiij; Ί . Η , S . l ! i n d r ) . 1 S . Т Ы ' p o l i c y w h i c n we f o l l o w i s t o iooK .it 
ч ! I - K n o w n i n n i c i c i x t l n ' ^ r c n : - f o r z o r o - ^ u n q.-iir.ps ( : о"" >t .'-.urv-vv', 'Uv r h , i , -
t e r j o í t h e b o o k o f P a r t h j s j r a t h y . ind Raij iuiv. in I 1 /71 ] '~r \.ιη<>\, .ki '-. i 
I 1 9 7 4 ] ) d n d t o - " o r m u l a t e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a r b i t r a t i o n g.ir:c;n . ' ^ , w h c i f 
Γ - <X, Y, K. , K . , > , i n s i ; c h <i Wtiy t h a t t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s i m j l y , ' o t ' v i c h 
ηαηιο , ( K j - t l - 4 ) K , .< ¡ C , ! 1 , t l i o c o n d i t i o n ; , i n t r e m i n i m . i x t n c o r c - n : ; . 
We s t a r t w i t h a r e s u l t , w h i c h л о d e r i v e f ro in Lho m i n i m a x t . i e o r e w •: 
N i k a i d o I Isl'j'l , a n d w h i c h а і ь о i n c l i d e s t h e t h o o r e r . s 6 . 1 a n d б . . : . 
THÎIORÈÏM б.Л. ·'• t Г. he ">. <ίϊ·1·; 'ντ',ί-ηζ 'irj'u-, : - / - - ¡ ' Í ' , - < Χ , Υ , Κ , , Κ , > .г-, - ;· 
o г- к о > ren -:.· у .--ч»', 
( ¿ ) X j-ríii Y ui·,. · . . " ; ; • - • : .·• J · . " .· ν .·>;-.'. .· \' '.'-.. .-> •. ; ι' ' \:ілі' .·. , · .· 
( J ) Kj ( Í K J K 2 Л:-, ·- >..-;:'>,.< ·.·..· ; ' , ' : : · ' . ' ¡--.л, 
('-) . ' ч ' ¿J- . 'λ а - I О , Г ] , 'κι \'Κ '',,'j· αΚ - ( ! - , < ) К , Jó' :-α.?.-'-,·, >?-.J,¡ ν . ' · . 
y'i'Si ·ί>..ί.:•.'>;:' J, ¡.гкй ;:•. ν . ' - •,^.,'. a- .•'• í''¿.·, . · . ' · . - · · - ; ' ч- . 'Г ' ; . ' ' i»' u . 
J ' Î J » , I . г ^.,'!,..'^! ù η-. tìiriuÌ ,Τ,ΪΊ ;;,•'. ι. \\· ' Ί ν І ; Л ' Л ."/;'.- .".;. 
φ - ' -
PROOF. The theorem is a direct consequence of theorem 5.15, since t:u· 
properties (2), (3) and (4) imply that, for each α с LO,11, the zero-.-ium 
gano <X, Y,!)K. - ( 1—д) K2> satisfies the conditions in the minimax theorom 
of Nikaido [1954], and consequently possesses a value and optimal stra­
tegies. L; 
A direct, consequence of theorem 6.4 is 
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Л Ю К . " ! f Ι -^Χ,Υ,Κ.,Κ > О * ι г , „ 1' , ν i· Ч 
* . ' ' "" "' 1 1 1 . j . ' ι' , > 
Κ(Γι · rCìj, η - η· > - Γ , Í 
ƒ" ί' Ι ι г ι ι J г". 
Now we p r P a c n t sono e x i s t e n c e t h c o r o m s f o r a r b i t r a t i o n g a r e s , í ho r^ 
b o t h b t r a t e g y SDaces of t a e u n a c r l y i n g gane a r e no t n e c e s s a r i l y compac t . 
THtORLM 6 . 6 . toi' л. тх^—Ььт^ргх jivnc 1 = (A,B) (in ъ.) (о r ¿Ί ^ d ?> 
tW /'a I ' J / ^ 'o ·'[."». {-j ^й í rb 'l'attor ¡j m> TK ' Ί' '' j ' J" ' 
PROO"". The t h e o r e m f o l l o w s from t \eorem 5.8 and '"he f i c t t h a t a l i t i c 
m a t r i x games χ Α - ( 1 - ι ) Β , χ [ 0 , 1 1 , p o s s e s s a v a l u e (cC. l i- j s I I'J"1 ι , 
p p . ¿ 9 - 3 1 ) . 
T.ie minimÌX theore i r of i a n [1953] and t h o o r e n 5.0 imply 
TUbORLM 6 .7 L· ι I t>i an .rOcti-a ι» „апь, Л^і-г Γ = <Χ,Υ,κ ,K2> J 
ecíitjfy Ine „'ollobKl·j 'one* i I>J: 
(1) i I Pi, и cP, 
(2) χ t s α <j^'"pz<jb И ia -dorfj' si гз> , 
(3) К. and - t u arc зст^сспЬгтолг, (i. г. upi y' J ν „ioni ι I^JÍJ ' ι / 
first coordiniti, ana 1<ικν sun •'oitunuous гп the s ю*· t с τα ι < ' , 
1 2 
(4) κ . and - l u form α сопоа е-еэп ех-ігке іаъг ъ.е. for еа^п χ ,χ χ 
and t e ( 0 , 1 ) , there is an χ € χ, зысй í .«at , / o r e a *h y ι Y, 
K ^ x 0 ^ ) > t K ^ x ^ y ï + d - t j K ^ x 2 ^ ) , - K 2 ( x 0 , y ) 2 - t K ¿ ( x 1 , y ) - ( l - t ) K 2 ( x / , \ ) , 
1 2 0 
and for each y , y с Y and t t ( 0 , 1 ) , there zs a y f Y, г iö/г г/:гч' 
K j t x ^ 0 ) < t K ^ x . y b + d - t l K j í x . y 2 ) , - K 2 ( x , y C I ) < - t K 2 ( x , y 1 ) - ( l - t ) K 2 ( x , v 2 ) , 
/ o r each χ e χ . 
Then Γ. p o s a c s s ß s αλί агЪьЬгаъгоп lvalue. 
Φ 
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The next theorem follows from theorem 5.8 and the minimax theorem 
of Sion Γ1958]. 
THEOREM 6.8. Let Γ be ar avbitvalion garre, whore Γ = <Χ,Υ,κ ,K2> and 
Φ satisfy the following aondi lions: 
(1) φ is regular, 
(2) χ is a compact and convex subset of a linear topological space, 
(3) Y is a convex set, 
(4) К and -K_ are semicontinuous, 
(5) for each at [.0,1]., the function αΚ.-(1-οι)Κ2 is quasi-concave in the 
first coordinate, and quasi-convex in the second coordinate. 
Then Γ possesses an arbitration value. 
Also with the aid of theorem 5.8 and the minimax theorems of König 
[1968] and Terkelsen [1972], interesting existence theorems for arbitra-
tion games can be derived, but we will not state them here, explicitly. 
Now we extend a result of Wald [19501 for zero-sum games to arbitra-
tion games. Let Γ= <X,Y,K.,K-> be a two-person game in normal form with 
bounded payoff functions. Let for each bounded function L: X * Y-»· Ж, 
L d : ХхХ-^-ИЬе defined by 
d (x ,x ) = sup |L(X ,y)-L(x y)I. 
Vf Y 
. Κι K2, 
Then d =max {d ,d } is a pseudo metric on X. By identifying equi­
valent strategies, we may suppose that d is a metric on X. Similarly, 
a metric dp on Y can be defined. 
THEOREM 6.9. Let Γ=<χ,Υ,Κ ,K_> be a two-person game in normal form, 
where 
(1) K. and K. are bounded Borei measurable functions (with respect to 
the Borei sets corresponding to the metrics d1 and d.^), 
(2) <x,d1> is a conditionally compact metric space. 
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Let Γ= <P ,Ρ ,Ε ,Ε > be the mixed ехъеппгоп of " ¿here Ρ ,Ρ ,Ε ,Ε are 
χ γ ι ^ Χ Υ 1 Ζ 
defined as in example 1.1.4, and let ф: К(Г) •* Р(Г) be α regular arbi­
tration fvnotior.. 
Then, the arbitration game Γ possesses an arbitration value. 
PROOF. Since <X,d1> is a conditionally compact metric space, also 
κ1 κ 2 
<X,d > and <X,d > are conditionally compact metric spaces. Since 
α Κ
Γ
( 1
-
α ) Κ 2 1 2 Kl 1 2 K2 1 2 d (x ,x ) < ad (x ,x )+(l-a)d (x ,x ), 
aK1-(l-a)K2 
we may conclude that also <X,d > is conditionally compact 
(cf. Takahashi [1963], p.53). From theorem 2.2 on p.38 of Wald [1950] 
it follows that the zero-sum game <X,Y,aK. - ( l-α) К ^ nas a value. 
Together with theorem 5.8 this completes the proof. Π 
In an oovious way, the extensions of Teh-Tjoe Tie [1963] and 
Parthasarathy [1965] of Wald's result also imply existence theorems 
for arbitration games. 
We end this section with an example of a game for which the arbi­
tration value does not exist if the solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky 
is used. 
Γ0 0" 
EXAMPLE 6.10 Let Γ be the bimatnx game (Α,Β) , where A= and 
Г0 1] jf.4 _ 
В = 12 1 
and let φ = φ . Then Κ(Γ) =conví(0,0) ,(1,1), (0,2) } and 
KS 
Ρ(Γ) =[(0,2),(1,1)]. Note that, by example VI.3.10, φ is not a 
regular arbitration function. Now 
"
{ e i } ^ ' v ! - ^ 1 7 
B2(x) = i {e 1 , e 2 } i f ^ " f " ? ^ 1 7 ' B l ( e i ) ^ 6 ^ ' f o r 1 C i 1 ^ } , 
{e2} i f x 2 < ! - i \ / 1 7 
where В i s the b e s t - r e p l y mult i funct ion introduced in sect ion 1.2. 
This implies t h a t Е(Г,KS' ~ ^ · I n a s imi la r way, one shows t h a t , for 
f 
t > 0 small enough, E (Г K5) =Ó· Consequently, by theorem 3 .11 , Γ
 Kg 
does not have a va lue . 
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§7. APPROXIMATION OF ARBITRATION GAMES BY FINITE SUBGAMES 
The purpose of this section is to prove the existence of the arbi­
tration value for two classes of games by approximating those games by 
a sequence of subgames for which it is known that the arbitration value 
exists. In other fields of game theory this approximation procedure was 
also successful (Wald [1945], Tijs [1975] and Owen [1976]). However, 
the problems to overcome m the field of arbitration games are greater 
because there do not exist continuous bargaining solutions as we have 
seen in proposition VI.4.1. The relation between the value of the game 
and the values of the approximating subgames is also more complicated. 
Let Γ=<X,Υ,Κ.,K ?> be a two-person game in normal form. We call a 
game Γ' = ^ ' ,Υ' ,K',K'> a subgame of Γ if Χ' с χ, γ' с γ and К' : Χ' χ Y' •+ TR 
is the restriction of К to Χ' χ Y' , for ι* {1,2}. 
Our results are based on the following proposition. 
1 2 3 
PROPOSITION 7.1. Let Γ ,Γ ,Γ ,... be a sequence of subgames of a bounded 
game Γ and let φ be an upper semiaontinuous bargaining solution. Supposej 
furthermore, that the following properties hold: 
(1) lim d„(R(r n),R(r)) = 0 , 
П-Н»
 H 
(2) for each η e W, the arbitration game Γ possesses a oalue, 
(3) ν (Γ ) > limsup ν (г") , for if {1,2}. 
1
 Φ η-«.
 l
 * 
Then Γ. is striatili determined and ν(Γ,) = f„(limsuD ν(Γ )) . 
Φ Φ Γ
 η
-κ„~ Φ 
PROOF. In lemma 3.1, it was proved that ν(Γ ) econv({p (Γ),ρ (Γ)} иΡ(Γ)). 
By properties (1) and (2) and lemma VI.2.1, limsup (г") е(1/(Г). Then 
η-« Φ 
by property (3), (Г )сСі/(Г). Since W i D η conv({ (¿j (Γ) ,p 2 (Γ) } и Р(Г) ) = Р(Г) , 
we have ν(Γ,) e W t D ; hence, Γ, is strictly determined. It is straight-
φ φ 
forward to prove that the facts ν(Γ ) e Р(Г) , limsup ν(Γ") с ((/(Г) and (3) 
Φ η->-~ Φ 
imply that ν(Γ ) =j
r
(limsup (Г ) ) . Π 
Φ η-«> * 
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Let Γ=<Ρ ,Ρ ,Ε.,Ε > be the mixed extension of a continuous two-
2 
person game Γ = <X,Y,K. ,K
;)> as defined in 1.1.4. Let φ : В •* Ж be an 
upper semicontinuous regular bargaining solution. We want to prove that 
the arbitration game Г possesses an arbitration value and optimal stra-
~1 ~2 
tegies for both players, using a sequence Γ ,Γ ,... of mixed extensions 
of finite subgames of Γ. The subgames are constructed as follows. For 
each η e Ю, there exists a partition of X into a finite number of non­
empty Borei measurable subsets C.(n),C_(n),....C , .(η), where the dia-
l -i p(n) 
meter of each of these subsets is at most —. Similarly, there exists a 
η
 J 
Borei measurable partition D.(n),D-(n),...,D . .(n) of Y with diameter 
1 2 q(n) 
diam (D (n) ) S —, for each 3 e {l,2,...,q(n)}. For ie{l,2,...,p(n)^, take 
χ (n) e С (η) and for Ί e {1,2,...,q(n)} take у (η) с D (η). Then 
1 1 3 3 
Γ = <Ρ I'PVÍ '^ і 'Е'з> l s ^ 6 m:l-xeà extension of the finite game 
Г
П
 = <X(n) ,Y(n) ,Κ^,Κ^, where 
X(n) := {x. (n) ,x- (n) , ,x .(n)}, Y(n) := {y. (n) ,y„ (n) , .. . ,y (n) } 
1 Δ pin) 1 ¿ q(nj 
and К and К are the restrictions of K. and К to X(n) χγ(η). 
We denote in the following the arbitration value of Γ by ν . This value 
exists in view of theorem 6.2. 
THEOREM 7.2. Let Γ,Γη,φ,νη Ъе as above. Then 
(1) Г possesses an arbitration value v, 
(2) ν = j~(limsup ν ), 
n-**> 
(3) 0
ι
(Γ ) ¿φ, for it {1,2}. 
PROOF, (a) First we prove that lim d (К(ГП),К(Г)) =0. Note that 
n-~»
 H 
R 0(r
n)cR
o
(r) and R(rn) с β(Γ) , for each η e Л, (7.1) 
because Ρ . с Ρ and Ρ ^ Ρ . Take f > 0 and μ e Ρ , ν ε Ρ . For each 
neXJ, let σ (μ) := l^^? \i(C (η)) e , , and τ (ν) :=íq(")v(D (η)) e , , 
η ι=1 ι χ (η) η j = l j y (η) 
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S i n c e К and К a r e u r i f o m l y c o n t i n u o u s T u n c t i o n s on X ^ Y , t h e r e e x i s t s 
an η e H such t h a t , f o r a l l η 2 η and i f { 1 , 2 } , 
|E ( μ , ν ) - Ε η ( σ ( μ ) , τ (υ)) | < г . ( 7 . 2 ) 
1
 ι i n η ' 
In view of (7.1) and (7.2), we have dH(R (Γ
η) ,R (Γ) ) <ε and then by 
lemma VI.2.3, also d„ (R (Γη) ,R (Γ) ) <c, for all η > n* . Hence, 
Η 
lim d íR(rn),R(r)) =0. 
η-*»
 H 
(b) Next we show that ν (Γ ) > limsup ν , for і^ {1,2}. ι 
η-κ» 
We give the proof for ι = 1. In view of theorem 6.2, we can take 
μ с О.(Г.) and ν c Ο-(Γ,). Since Ρ„ is a compact metric space (cf. 1 φ λ φ Χ 
Hildenbrand L1974J,ρ.49), there exists a subsequence η(1),n(2),... of 
ι - , i_ i.1- *. д.1. с v. ^ ι ^ -n(l) -n(2) 
1,2,... such that the sequence of probability measures μ ,μ ,..-
j 4-v. -n(l) -n(2) 
on X and the sequence ν ,v ,... of probability measures on Y 
weakly converge, say, to μ and v, respectively and such that 
·, η (k) . η lin ν = limsup ν . 
k-x= η χ«·* 
Now take an arbitrary ν e Ρ . Then 
, ,„n(k),-n(k) . .. „nfk) ,-n(k) ... , _ , - , _ ,- >> ,-, -,> lim (Ε. (μ ,τ (ν)),Ε (μ ,τ , (ν) ) = (Ε. (μ ,Μ) ,Ε 0 (μ,ν) ) . (7.3) 
к-*» 1 n(k) 2 n(k) 1 ¿ 
By (a) of the proof, (7.3) and the upper semicontinuity of ф. we obtain 
.ι i./~ \ >. ι . _n (k) ,-n(k) . . . ^  . n(k) „^  
ф Ε(μ,ν) alimsup ф Ε (μ ,τ (ν)) >lim ν . (7.4) 
1
 к Η» nut) к^ .„ ι 
But then v.(Г.) >inf φ.Είμ,ν) >lim ν, =limsup ν . 
1
 f1 υ 1 к-н» ! η-«. 1 
(c) In view of proposition 7.1, we may now conclude from (a), (b) and 
theorem 6.2 that Г, possesses an arbitration value ν and that 
Φ 
v = J~(lim v n ( k ) ) = i~(limsuo v n) . If lim П ( к ) £ а)(Г) , then ν, (Г.) = о. (Г) , 
г
 к-^ °
 Г
 п-н»* к^» 1 φ -1 
which implies that О. (Г.) = Р„ jí ¡6. If lim ν ' с 0/(7) и Р(Г) , then 
1
 Φ
 х
 к-х» 
lim ν" = , (Г.) and then (7.4) implies that μ с О, (Г. ) . Hence, 0.(7.) ^(й. 
к-н» 1 1 φ ι φ Ι φ 
Similarly, one can prove that 00(Γ ) ^ 0 . L] 
ζ φ 
Finally, let Γ = (А,В), where A and В are two bounded mx^-matnces 
and let φ be an upper semicontinuous regular bargaining solution. For 
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each η с IM, we write Г for the mxn-bimatnx game (A ,B ) , introduced 
in section 5 of chapter IV. By theorem 6.2, the finite arbitration game 
Г possesses a value, wnich we denote by ν . The question whether 
semi-infinite arbitration game Γ, has a value was answered affirmatively 
in theorem 6.6. In the next theorem we give a different proof of this 
result and also the relation of ν(Γ ) with the sequence of values 
1 2 V ,v ,... is described. For the proof we need the following lemma. 
LEMMA 7.3. lim d^ , (R (ГП) ,R (Г) ) =0. 
η*»
 H 
PROOF. Since RgiT1) с!?0(Г
2) ^ R Q Í T ),...,lim RQÍT11) exists and equals 
П-Хю 
cl( U R (ГП)) in view of proposition 1 in Salinetti and Wets [1979]. 
ne U 
OO _ OD 
By lemma IV.2.3, for each q c S there exists a q e S with finite carrier 
such that (g)q= (g)q> which implies that RQÍT) = U R (ГП) . Hence, 
ncU 
lim d (R (rn),cl-R (Г)) =0. But then the lemma follows from the inequa-
н и и 
n-w 
lities 
0<d H(R(r
n) ,R(r)) =d H(cl conv К 0(Г
П), cl conv R Q Î T ) ) = 
= dH(conv R 0(r n), conv cl Е0(Г)) <d H(R 0(r
n), cl R Q C D ) , 
where the second equality follows from lemma VI.2.4 and the last inequa­
lity from lemma VI.2.3. ] 
THEOREM 7.4. Notation as above. 
(1) The arbitration game Г, possesses a value and ν(Γ ) =j (limsup ν ). 
Φ Φ Ι η
-
**
30 
(2) Ο^Γ ) ¿φ. 
PROOF. In this Droof we don't use the transposition symbol. By theorem 
6.2, for each η r U, there exist ρ с S m, q"e S n such that 
Ф1(Е (p ,q) fE (p ,q)) >v , for all q e S , and (7.5) 
Ф2(Е"(р,і
П),Е2(р,ІП)) Sv^, forallpfS 1" (7.6) 
Let t :=limsup ν . Take a subsequence n(l),n(2),... of 1,2,... such that 
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lim ν = t (7.7) 
and such that the sequence <p ;k t Κ> converges, say, to p. 
(a) First we prove that Vjd" ) >t . For each η e U, let s": S •+ s" be 
the map, defined by 
ft CO oo 
g (s,,s-,...) = (s,,s-,...,s ., Σ s ), for each s с S . 1 ¿ ι ζ n-1 ]=n ^ 
Take q <¡ S . Then 
, ,-n(kl
 Dn(k) -n(k) „n(k) - -
lim (ρ A β (q) ,ρ В $ (q) ) = (pAq,pBq) . (7.8) 
Since φ is upper semicontinuous, lemma 7.3, (7.8), (7.5) and (7.7) 
oo 
imply that, for all q с Ξ , 
^ ,-» -τ, \ ^  ι л í"n(k'n Dník) , , -n(k)„ ,n(k) , . 
Φ J (pAq,pBq) > limsup φ1 (ρ A n ( k ) ß <q) '
ρ
 n(k)ß (q) ' 
ì limsup ν = t. . (7.9) 
к-*» 
Hence, ν,(Г ) > t.. 
I f 1 
(b) Next we prove that ν2(Γ ) St-, Let ε = ^ (tp-v, (~ ) ) . We have to show 
that t £0. Suppose г > 0. Then, by definition of ν-(Γ ), for each η e U, 
there exists an r e S such that 
* 2(r
nAa n(i n),r nBa n(q n)) <ν 2(Γ φ)+ε, (7.10) 
. η,-η. ,-n -η -η oo п^ η,-η. η„ η -η. 
where a (q ) = (q.,q,,...,q ,0,0,...) e S . Denote (r Aa (q ),r Ba (q )) 
by ζ . Since A and В are bounded matrices, there exists a subsequence 
m(l),m(2),... of n(l),n(2),... such that the sequence <z ; h f Ж> 
converges, say, to (u,v) e К(Г). By corollary VI.4.10, (7.10) implies 
ф2(и, ) =lim ф 2(г
ш ( 1 і )) <ν 2(Γ Α)+ε. (7.11) 
h-K» v 
On the other hand, for к sufficiently large, we have, in view of (7.6) 
and (7.7) 
, , n(k). , n(k) -n(k) п(к)
п
 -n(kK . n(k) ... 
Φ2(Ζ )=ф 2(г A n ( k ) q ,r B n q ) > V 2 >t 2- E. 7.12) 
r r
n(k) 
Note that in formula (7.11), φ =φ and m formula (7.12), ф_=φ 
Now (7.12), lemma 7.3 and the upper semicontinuity of φ imply that 
ф2(и, ) >t 2-c=v 2<r )+2ε. (7.13) 
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But (7.11) and (7.13) are contradictory if ε > 0. Hence, ε S 0. 
(b) In view of lemma 7.3, theorem 6.2 and (a) and (b) of this proof, we 
may conclude, using proposition 7.2, that Γ possesses a value and that 
ν(Γ ) = j (limsup ν ). 
Φ
 г
 η-H» 
(c) Now we prove that 0 1 (Г) ^  (¡S. If t e W (Г) , then 0 1 (Г ) = S™. If 
t e Р(Г) и W C ) , then ν, (Τ J = t, and then ρ e О. (I\ ) in view of (7.9) . [] 
_ 1 φ 1 1 φ 
We conclude with an example of a semi-infinite arbitration game, 
where lim ν ^ν(Γ ). 
n-M° Φ 
EXAMPLE 7.5. Let A = 
1 1 1 ... 
ì 1 1 
2 3 4 ··· 
, B: 
0 0 0 
1 1 1 Then for each 
,,-n, bargaining solution ф we have ν(Γ ) = (1,0), for each η e Π, while 
ν(Γ,) = (1,1). 
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CHAPTER Vili 
FINITE ARBITRATION GAMES 
§1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we consider arbitration games I , where the under-
Ψ 
lying game 1 is an mxn-bimatnx game (A,B) and where φ is a regular 
arbitration function. In view of remark VII.1.1, we may suppose that 
the players of the game Γ, use correlated strategies on U x H . These 
correlated strategics on U χ ]N can be identified with the elements of 
m η 
the set 
S :={r-(r 1 1,r 1 2 r m n ) c B ; r > 0 f > ι = 1Σ : ι - 1 r i ; |-l}. 
mxn 
If the players in the game Γ jointly choose a ζ t S , then the (expec­
ted) payoff to player 1 (2) is 
r. πι „ η 
<A,z> =Σ ,Σ . a ζ (<B,z>). 
1=1 3=1 ID ID 
2 
This implies that К(Г) = convC (a ,b )Ì1R;IL1Ì,I(H}. Note that m 
i] i] m η 
о 
this case, for a p t Р(Г) and a dtD(p), the dumny zero-sum game 
Г =<S m,s n,E „,-E >, where, for all (x,y) с S m χ s", 
p,d p,d p,d 
V 
E ,(x,y) = <d,E(x,y)-p>, is in fact the matrix game 
p,d 
ν 
M , :=-d_Ä+d,B-<d,p>J p,d 2 1 ' r mxn 
We show in this chapter that for sach a finite arbitration game Γ 
Φ 
the optimal (threat) strategy spaces of the players are polytopes. 
о 
Furthermore, in section 3, a multifunction on the inner Pareto set Р(Г) 
of the game is defined for which the point where the sign of this multi-
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function changes (if this exists) deternmes the position of the arbi­
tration value. This implies that the arbitration value of the game can 
be found by determing the possible zero of this multifunction. In 
section 4, a method is described how to find such a zero. 
The results ir this chapter have been obtained jointly with T13S 
and are based on Jansen and Ті]ч [1980b]. 
52. THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY SPACES OF A FINITE ARBITRATION GAME 
Unless otherwise stated, in this section, Γ is a fixed mxn-bimatnx 
game (Α,Β) , φ is a fixed regular arbitration function and ν :=ν(Γ ). 
We will show that the optimal strategy spaces of players 1 and 2 in the 
arbitration game Г
А
, are polytopes in S and S , respectively. 
y 
о 
Suppose, for the present, that ν f Ρ(Γ). Then dummy games may be 
helpful to characterize the optimal strategy spaces. First we note tiat 
theorem VII.5.4 implies that optimal strategies of dummy games Г 
with а1(Г ,) = 0 and dcD(v), are also optimal strategies in the arbi-
v,d 
tration game. But the converse statement is not necessarily true, in 
general, as the following example shows. 
EXAMPLE 2.1. Let ?= (Α,Β), where A 
Γ0 0 0 
3 2 0 and В 
0 3 0 
0 2 0 
Then, 
N 
for the Nash arbitration function φ , ν(Γ
 N)=(2,2) and 
Φ 
D(v) = { (6,-1-6) t Δ; -•!< 6 5--Ì}. Now, 
ro
 3 6 οι Γ
0
 6 á
- -
val(Γ ) =val 
ν,(о,-1-6) 
3+36 2+46 О - 1 ,
 л
.
 l f
 . ϊ· Consequently, 
1-2-46 δ > - — 
all dummy games Γ with 5 £-— have a value equal to zero. How-
v, (6,-1-6) "-'-•"- 2 
е ег,02(Г N)=conv{e 2 fe 3 f(y f0 f|)} and 0 2 Г ^ ( ό ^ ^ ) 
Note that ¿Ο.τ) ¿ О , (Г . . . , ) , for all 6 < -ì. 
J 3 ζ ν,ο,-1-ο) ¿ 
{e2} 6 
3 lf 
UqcS ; 4 ι = 0} 6 
For the description of the optimal strategy spaces for the arbitra-
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tion game г for the case vt Р(Г), we introduce the notion of extreme 
Φ 
direction. As observed in lemma VII.4.3, D(v) is a non-empty, compact 
subset of Δ. Therefore, there exist d ,d eD(v) such that d, = max d 
dcd(v) 
and d = min d . We call d and d the extreme direations for v. 
deD(v) 
THEOREM 2.2. Let Γ be a finite arbitvation game for which the under-
o 
lying bimatrix geme Г has size mxn. If ν := (Г ) с Р ( Г )
Л
 then 
О. ( Г
х
) = {χ* e S m ; E ,+ ί χ * ^ ) > 0, for all у e S n } and 1 φ v , d 
° η ( Γ . ) = í y* с S n , E
 J _ ( x , y * ) < 0, for all χ с S m } . ¿ φ v , d 
PROOF, (a) I f E
 + ( x * , y ) > 0, f o r a l l y e S1 1, t h e n , by lemma V I I . 5 . 2 , 
φ E ( x * , y ) > ν , f o r a l l у t S n . So χ* ί O j ( Γ
Α
) . 
(b) For χ f О , ( Г . ) we h a v e , by d e f i n i t i o n , 
1 φ 
φ E(x*,y) av., for all y e Ξ η. (2.1) 
Suppose that there exists a y e S with 
E
 J + (x*,y) < 0 (2.2) 
v,d 
Then lemma VII.5.2 implies that φ.Είχ ,y) <v.. So, in view of (2.1), 
φ E(x ,y)=v 1. Note that E(x ,γ) ψ w, by (2.2). Put 
II * ~ h —1 * ~ 
d := [|E(x ,y)-v|| (E(x ,y)-v). Then df D(v). Furthermore, it follows 
from (2.2) that -d d +d d„ <0; so d_>d which contradicts the definition 
of d . Consequently, Ε
 Η
+ ( χ /Y) > 0 r for all ye S . 
(c) In a similar way, one proves the other equality in the theorem. Q 
о 
COROLLARY 2.3. Let Г be a finite arbitration game with ν := ν(Γ ) e Р(Г) 
andd + = d". Then, for if {1,2}, Ο (Γ.)=0 (Γ M . J
 ι φ ι v,d 
In the remainder of this section, we consider finite arbitration 
games ", with (Г.) =р(Г) . Games with (Г ) =р(Г) can be handled in a 
similar way. 
LEMMA 2.4. Let Tx be a fbnite arbitration game where the underlying 
154 
bimatp-Lx game I = (А,в) has size mxn. If φ (р(Г)) <=и/(Г).> then 
(1) ν(Γ.)=ρ(Γ) iff val(-B) = -max{b } , 
(2) г/ ν(Γ ) =ρ(Γ), then 01(Γ,) = 0 ^ - 6 ) = s"
1
 and 0 2(Γ. ) =o 2(-B) . 
PROOF, (а) Suppose that ν(Γ ) =ρ(Γ). If yeO.,(I\), thon 
φ ¿ φ 
Ф2(хАу ,хВу ) > ρ ( Γ ) , f o r a l l χ t S m . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t ф(хАу ,xBy ) = ρ ( Γ ) , 
f o r a l l x e S . S i n c e φ ( ρ ( Γ ) ) c [ J ( r ) , we o b t a i n t h a t xBy = p (Г) = maxib }, 
f o r a l l x c S . C o n s e q u e n t l y , v a l ( - B ) =-max{b } and y <- O - ( - B ) . 
(b) I f v a l ( - B ) = -maxtb }, t h e n i t i s e a s y t o show t h a t f o r a y c O _ ( - B ) , 
ф ( x A y ^ x B y S > ρ 2 ( Γ ) , f o r a l l χ e S1". Hence, ν ( Γ ) = р ( Г ) a n d y € 0 2 ( r ) . 
(c) Combining (a) and ( b ) , we have p roved (1) and t h e second s t a t e m e n t 
i n ( 2 ) . I n o r d e r t o c o m p l e t e t h e p roo f , we n o t e t h a t 
ф ^ х А у ^ х В у Ь > p (Г) = V j i r ) , f o r a l l (x,y) <• S1" χ S n . T h e r e f o r e , 
Ο ^ Γ ) = s m = o 1 ( - B ) . Π 
The s e t s 
Ltd) := {г с R C ) ,- r = p(r)+ad, for some a > 0} (d с Δ) 
play an important role in the following two results. 
LEMMA 2.5. Let Γ, be a finite arbitration game satisfying 
(1) (Г ) =р(Г)
і > 
(2) Ltd) с φ'^ρίΓ)),, for all de Δ with L(d) Π φ _ 1(ρ(Γ)) ^  φ. 
Then О,(Г^) = S m and there exists a d e A such that 
1 Φ 
0,(Γ.) = {yt S n; E-,
r
, ,*(x,y) s 0, for all xc S m } . ¿ Ф р(Г) ,α 
PROOF, (a) Let DtptD ) := {d с Δ; (¿7^(а)сф~ (ρ (Г) )}. As in the proof 
of lemma VII.4.3, one can show that DtptD) is compact. Therefore, 
there exists a d e Δ such that d =min{d2,· d с DtptD)}. 
(b) Now we want to show that 
φ'^ρίΓ)) = {г с RtD; <d*,r-£(D> < 0}. (2.3) 
155 
v
* -
First suppose that <d ,г-р(Г)><0 for an r L R(r) \{р(Г) }. We distinguish 
two cases. 
v* * _ 
I f <d , г - р ( Г ) > = 0, t h e n r t L ( d ) and ф(г) = р ( Г ) by t h e d e f i n i t i o n of 
0 ( р ( Г ) ) . 
I f <d , г - р ( Г ) > < 0 and φ ( r) = ρ ?< ρ(Γ) , t h e n Г г , р 1 η L(d ) jí φ. However, f o r 
an X £ [ r , p ] n L ( d ) , ρ ( Γ ) = φ ( χ ) = ρ ^ ρ ( Γ ) , which i s i m p o s s i b l e . So 
r < (Г^рСП) . 
-1 - v* _ 
Now suppose that гсф (ρ(Γ)) and that <d ,г-р(Г)>>0. Then г^р(Г) and 
d := ||г-р(Г) ||~ (г-р(Г) ) e 0(р(Г) ) , in view of (2) . As in the proof of 
theorem 2.2, one can show that d <d , which contradicts the definition 
of d . 
(c) The fact that О. (Γ ) =S can be proved as in (c) of the proof of 
lemma 2.4. The remainder of the theorem is an easy consequence of (2.3). D 
Now suppose that Γ, is a finite arbitration game with ν(Γ ) =р(Г) 
while (2) of lemma 2.5 is not satisfied. Then there exist de Δ and 
r,síL(d) with ф(з)=р(Г) and ф(г)Ир(П. We want to show that, in this 
case, φ (ρ(Γ)) cL(d) и{р(Г)}. Since φ (ρ(Γ)) is closed, there exists 
an s £L(d) with s_ = min t_. Now suppose there is a t έ. φ (ρ(Γ)), 
t r L ( d )
 * ν -
t5¿p(r) with t/L(d). Note that t <s . So <d, t-p( Γ) > ψ 0. We distinguish 
two casos. 
ν _ к '' к 
If <d,t-p(r)><0, then choose, for each к e U, a ρ сР(Г) with p.> φ (r) 
and 'Ι ρ (Γ)-ρ || <k . In view of the connectedness of the line segment 
[r,s ] and the continuity of φ, there exists, for each кr U, an 
к * к к к к 
х e [r,s ] with φ (χ ) =ρ . For large к, the line through ρ and χ -
intersects with the line segment [r,t]. Let у be the intersection point. 
к к к 
Then, by lemma VII.4.1, φ (у )=p , for all к e К. Since limy =r,weobtain 
k-xn 
- к к -
р(Г)=1іт ф(х ) = 1іт ф(у ) = φ (г) ^ р(Г) . This is impossible. 
к-».» к*» 
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v
 - * * 
If <d,t-p(r)>> O, then we can choose an r e[r,s ] such that 
[г ,ф(г ) J η Гр(Г) ,t] ^  ¿. However, for an χ r [r*, φ (r*) ] г [ρ(Γ) , t] , 
- * _ 
р(Г) = φ (χ) = φ (г )^ρ(Γ). This, also, is impossible. 
Summarizing, 
-1 - v * 
φ (ρ(Γ)) = {re К<Г); <а,г-р(П> = 0, r 2 > s 2 } . 
Now the following result is immediate. 
LEMMA 2.6. Let Г be a finite arbitration gane with ν(Γ,) =ρ(Γ) such 
that (2) от" lenma 2.5 is not satisfied. Then о,(Г\) =S and there are 
ι φ 
a d с Δ and с ί Ж such that 
02(Γ ) = { у S
n
; for all xe s m f E- d< x<y! = 0 and E2(x,y) >c}. 
From theorem 2.2, lemma 2.5 and lemma 2.6, we infer 
THEOREM 2.7. For a finite arbitration game Γ , О.(Г ) and Ο-ίΓ,) are 
polytopes. 
S3. THE DUMMY-VALUE MULTIFUNCTION 
For a finite arbitration game Г., we construct a multifunction m on 
о 
Р(Г) for which the point where the sign changes (if this exists) is 
definitive for the position of the arbitration value. 
о 
DEFINITION 3.1. The multifunction (Π: Ρ (Γ) •+ Ж defined by 
О 
т(р):={ а1(Г ) ; d с D (ρ) } , f o r p c P C ) , 
ρ, α 
is called the dummy-Value multifunction corresponding to the arbitration 
game Г^. 
LEMMA 3.2. Let Г, be a finite arbitration game. Then 
о 
(1) m(p) is a non-empty; oompaotj convex subset of TR, for all р е Р(Г), 
(2) m is a closed multifunction. 
о 
PROOF, (a) Take a p e Р(Г) . Since, by lemma V I I . 4 . 3 , D(p) i s a non-empty, 
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compact, convex subset of Δ, the continuity of the function d ·+ аІДГ ) 
Pr о 
on D(p) implies (1). 
1 2 (b) Let ρ ,p ,... be a sequence in Ρ(Γ) converging to ρ с Ρ(Г). Suppose 
that for each к с И, с e m (ρ ) and that lim с =c. We must prove that 
к к к 
с ε m (ρ) . Since с, e m (ρ ) , there exists, for all к с l·!, a d f D (p ) such 
that с, = а1(Г ) . In view of the compactness of Δ, we may suppose 
K
 p k,d k 
1 ? that the sequence d ,d ,... converges, say, to dc Δ. The upper semi-
continuity of the multifunction D implies that drD(p). Since 
с = lim аКГ , , ) = аКГ J , с e m(p) . U 
к-*» p k,d k P'd 
We use the following notation: 
о 
m(p) > 0 if t > 0, for all t e ffl(p) ; m > 0 if ш(р) > 0, for all ρ г Р(Г) . 
The next two lemmas imply that the multifunction m has at most one 
о 
zero, e.g. there is at most one point ρ с Р(Г) with Oc m(p) . 
о 
LEMMA 3.3. Let Г, be a finite arbitration game with (Г,) с Р(Г). Then 
Φ Ψ 
(1) ν(Γ,) is the only zero of m-. Ocmtp) iffp = v(T), 
(2) m(p) > 0 iff pj < vjfr ), 
(3) m(p) < 0 iff pj > VjCr ) . 
PROOF, (a) By theorem VII.5.4, p = ν(Γ) , if 0 e m(p) . Let ν := (Г . ) . As 
in the proof of theorem VII.5.13, one can show tnat аКГ ,
+
 ) SO and 
v , d 
а К Г ^ _ ) < 0 . L e t f o r <S t Ldt » d " ] , f (6) := а 1 ( Г , . , „ . ) . Then f i s 
v , d 1 1 ν , ( δ , - 1 - δ ) 
a c o n t i n u o u s f u n c t i o n w i t h f ( d ) > 0 and f ( d ) < 0 . As a c o n s e q u e n c e , 
t h e r e i s a d r D(v) w i t h а 1 ( Г ,) = 0, t h a t i s 0 с m(v) . 
v , d 
(b) I f O ^ i n ( p ) , t h e n i n view of ( a ) , p j ¿ v ( r ) . Now suppose t h a t 
о 
ρ с Ρ(Γ) , ρ, < ν, (Γ ) and that аКГ ,) < 0, for some d с D(p) . Then, for 
ι ι φ ρ,d 
χ с О, (Г\) and у ( О.(Г ,) ,Е Лх,у) < 0, so that by lemma VII.5.2, 
1 φ ¿ p,d p,d 
р. гфЕ(х,у) > v 1(",)
 >Pi< which is impossible. So val (Г ) > 0, for all 
de Dtp). Consequently, m(p) >0. Analogously, p. > v. (Γ ) implies m(p) <0. 
15Θ 
The other assertions in the theorem follow easily. 
LEMMA 3.4. Let Γ be a finite arbitration game where the underlying bi-
ψ 
matrix game Γ = (А,в) has size mxn. Then 
(1) m< 0 iff ν(Γ ) =І(Г) , 
(2) m> 0 iff ν(Γ,) =ρ(Γ) . 
Φ 
о 
PROOF. We only prove (1). Suppose that m < 0 . Then, for реР(Г) and 
d Í D(p) , аКГ ,) < 0. This implies that for a y* e Ο. (Γ ,) , Ε , (χ,у*) < 0, p,d ¿ p,d p,d 
for all xe S . Using lemma VII.5.2, we obtain that φ E(x,y ) ?p 7, for 
all x c S . Consequently, v
n
(r,)=sup inf ф.Е(х,у) 2 inf ф„Е(х,у*) > p.. 
^ 2 φ „η m 2 m 2 2 
о yeS XfS xeS 
Since ρ e Ρ(Γ) was arbitrarily chosen, this means that тІГ.) ^ р^, for 
о 
all pt-PíD . So (Г ) =р(Г) . 
Now suppose that (Г ) =р(Г). Then, similarly, one can show that it is 
impossible that m > 0. Therefore, if not m < 0 , the connectedness of the 
о 
set {tf JR; there exists a p e Р(Г) with tcm(p)} implies the existence 
о 
of а реР(Г) with 0 с m (ρ) . But then theorem VII.5.4 implies that ν(Γ ) =p, 
which is also impossible. Hence, m < 0 . Π 
EXAMPLE 3.5. Let Γ= (Α,Β) , where A = 
0 0 0 
3 2 0 
0 0 0 
let φ be the Nash arbitration function. Then 
and В : 
0 3 0 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
and 
m(p) 
{ 2 - ^ } i f 0 < p 1 < 2 
2 2 
. {2-^?^ i f 2<pi <3 
§4. THE DETERMINATION OF A ZERO OF THE DUMMY-VALUE MULTIFUNCTION 
In this section, a method is given to determine a possible zero of 
the dummy-value multifunction corresponding to a finite arbitration 
game Г , where Г= (А,В) is an mxn-bimatrix game. 
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The first problem to be solved is the determination of the Pareto 
set Ρ(Γ) of Г. Since К(Г) is a polytope, it is sufficient to give a 
method for finding those Pareto optimal points that are also extreme 
points of К(Г) . Let Р(Г) г ext К(Г) = {р(1) ,р(2) , ...,ρίυ)}, where 
р(Г)=р(1) <р(2) < ... <р( ).=р(Г).. Now we can base an algorithm 
on the following scheme. 
(1) p(v) is the lexicograpnic maximum of C, := {(a ,b ) ; i L U ; - i t U } , 
l i ] i ] ran 
w h i l e p ( l ) : = ( р ( 1 ) 2 » р ( 1 ) 1 ) ^5 t h e l e x i c o g r a p h i c maximum of 
C. := { (b , a ) ; ι с К , э e К } . 
1 ij ij m η 
(2) Let C 7 be the collection of those points (a ,b ) that lie above 
¿ \.j 13 
the line through p(l) and p(v). Then ρ(υ-1) is the lexicographic 
maximum of C_ and ρ(2) is the lexicographic maximum of 
C_ := {(b ,a ); (a ,b ) с С,}. 
2 ij ij ij i] 2 
(3) It is clear how to define, for suitable k's, С ,C and p(k). 
к к 
(4) We are finished if, for some k, C, = & or p(k) =p(k+l). 
Secondly, one must be able to determine one or more elements of the 
direction set of a Pareto optimal point. In general, however, it is not 
о 
possible to give a method for finding a d' D(p), for ρ e Ρ (Γ), because 
this problem depends heavily upon the arbitration function under consi­
deration. In the examples 4.3 ana 4.4, we will show how one deals the 
cases where the arbitration functions are those of Nash and Kalai and 
Rosenthal. 
Next, we describe an algorithm for finding the possible zero of the 
multifunction m. Let L > 0 be the desired precision. 
о 
(0) Choose p(e) and p(e) in Р(Г) in such a way that || ρ (Γ) -ρ (ε) Ц^ < ε 
and ||ρ(Γ)-ρ(ε) \\
α>< с. 
If m(p(()) г 0, then take p(r) as an estimate for ν(Γ ). 
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If m(p(E)) <0, then take ρ(ε) as an estimate for ν(Γ ). 
φ 
If, however, ιη(ρ(ε)) >0 and lTl(p(e)) <0, then we proceed as follows, 
о 
(la) take ρ« Р(Г) in such a way that p. = Ί(p(r),+ρ(f).) and compute an 
element n(p) of flip), using some of the well-known methods for 
determing the value of a matrix game. 
(lb) if m(p) > 0, replace p(r) by p. If m(p) <0, replace ρ(ε) by p. 
Repeat (la) if || ρ(ε) -p(t ) Ц^ > f . 
(le) if ||ρ(ε)-ρ(ε) || <ε, then stop and take ρ(ε) as an estimate for 
Φ 
Obviously, the algorithm terminates after a finite number of steps 
and produces a sequence p(l),p(2),...,p(N) of successive approximations 
о о 
of the value v(I\). We distinguish two cases: ν(Γ\) Ρ(Γ) and ν(Γ\) ^ Ρ(Γ) 
Φ Φ Φ 
ο 
Case 1. If ν(Γ ) e Р(Г), then, without loss of generality, we may suppose 
that m(p(N-l) )> 0,m(p(N) )< 0 and ||p(N)-p(N-l) Ц^ < E. Then, by lemma 3.3, 
^ Г ) € ( p f N - D ^ p W j ) and
 2(Г ) « (p(N)2/p(N-l)2). (4.1) 
The following lemma describes how to find, with the help of p(N-l) and 
p(N), good approximations of the value and optimal strategies for both 
players in the arbitration game. 
THEOREM 4.1. Let Г. be a finite avbivvation game, where the underlying 
о 
bimatrix game Г has size mxn. Suppose that (Г,) с Р(Г) and let p(N-l), 
p(N) and ε be as before. Then 
(1) p(N) is a good approximation for ν(Γ ): ||ρ(Ν)-ν(Γ ) [|
ш
<г. 
(2) Ojtr _
 d
) c 0 i ( r A ' ' f ° v апУ d c D(P(N-1)) . 
'3) 0 · 7 ( Γ „ η J ^0%(TJ , for any dcü{pm) . ¿ p(N) ,d J- ψ 
PROOF. (1) i s an i m m e d i a t e c o n s e q u e n c e of ( 4 . 1 ) . We o n l y p r o v e ( 2 ) . 
L e t x* t О, (Γ ,., , , J and d t D ( p ( N - l ) ) . Then 1 p ( N - l ) , d 
E
P(N-1) , Χ ' * 1 ä V a l ( r p ( N - l ) J 2 0 ' f 0 r a 1 1 У f З П · 
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Thon, by lemma VII.5.2, for all ус S , 
CjEtx^y) -ρ(Ν-1) 1 >ν1(ΓΑ)-(ρ(Ν)1-ρ(Ν-1)1) >ν1(Γ )- . 
So χ* 0^(Γ
Α
) . Π 1 φ 
ο 
Case 2. If ν(Γ
Λ
) / P C ) , say, ν (Γ ) = ρ( ) , then N = 2 and ||ν(Γ )-ρ(Ν) ||œ < ε. 
Furthermore, one can show, as in the proof of theorem 4.1, that if the 
underlying bimatnx game has size mxn, then 
0 1 ( Γ (Ν) d' C 0 l í r y ' f o r а П у d < D Í P ( N ) ) ' a n d з П с 0 2 ( І ф ) · 
In the following example we show that, in general, it is not 
possible to use the method of Newton-Raphson for finding a zero of the 
multifunction ri. 
EXAMPLE 4.2. Let 1'= (A,B) be the bimatnx game introduced in example 3.5 
and let φ be the Nash arbitration function. If one starts with 
p(l) = (lh,2h) , 
(3,0) even 
then p(n) = ^ if η> 1 is , where p(n) is determined with 
Lpd) odd 
the help of the Newton-Raphson method for solving equations. 
Finally, we give two examples in which we consider, successively, 
the situation where Φ represents the arbitration function of Kalai and 
Rosenthal and where ± represents the arbitration function of Nash. 
KR 
EXAMPLE 4.3. Let Γ= (А,В) be an mxn-bimatrix game and let ф = ф . Note 
that и(Г) = (nax{a }, max{b }) is the utopia point of Г. Now let, for 
i] 13 
each p< Р(Г) , ^  с [0,π/2] be the angle t^t tne line through ρ and u(r) 
makes with the horizontal axis through il(T) . Then the mapping ρ ι+ θ 
(ρ г Ρ(Γ)) is a one-to-one correspondence between Р(Г) and [Ο,-η/2]. 
о 
Furthermore, if ρ •= Ρ(Γ) and 0 < (0,r/2) corresponds to p, then 
D(p) = {a. (-cos Э,-зіп θ) } , where a Q := (sin 0 + cos θ) . Therefore, we 
U ö 
о 
denote the dummy zero-sum game corresponding to ρ Ρ(Γ) with Γ„. Using 
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the fact that tan 0 = Ι к (Γ) -p J/[u (r) -pj], we obtain that 
I
 л
 = a„LA sin 0 - В cos 0 - J max{a } sin 9+J max{b } cos 01, 0 0 mxn i] irxn i] 
for θ с (0,π/2). Hence, 
α„ m (0) = va] A sin О-В cos θ] - max{a } sin θ + max{b } cos θ . 
0 i] i] 
As we know, the arbitration value can be found by solving the equation 
ІЛ( ) =0, 9' (0,π/2), or, equivalently, since cos 4 ji 0 , by solving 
m(6) := (n cos OJ^mte) = О, Э г (0,ττ/2) . 
One can prove t'idt m is a differentiable monotonically decreasing 
function of 0. This simplifies the computational procedure. 
N 
EXAMPLE 4.4. Let "= (A,3) be an mxn-bimatrix game and let φ=φ . Iet, 
о 
for each pc Ρ (Г) , 
0 (ρ) :={θι_ (0,тг/2) ; there exists a line througn ρ and supporting 
to Κ(Γ) which makes the angle θ with the 
horizontal axis}. 
Then D(p) = {aQ (-cos 0,-sin 0) ; θ с 0(ρ) } , where α. := (sin 9 + cos 9) 
ö и 
о 
Writing "" for the dummy zero-sum game corresponding to pi PC) and p, 0 
a (-cos θ , -sin 0) с D(p), we have to solve val(Г ) =0, 0 t С(ρ), or, 
Ь ρ,Ό 
equivalently, 
vali A sin 0 - В cos 0 1 - p. sin θ + p. cos θ = О, θ с 0 (ρ) , 
in order to find the arbitration value ν(Γ,) (cf. Owen [1971J). 
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CHAPTER IX 
PERTURBATION THEORY FOR ARBITRATION GAMES 
51. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we study, for arbitration games, the dependence of 
value and f-optimal strategies on the payoff functions of the underlying 
дятле and the bargaining solution. 
The m i n result is that the value for player if {1,2} is an upper 
seni continuous function if the underlying solution is upper semicon-
tinuous. Further, four conditions on a game are given, each of them 
guaranteeing that, for each upper semicontinuous solution, the arbitra­
tion value is continuous in that game. Also it appears that an (almost) 
optimal strategy in a disturbed game is almost optimal in the original 
game, if the norturbation is small. 
In section 3 it is shown that the arbitration value is continuous 
in a biiraLrix game, for all upper semicontinuous regular solutions, if 
and only if that game satisfies the four conditions meant above. This 
implies that for a given upper semicontinuous regular solution, the 
value is continuous on an oDen and dense subset of the class of all 
bimatnx cames of a fixed size. 
In section 4, we prove that the arbitration value depends in a 
Laoschifζ continuous manner on the arbitration function. Finally, 
necessary and sufficient conditions are given, guaranteeing that the 
arbitration value of a came does not depend on the arbitration function. 
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The results in this chapter have been oßtained jointly with Tijs 
and are, esbertially, tlobe of Tijs and Лапы_п [19B0a]. 
§2. PERTURBATIONS OF THE PAYOFF FUNCTIONS 
In this section, X and Y are fixed non-empty sees. Let G be tue set, 
consisting of two-регьоп games in normal form <X,Y,K ,Κ«'*, wheie K. and 
2 
K- are bounded payoff functions. Let K= (K. ,K.) : Χ χ Y 'TR . Lee d: G χ G >- Ж 
be the metric on G, defined by 
ά(Γ,Γ·)= sup ||κ(χ,γ)-Κ' (x,y) !!„, 
(x,y) χχγ 
for all Γ = <X,Y,K ,K2>, Γ' =<X,Y,K',K'> ( G. 
2 
Let φ: 8 •+ IR be an upper semicontinuous bargaining solution. Tuen VG{$) 
denotes the set of games Γ ( G, such that the arbitration game Г роььезьез 
a value. In this section, we are mainly inuerested in the continuity 
2 
properties of the map Г ч- ν(Γ ) from 1<'6(ф) into Ж . We need a 
1 2 
LEMMA 2.1. Let Г= <X /Y /K 1,K >, Г' =<X,Y,K!,K'>, Γ ,Γ ,... be еІг^С: „s 
of G, Then 
(1) dH(R(r) ,R(r·)) £d(r,r·) . 
(2) Ij" Iim d(rn,r) = 0 , then limsup W(rn) сСіЦг). 
n-*-°° η reo 
(2) !ƒ lim d(rn,r) = 0 , then liminf P( n) = Ρ(Γ) . 
η-Ню 11-^ =° 
PROOF. Take rrcl(R (Γ)). For each <5 > 0, there is an (x,y) ( X x Y, sucn 
that ||к(х,у)-г | ^ < 6. Tnen 
IlK-tx.yJ-rli^s ||к-(х,у)-к(х,у) 11^+ ||K(x,y)-r||œ< Цк'-кЦ^-*-δ. 
Hence, r c B a T l | K , _ K | l œ ( ^ ( Γ • ) ) с B 6 + | | к , _ к | и ( c l (R ^ Г ' ) ) ), f o r each δ > 0 , 
which i m p l i e s t n a t c K R ^ D ) C B | | K , _ K | | ( c l (R 1 (Γ ' ) ) ) . 
S i m i l a r l y , i t f o l l o w s t h a t c K R - t F ' ) ) < Bi. , ^ ц ( c K R . t D ) ) . 
So d í c K R , (Γ) ) »CHR. ( Γ 1 ) ) ) S Ц к ' - к Ц = d ( Γ , ; , ) . S i n c e , су lemma V I . 2 . 4 , 
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0 г 
1 1. 
Λ
η = 
and В = 
0 
'1 1 
0 0 
1 
1+n-l 
β(Γ) = conv(cl(R (Γ) )) and R ( Γ • ) = conv(cl (R (^  · ) ) ) , it follows from 
lemma VI.2.3 that (1) holds. 
To prove (2) and (J), we note that lin сЦГ ,Γ) =0 iirplies, in view of 
nx» 
(1), that lun d (R (."") ,R ( ") ) =0. Then, by the lemiras VI.2.1 and VI.2.2, 
tne assertions (2) and (3) are true. 1 
First, we give an answer to the question, whether there exist bar­
gaining solutions such that the corresponding value function is continuous. 
2 
PROPOSITION 2.2. There exist no solution * : В • ж , such that 
I ·->- ν(Γ ) (Ft 1/С(ф)) is i-o/'linuoas. 
Φ 
PROOF. Let Γ be the bin.atnx ga-ne (A,B) with A = 
For η с U. let Γ be the bimatrix game (A ,B) witn  
2 
Then, for all φ : В >• K , we have ν(Γ ) = (1,1), because Р(Г) ={(1,1)}; 
and (Г ) = (1+n ,0), for all nt U (the second pure strategy of player 
1 is optinal m г") . Now l m d(,n,r) =0 and lim ν(Γη) ^ ν(Γ ). Hence, 
ν η
-
*
0 0
 η **> y 
the value function ν is not continuous. Γ 
One of the main results in this cnapter is obtained in the following 
theorem, namely, that the value functions v. and v- are at least upper 
scmicontinuous. 
2 
THhOREM 2.3. Let X,Y be non-empty sets and let φ : 8 >- ж be an upper 
seniaontinuous bargaining solution. Then 
(1) The map Г ·+ ν (Γ ) (TL 1/6(φ)) is upper smioontinuous for ι с {1,2}. 
(2) Let VGW* = {Γι 1/6(φ) ; ν (Г.) И ρ (Г)} ,1/0(9) = {Г e 1'С(ф) ; ν (Г.) ^  ¿(Г)}. 
Φ - * Φ 
Then 1/6(ф)* and 1/С(ф) are open subsets of 1/С(ф). 
(3) ν : 1/6(ф) >• Η and v 2: ΙΌίφ) • ж are oontinuous functions. 
(4) ν is continuous in \, if ν(Γ,) / {ρ (I ) ,ρ(Γ) }. 
Φ 
(5) Let Γ,Γ ,Γ ,... be a sequence in 1/6(φ), such that lim α(Γ ,Γ) =0. 
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Then ν(Γ,) =_/
r
(lim (г")) . 
Φ
 Γ
 η^ο * 
PROOF, (a) First we prove that v„ іч lower semicontinuous in a point 
1 с fGdM . Take e > 0 such that v., (I ) -ε > p. (I ) . Let 
ζ φ _¿ 
A = {r e R( Г) , ç_ (r) ävptr )-e}. Then A is a non-empty compact subset of 
2 
Ж , because φ is continuous on R( ). This implies that 
D={(a,S) B; ai A, S = R (I ) } is a compact subset of B. Let f : 8 ->• Ж be 
the function, defined by f(a,S) =p.(S)-φ (a,S). Then f is lower semi-
continuous and the restriction of f to the compact set D is a positive 
function. This implies that we can find a 6 > 0 such that the restriction 
of f to D = { (b,T) L В; Ь с Β. (Λ) , T( Н,(К(Г) ) } is positive. Here 
о 0 
В (A) = tx ( К ; inf Цх-аЦ^ ¿} and И (A) =• {Β ί K; d (B,A) < 5}. Now, D 
is a compact subset of Б (cf. Hildenbrand Г1974], p. 17) and φ.: D ->· Ж 
is continuous by theorem VI.4.14, because φ. (b,T) <ρ (T), for all (b,T) ( D . 
Hence Φ2. D •* Ж is a uniformly continuous function. So we can take a 
δ t (0,61, such that for all (a,S),(b,T) t D we have 
|ф (а,5)-ф2(Ь,Т) | < t if d((a,S) ,(b,T)) < δ . (2.1) 
Now, take a yt Y such tnat 
Ф2К(х,у) >ν2(Γ )-ε, for all Xf X. (2.2) 
_ 2 ~ ~ ~ 
Then {K(x,y) e Ж , χ с χ} с д. Let Г = <X,Y,K ,К2> be a game in ΙΌίφ) with 
d(r,r) < δ j . Then the inequalities || K(x,y)-K(x,y) Ц^ < δ < δ, for all χ t Χ, 
and d„(R(r),R(r)) <δ, <δ imply, that (K(x,y),Κ(Γ)) f D*. In view of 
£1 1 
(2.1), we obtain 
|ф (K(x,y) )-ф2(К(х,у)) I < ' , for all Xf X. (2.3) 
Hence, by (2.3) and (2.2), ф2К(х,у) >Ф2К(х,у)-ε >v2(",)-2ε. 
So, v0(~.)=sup in: ф_К(х,у) > inf ф_К(х,у) >ν_(Γ,)-2ε. ¿
 Φ yf-Y xcX ¿ xcX ¿ ¿ * 
We have proved that, for all games Гг VGity) with d(r,r ) <δ , we have 
ν,,(Γ,) >ντ(Γ^)-2ε. Hence, v_ is lower semicontinuous in Γ. 
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(b) I f Γ VG($) and ν ( Γ ) = р ( Г ) , t t ien ν i s u p p e r s e i n i c o n t i n u o u s i n Γ, 
φ ¿ 
bccaubo ,for all I ( l/G(<ji), wo have 
ν2(Γ ) <р 2(П 5р2(Г) +d(r,T) =ν2(Γ(4ι)+α(",Γ) . 
In view of part (a) of this proof, v, іь continuous for all games Γ 
with Г.) =p(I ) . 
(c) Similarly, as ir (a) and (b), we can orove tnat v. is lower semi-
contmuous in points Г; VG{$) and continuous in points T' with 
ν ( Γ ) = р ( Г ) . 
— 1 2 
(d) Now, l e t Г be a game w i t h (Г ) / { p l D , р ( Г ) } . L e t Γ , Γ , . . . be a 
s e q u e n c e i n 1/С(ф), c o n v e r g i n g t o Г. Suppose t h a t < v ( r , ) ; к с 1^ > i s a 
Φ 
suDbequence of <ν(Γ ) ; nt П>, converging to t с TR . Then 
Φ 
v(I ) <1іт (Г
і
 )=t, in view of (a) and (c) . 
Φ к roo Φ 
Furtnermore, t( W(r), by lemma VI.2.1 and ν(Γ.) ( Р(Г). Then, however, 
Φ 
ν(Γ,) = t = lim (Г" ) . This implies that lin v(r") =ν(Г.) . So we have 
Φ к «ο Φ η*«· Φ Φ 
proved that ν is continuous in Г. 
1 2 (e) Suppose that ν(Γ ) =р(Г) ard let Γ , Γ , . . . be a sequence in 1/6(0), 
Φ 
converging to Γ, and suopose that lim ν(Γ ) =t. Then tt_W(r), by lemma 
n'·«' Φ 
VI.2.1, and t = ν2(Γ ) =p (Γ) by (b) of this proof. Hence, t <p (Γ). 
Tins implies that v. is upper semicontinuous in Γ. Similarly, it fol­
lows that v
n
 is upper semicontinuous in points with ν(Γ.) =р(Г) . 
ζ φ _ 
(f) Combining the foregoing rebults implies that we have proved (1), 
(3) and (4). Tnat also (2) holds, follows from the fact that 
W ? ^ ) * = {Γ- Ι/6(φ) , v. (Ι ) - Ό . (Γ) < 0}, 
1 φ 1 
І/6(ф) = {ГЕ І/6(ф) ; -(Г.)-і_(Г) < 0} 
ж ¿ ф ζ 
and that Γ >-»· ν. (",)-ρ, (Γ) and Γ |-»· ν_(Γ,)-ρ_(Γ) are upoer semicontinuous 
1 ф _ 1 Ζ ψ ζ 
functions. 
(g) Now we prove (5). If ν(Γ
Α
) / {р(Г) ,р(Г) }, then by (4) 
Φ 
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vtrj =lim ν(Γ,) = /„(lim ν ( Γ , ) ) , for a sequence Γ , Γ , . . . in 1/6(6) con-
Φ ηχ» Φ
 Γ
 η-+» * 
verging to Γ. If ν(Γ , ) = ρ (Γ) , then by (3), lim v., (г") = v. (Γ ) = ρ (Γ) . 
Φ η ^
 2
 Φ
 2
 Φ
 2 
Hence, lim ν (Γ") с W C ) and ν (Γ ) = ρ (Γ) = <„ (lim ν(Γ") ) . 
п^» * Φ
 Γ
 η-+°° Φ 
Similarly, ν(Γ,) =J^(lim (ГП)), if ν(Г.) =ρ(Γ). D 
Φ Γ η-».» Φ Φ 
In the next theorem, four conditions on a game Γ are given, each of 
them guaranteeing that, for each upper semicontinuous bargaining solution 
φ for which the value ν(Γ ) exists, the corresponding value function on 
у 
1/6(ф) is continuous in the point Γ. In section 3, we prove that, for a 
certain subclass of games, these conditions are also exhaustive. 
THEOREM 2.4. Let Γ = <χ,γ,κ. r^-2> ^ 6 a two~pevson game and let 
2 {¡AT) := sup inf K. (x,y) , i.C) := sup inf К (x,y) . Let φ : 8 ->• Ж Ъе an 
1
 XcX yíY l ¿ yrY x<-X ¿ 
upper semicontinuous bargaining solution and suppose that Ге Ι/6(φ) . Then 
2 
ν: ІАЗ(ф) ->• ж is continuous in Tj г/ one of the following conditions 
holds. 
v.l PC) =W(n , 
V.2 -i^D >p1lT) , ¿2C) >Р 2(Г) , 
V.3 ¿^Г) ïPjtD, WC) = {р(Г)}, 
V.4 42(Г) > р 2 С ) , W(r) ={¿(r)}. 
1 1 1 2 2 2 
PROOF. Let Г =<X,Y,K ,Κ >, Γ = <Χ,Υ,Κ ,Κ >, . .. be a sequence in 1/6(φ), 
1 2 
converging to Г. Then the sequence v C , ) ,ν(Γ ) , . .. is bounded. To prove 
the theorem, it is sufficient to show that each convergent subsequence 
of this sequence, converges to ν(Γ,), if one of the four conditions 
holds. Let (Г ),vC, ),... be such a subsequence, with limit t. 
Φ Φ 
By lemma VI. 2 .1, t с Ш(Г) and by theorem 2.3, v(I ) = } _ dim v(r" ) ) . 
Φ - k-x» Φ 
We are finished, if we can show that t c P O , if Γ satisfies one of the 
four conditions. 
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(a) I f (V. l ) h o l d s , t h e n t t (Ι/(Γ) = P(I ) . 
(b) Suppose t h a t 1 (") > p (Г) . S i n c e , f o r each η U , 
v . (Γ") = sup i n f φ ( K n ( x , y ) ) > s u p i n f к " ( х , у ) = i , ( Г П ) , 
1
 'f x X у. Υ 1 X f X y Y 1 1 
we havo 
l im ν . ( Г ^ ( к ) ) > l i m i , ( 1 П ( к ) ) =i. (Г) >р ( 2 . 4 ) 
к + „ 1 Φ к->"
 1 1 
S i m i l a r l y , i t f o l l o w s t h a t 
l i m , ( г " ( к ) ) > р , ( І ) , i f 4 . ( 1 ) ^ р . С ) (2 .5) 
к-н»
 ¿
 Φ -
z
 ¿
 -
¿ 
(c) If (V.2) holds, then (2.4) and (2.5) imply that (tj,t2) = (ρ (Γ),ρ (Г)). 
Hence, t t P(l ) . 
(d) If (V.3) holds, then (2.4) implies that tf Р(Г) иW(I) = Р(Г). 
(e) If (V.4) holds, then (2.5) implies that t L Р(Г) ι (і/(Г) = Р(Г) . 
This completes the proof. [] 
Note that the games "", satisfying (V.l), form a dense subset of 6(ф) 
Tne following theorem states that an (almost) optimal strategy in a 
disturbed game is almost optinal in the original game, if the perturba­
tion is small. 
2 
THEortEM 2.5. Lee φ: 8 -* ж Ъе an upper semronttnuoue soluvion. Let 
Г ( ΙΌ(φ) and let ε > 0, ε' > 0. і&п títere exists a δ > 0 suah that, fov ι e · 1,2 , 
0 ε (Γ') -o'r + í'' (Γ J , fov all Γ' t 1/6 (Φ) uìith α(Γ,Γ·) < δ. 
1 φ ι φ J 
PROOF. We only prove the assertion for i = 2. If ε ä v. (I ) -pn (Γ) , then 
2 φ 2 
θξ(Γ·) cY = o? + E' (IJ, for all Γ' e \!G (Φ), 
ζ φ 2 φ 
and then the theorem holds. Suppose from now on that e € ΓΟ,ν.(ΓJ-ρ (Γ)), 
2 γ _2 
which implies that 
ν(Γ ) Ир(Г) . (2.6) 
Let us assume, for a moment, that the assertion in the theorem is not 
satisfied for Г. This implies that there is an г.с Г0, р(І )-р_(Г)) and 
an ε. > 0, such that, for each η с И, there is a game 
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Ч.п, 
Г
П
 = < Χ , Υ , κ " , κ " > с l/G(<f>) w i t h (¿("" ,Γ) < - , which o o s s e s s e s а у "
 t О. (Г 
1 Ζ η Ζ 
η
 Γ
η
+ ε
ι 
with у / О . 0 1 ( Г
І
) . Then wc have 
2 φ 
lim d
u
(Rrn),R(r)) =0, (2.7) 
and, for each η с U, there іч an χ (X with 
Ф2К(х
П
,у
П) <
 2(Г )-ε0-ε1 and (2.8) 
Ф 2К
П(х П,у П) -· v2(r")-e0. (2.9) 
Take a subsequence n(l),n(2),... of 1,2,... such tnat the sequences 
^ n(k) , n(k) n(k)
v
 Лі(к), n(k) n(k). , 
<K (x ,y );k с H > and <ф К (x ,y ) ;k( И > converge. 
Let z = lim К П ( к ) (х П ( к ) ,у П ( к )) . By (2.7) , ζ e Κ(Γ) . In view of (2.6) and 
k-K» 
theorem 2.3 (3), v. is continuous in I. The upper semicontinuity of ф_, 
the continuity of v_ in Г and (2.7) and (2.9) imply that 
<t>0(z) > lim Φ_Κ (χ ,y ) > liminf voir, )-ε. = v-d , )-εΛ. (2.10) 2
 k^ a j 2 k^o ^ φ 0 2 φ 0 
It follows from (2.10) that φ (ζ) >v2(Γ )-ε >ρ (Γ). Hence, φ is con­
tinuous in (ZjRtD), by tneorem VI.4.14. This implies, in view of (2.Θ) 
and the fact that lim K(x ,y ) =z, that 
k м» 
φ-(ζ) = lim ф„К(х П ( к ),у П ( к )) <ν,(Γ
Α
)-ε -ε.. (2.11) 
•2 k x o ¿ ¿ γ U 1 
Since (2.10) and (2.11) contradict each other, we have completed the 
proof. n 
§3. CONTINUOUS ARBITRATION GAMES AND MIXED EXTENSIONS 
In this section, X and Y are fixed compact convex subsets of some 
topological vector spaces. 
We consider arbitration games Г , where φ is an upper semicontinuous 
bargaining solution and where the underlying two-person game Γ is an 
element of the class CC(X,Y) of all convex continuous games. Here we 
call a game Γ=<X,Y,K1,K2> a convex continvous game if 
(i) X and Y are compact convex sets in topological vector spaces, 
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di) К and К are continuous, 
(111) К is concave in the i-th coordinate and convex in the (3-i)-th 
ι 
coordinate, for i' {1,2}. 
Note tnat MC(X,Y) =CC(P ,P ), where MC(X,Y) denotes the class of mixed 
extensions of elements of C(X,Y) introduced in example 1.1.4. 
By theorem VII.6.4, such an arbitration game Г is strictly determined 
and О (Г\) фф, for if {1,2}. 
ι Φ 
We collect the important perturbation results for the class CC(X,Y) 
in the following tneorem. 
2 
THEOREM 3.1. '<et ф: В •+ IR Ъе an upper semtaontinuous regular bargaining 
solution. Then 
(1) CC(x,Y) c|/G(<t>); o.tr ) and О (Г ) are non-enpty compaat sets for 
each Г e CC(χ,Y), 
(2) Vj : CC(x,Y) -*• жів, for each ι с {1,2}, an vpper semicontinuous 
function, 
(3) o.. CC(x,Y)^x and o,: CC(x,Y) -»• Y are upper semiaonUnuous mult/L-
funations. 
PROOF, (a) We only need to show that О (Г.) is compact, for it {1,2}. 
ι φ 
The continuity of the map φ К implies that О (Г ) is closed. 
(b) The second assertion in the theorem follows from theorem 2.3. 
(c) Take a sequence Γ,Γ ,Γ ,... m CC (X,Y) with lim ά(Γη,Γ) =0 and let 
n-Хю 
χ,χ ,χ ,... be a sequence in X with χ e О.(Г ), for each η f U, and 
1 φ 
lim χ = χ. Let δ > 0. It follows from theorem 2.5, with 0 and δ in the 
n-X"> 
role of ε and ε', that х ' Ч о Л Г ), for all η sufficiently large. Then 
л л 
however χ с О, (Г, ), since O.fT",) is closed. Since δ was arbitrarily 1 φ 1 φ 
chosen,χ e П О, (Г\)=0, (Г ). This implies that O,: CC(X,Y) •*• X is an 
δ>0 1 Ф 1 Ф 1 
upper semicontinuous multifunction. The second assertion in (3) can be 
proved analogously. D 
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2 
COROLLARY 3.2. Let φ: В -*- Ж be an upper semi continuous regular bargai­
ning solution. Then 
(1) ν : Mf(x,Y) •+ ж is an upper semioontinuous function, for ι L {1,2}. 
(2) o.: t!C(x,Y) ·> χ and Ο-: /ΙΟίχ,Υ) •* γ are upper semioontinuous multi-
funettoas. 
Now we consider bimatnx games. For m,n W , 
let A be the family of bargaining solutions i, for which the arbi-
2 
tration value ν(Γ,) exists for each Г с И . Note that, in view of 
φ mxn 
theorem VII.6.2, each upper semicontinuous regular bargaining solution 
2 is an element of A . Let С be the subset of И , consisting of 
mxn mxn mxn 
* 2 
those elements Г с И for which the map Γ ** ν(Г,) is continuous, for 
mxn
 r
 φ 
all φ с A 
mxn 
2 
THEOREM 3.3. Let Г с и . The following assertions are equivalent. 
( 1 ) Г е C
m
x n ' 
mxn 
(2) Г satisfies one of the four aonditions in theorem 2.4. 
PROOF. Tnat (2) implies (1) follows immediately from theorem 2.4. 
Suppose that the mxn-bimatnx game Г ' = (А,В) does not satisfy (V.l)-
(V.4) . Then Г' satisfies one of the following two conditions: 
H.l 4 (Г') ^ ( П ) and (¡¡(Г') JÉ {р(Г')}, 
Η. 2 42(Γ·) ^ ( Γ
1 ) and Wir1) φ {ρ(Γ·)}. 
Suppose that (H.l) holds. We prove that Г >-»· ν(Γ -) is not continuous in 
2 Ψ 
Γ', where ψ is the upper semicontinuous regular arbitration function, 
introduced in example VI.3.8. Let Wir') =[с,р(Г,)1. Then there is an 
r f U and an s ( U , such that с = (a ,b ) . For each к t TJ, let 
m η rs rs 
I' = (A,B(k) ) , where 
fb i f i ^ r o r ^ / s 
b i D
( k )
 ••={ 1D -1 b +k ifi = r,i = s. 
^ rs
 J 
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Thon lim d(rk,r,)=0 and lin ò. ("k) = i, (Γ') . Then, however, 
к χ» к >·•» 
lim v. (:к_) =nax {с, ,ύ . (ι • ) } ¿ ν. (Γ · ) = p. (Γ1) . 
Hence, Γ' /C . Similarly, if Γ' satisfies (H.2), then also I" /C . Γ 
mxn mxn 
In the following, let Ό denote the class of all mxn-bimatrix 
mxn 
games for which 
(1) all entries a in the payoff matrix A of player 1 are different, 
(2) all entries b in the payoff matrix В of player 2 are different. 
2 
ТНЕОЯЕМ 3.4. (1) V ir an open and dense subset of И , 
mxn ' ·' mxn 
(2) The value function I » ν(Γ.) is continuous on Ό , 
* Φ mxn 
for all φ e A 
mxn 
PROOF. (1) is obvious and (2) follows from theorem 2.4, because 
Ρ(Γ) =(1/(Γ) , for each Γ t Ό . Π 
mxn 
In the following example, we show that the multifunction 
О« : MC(X,Y) •* Y is not necessarily lower semicontmuous. 
EXAMPLE 3.5. Let "= (A,B), whore A = [-3 0] and B=[0 01 and, for each 
η f K, let Г П= (A,B(n) ) , whore B(n) = ~r~ 0]. Then lim а(ГП,Г) =0. For 
each bargaining solution ф, О-(I ) =S and 0_(Г") = {e, , for each n< 1С. 
¿ ψ ζ φ 1 
So liminf 0„(Γη) ?<0.(-.) . 
пн»
 2
 Φ
 2
 * 
§4. PERTURBATION OF THE ARBITRATION FUNCTION 
In this section, we consider a fixed game in normal form 
I = <X,Y,K1 ,K > v. CC(X,Y) and vary the arbitration function. We are 
interested in the dependence of value and (ε-)optimal strategies on the 
arbitration function. Let Φ be the set of all regular arbitration func­
tions φ. R(r) -> Ρ(Γ) . We provide Φ with a metric ο· Φ x Φ ->• И, defined 
by ρ (φ,ι ) = sup 'Ι ψ (r) -ψ (r) I' , for all φ,ψ e Φ. 
rcR(r) 
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Dy theorem VII.6.4, for each φt Φ, the value ν(Γ ) exists. The following 
continuity result holds. 
THEOREM 4.1. Let f >0. Then: 
(1) φ •+ν (Г ) гз., for ι •- {1,2}, a Lipschitz continuous function on Φ 
ι φ 
with Lipschitz constant 1. 
(2) If ρ(φ,ψ) <<$, then cf (Г ) с 0^ + 2 δ(Γ
φ
)
:
, /or ic {1,2}. 
PROOF. Obviously, 
|v, (Г J-v, (Γ,) I = 1 sup inf φ K(x,y) - sup inf ψ.Κίχ,γ) | < ρ (φ ,ψ) . 
1
 Φ
 1
 V xtX yfY ! xrX ytY i 
y o 
Hence (1) holds. To prove (2), let xcO.ÍF,) and suppose that Γ(φ,ψ) ¿δ. 
It follows from the inequalities 
φ.Κίχ,γ) > ^ ,K(x,y) -ύ , for each y( Y, 
ψ.Κίχ,γ) > v.(Γ )-ε, for each у с Y, and 
ν 1(Γ ψ)>ν 1(Γ φ)-ρ(φ,ψ)>ν 1(Γ φ)-δ, 
that ф,К(х,у) >ν,(Γ,)-ε-26, for each у с Y. Hence χ с 0 ^ + (ΓΙ. Thus 1 1 φ 1 φ 
О. (Γ,) со, (Γ,) . Similarly, one can prove the other inclusion in (2) . С 
1 ψ 1 φ 
In the following theorem, we give necessary and sufficient conditions, 
guaranteeing that the value of an arbitration game does not depend on 
the arbitration function. 
THEOREM 4.2. Let Γ t CC(x,Y) with ріГ) И р ( Π . Let ζ ( Ρ (Γ) . Then 
(1) ν(Γ ) =р(Г), for all φ f Φ,, if f there exists a yt Y, such that 
к2(х,у) =ρ2(Γ)., for all xc x. 
(2) v C ) =р(Г), for all φ i Φ, iff there exists an χ с Xj su;??! tfozi 
KjCx.y) = Р 1 ( Г ) , .Лзг а И ye Y. 
(3) ν(Γ,) = ζ, for all φ e ij iff there exist χ e χ and у с Υ such that 
к(х,у) = z and such that κ. (χ,у) г z.j /or aJZ ус Y ami к_(х,у) >z ^ 
/or all χ e X. 
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PROOr. (a) Suppose that ν(Γ,) =ρ(Γ) , for all φ с Φ. Take у г О,, (Г , ) . 
Then ρ2(Γ) <ψ K(x,y) =K 2(x #y), for all xt X. 
Conversely, suppose there is а у ' Y, such that K-(x,y) =р 9(Г). Then, 
for each φ t Φ, p_ ( ) ϊν_(Γ
Α
) > irf φ K(x,y) =p 5("), whicn implies that 
y
 χ 
ν(Γ,) =ρ(Γ) . So (1) is proved. Assertion (2) can be proved in a similar 
9 
way. 
(b) Suppose ν(Γ ) = ζ, for all φ e Φ. Take χ f ο. (Γ
 2) and у с О,(Γ . ) . 
ψ ψ 
Thon (χ,y) has the properties, mentioned in (3). 
Conversely, suppose that (x,y) с Χ χ Y satisfies the properties mentioned 
in (3) . Then, for all φ r Φ and χ r X, у с Y, we nave 
φ Κ(χ,y) = Kj(χ,y) < Kjtx.y) i ijKtx.y) and 
Ф2К(х,у) =K2(x,y) <K2(x,y) <ф 2К(х,С). 
Then, however, ν.(Г ) >inf φ K(x,y) =К.(χ,у) =ζ. and 
* У 
νΛΥΛ > inf φ.Κ(χ,ν) = Κ^ίχ,ν) = ζ„. Hence ν(Γ
χ
) > ζ. Since ζ с Ρ(Γ) and 
ζ φ ζ -^ ζ φ 
χ 
ν(".) (ΐΡ(Γ), we have ζ-ν(Γ.). This completes the proof. Π 
Φ Φ 
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SAMENVATTING 
In dit proefschrift worden evenwicitspunten van zowel bimatnxspe-
len als bemiddelmgsspelen bestudeerd. 
In het eerste hoofdstuk is het materiaal verzameld dat nodig is 
voor de daaropvolgende hoofdstukken. 
We bewijzen in hoofdstuk II dat de evenwichtspuntverzaiieling van 
een bimatrixspel een eindige vereniging is van convexe polytopen waar­
van de extreme punten geassocieerd kunnen worden met zekere vierkante 
deelmatnces van de uitbetalingsmatrices. Bovendien worden dimensie-
relaties afgeleid voor de betreffende polytopen. 
In hoofdstuk III worden reguliere evenwichtspunten van bimatrixspe-
len ingevoerd en bestudeerd. Een bimatrixspel met een convexe evenwichts­
puntverzameling of met eindig veel evenwichtspunten bezit zo'η regulier 
evenwichtspunt. Verder wordt het begrip regulanteit gebruikt om eigen­
schappen af te leiden van zogenaamde stabiele evenwichtspunten. Het 
blijkt ondermeer dat een stabiel bimatnxspel een oneven aantal even­
wichtspunten bezit. 
In hoeverre het mogelijk is een gedeelte van de theorie uit hoofd­
stuk II uit te breiden naar de familie van begrensde halfoneindige bi-
matnxspelen, wordt nagegaan in loofdstuk IV. 
In hoofdstuk V worden karakteriserende eigenschappen gegeven voor 
de waardeverzameling en de evenwichtspuntverzameling van bepaalde klas­
sen van tweepersoonsspelen. 
Hoofdstuk VI handelt over onderhandelingsproblemen en mogelijke op-
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lossingen daarvan. We laten zien dat bijna elke oplossing(sfunctie), 
die in de literatuur is verschenen, naar boven semicontinu is. Verder 
worden enkele voorwaarden geformuleerd die garanderen dat een naar boven 
semicontinue oplossing in feite continu is in een zeker onderhandelings-
probleem. 
In hoofdstuk VII wordt bij een beraiddelingsspel een familie van 
dummy nulsomspelen ingevoerd. Deze familie wordt gebruikt om stellingen 
te formuleren over het bestaan van een bemiddelmgswaarde en (ε-) optimale 
dreigstrategieën. 
De theorie uit hoofdstuk VII wordt in hoofdstuk VIII toegespitst op 
bemiddelingsspelen waarbi] het onderliggende spel een bimatrixspel is. 
Het blijkt dat de ruimten van optimale dreigstrategieën van de spelers 
convexe polytopen zijn. Verder wordt er een multifunctie geïntroduceerd 
die nuttig is bij het (numeriek) benaderen van de dreigwaarde en opti-
male dreigstrategieën. 
De invloed van storingen der uitbetalingsfuncties en bemiddelings-
functie op bemiddelmgswaarde en (ε-) optimale dreigstrategieën wordt 
beschreven in het laatste hoofdstuk. 
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STELLINGEN 
I 
Het probleem om voor een reële nxn-matrix Μ (η e W en een q e Ж elemen­
ten te vinden van de verzameling 
0(q,M) := {z € m" ; ζ >0, Mz + q > 0 en <z,Mz +q> = 0}, 
noemt men het Ігпеаг е complementariteitsprobleem (q,M) corresponderend 
met q en M. De elementen van 0(q,M) worden oplossingen genoemd van het 
probleem (q,M). Er geldt dat 0(q,M) de vereniging is van eindig veel 
polyhedrische verzamelingen die maximaal zijn t.o.v. de inclusie-relatie. 
II 
Zij M een reële n*n-inatrix en zij q e IR . We noemen ζ e 0(q,M) een extre­
me oplossing van het lineaire complementariteitsprobleem (q/M) als 
z£ext(P), waarbij Ρ een der polyhedrische verzamelingen is als bedoeld 
in de voorgaande stelling. Voor een oplossing zeO(q,M) zijn equivalent: 
(1) ζ ^ 0 is een extreme oplossing, 
(2) er bestaat een niet-singuliere vierkante deelmatrix К van M zó dat 
z. = 0 als de j-de kolom van M geen rol in К speelt, terwijl 
ζ
κ
 =
 -
К
~Ч' 
waarbij ζ (q ) de vector voorstelt die we krijgen als we uit ζ (q) 
К К 
die coördinaten weglaten die corresponderen met de kolommen (rijen) 
van M die geen rol in К spelen. 
III 
Zij M een reële nxn-matrix en zij q è TR . Zij Ρ ^ {0} een der polyhe-
т о 
drische verzamelingen als bedoeld m stelling 1 en zij ζ een element 
van het relatieve inwendige van P. Er geldt dat 
dim Ρ = |C(ζ)| - rang M , 
waarbil M„ := [m ] „,ο, „,0,, C(z) := {]; ζ > 0} en J
 Ρ i] leE(z) ,]eC(z) J ] 
E(z) := {]; (Hz + q) = θ}. 
IV 
De familie van continue spelen op het eenheidsvierkant waarvoor 
(1) het aantal evenwichtspunten eindig is en 
(2) elk evenwichtspunt uit een paar kansmaten met eindige drager bestaat 
ligt dicht in de klasse van alle continue spelen op het eenheidsvier­
kant. 
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V 
Voorbeeld 3.10 op bladzijde 121 van Γι] ι
Ξ
 onjuist. 
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New York. 
VI 
ZÍJ Ρ = {Ρ
α
; θ ε 0} een familie kansmaten op (X,A) met identificeerbare 
o 
parameter en zij G een multiplicatief geschreven groep van meetbare 
één-éénduidige transformaties g van X op zichzelf. Als 
(1) alle kansmaten uit Ρ invariant zijn onder G, d.w.z. dat voor alle 
θ E 0 
P. (g (A) ) = P. (A) voor elke A e A en elke g с G, en 
(2) G een compacte topologische groep is met Haarmaat и en μ(G) = 1, 
dan is de σ-algebra A := {A e A; g(A) = A voor elke g £ G} voldoende 
voor P. 
Vgl. Witting, H. [1974], Matherratisahe Statistik. Teubner, Stuttgart; 
Voorbeeld 3.14 op bladzijde 137. 
Lehmann, E.L. [19591, Testing statistical hypothesis. John Wiley, 
New York; 
Opgave 19 (il) op bladzijde 253. 
VII 
Zij (A,B) een begrensd mx»-bimatrixspel waarvoor A > 0 en В > 0. Zij 
[.Ί ί]· Dan gelden de volgende uitspraken : 
(1) als (p,q) eEÍAjB), dan (x,x) £E(C,C ), waarbij 
χ = 
1 
рдд 
p(A+B)q 
ρ ι = 1,2,...,m 
pBq1 1 q ι = m+1,m+2,.. . 
,„ „ч t i-m 
. p(A+B)q 
(2) als (x,x) eE(C,C ), dan (p,q) eE(A,B), waarbij 
^ " Л ^ - І ^ 3 = 1,2,... 
Vgl. Griesmer, J.H., A.J. Hoffman en A. Robinson [1963J, On symmetrie 
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Vili 
De uitspraak in stelling 2 in [l] voor bimatrixspelen kan worden uit-
gebreid naar elke klasse van tweepersoonsspelen die voldoet aan de eisen 
zoals gefornuleerd in een der existentiestellingen uit paragraaf 6 van 
hoofdstuk VII van dit proefschrift. 
[Ij Kalai, E. en R.W. Rosenthal [19781, Arbitratton of two-party 
disputes under ignorance. Internat. J. Game Theory 7_, 65-72. 
Vgl. Tijs, S.H. en M.J.M. Jansen [1979], Values for arbitration games. 
Rapport 7930, Mathematisch Instituut, Katholieke Universiteit Nij-
megen. 
IX 
De dummy-spel aanpak beschreven in hoofdstuk VII van dit proefschrift 
blijkt ook nuttig bij de bestudering van coöperatieve spelen waarbij 
zijdelingse betalingen zijn toegestaan. 
Vgl. Tijs, S.H. en M.J.M. Jansen [1981], Arbitration games; a survey. 
Verschijnt in: Operations Research Proceedings 1980. Springer-Ver-
lag, Berlijn. 
X 
Bij het veldvoetbal genieten de doelverdedigers een zekere mate van 
bescherming wanneer zij door een veldspeler worden aangevallen. Bij het 
zaalvoetbal zou men er toe moeten overgaan de veldspelers extra te 
beschermen tegen bepaalde acties van de doelverdediger. 


